In the last decade, rulers in Gulf regimes have aspired to greater strategic autonomy and distance from the West. Coined the "Gulf moment" by local commentators, this regional trend reflects a redistribution of power in the Arab world. This is the first book to examine the military dimensions of these shifts. Gulf military strategy has prioritised the improvement of local armed forces and the diversification of defence partnerships towards countries such as Russia, Turkey or China. However, this book shows how this has led to the militarisation of Gulf societies, the further erosion of multilateral initiatives - including the Gulf Cooperation Council - and the Gulf's perilous involvement in the war in Yemen. The book also highlights enduring reliance on the West. Each chapter covers a key aspect of defence policy from governance of armed forces, military education and power projection capabilities to regional security cooperation and lessons from warfighting experiences. Close attention is paid to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, countries that have enjoyed prominent roles in the region’s security affairs during the last ten years. The research is based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with major decision-makers, officials, and diplomatic and military representatives. It is also uses recently declassified official documents to gain rare insight into what Gulf countries intend for their defence policies.

This book analyses the emergence of the Indian Ocean as security complex and a strategic space of central importance and also looks at its prospective future. As well as US-China rivalry, the India-China rivalry is now the defining factor in the Indian Ocean - irrespective of the strategic asymmetry. This new situation has opened a space for middle-powers, old and new, to intervene. The authors argue that this situation may turn into an additional source of instability and that the creation of an inclusive and comprehensive regional security architecture, as well as the strengthening of regional multilateralism, should be the priority of all stakeholders in the coming decade.

For over 60 years, Israel's foreign policy establishment has looked at its regional policy through the lens of a geopolitical concept named "the periphery doctrine." The idea posited that due to the fundamental hostility of neighboring Arab countries, Israel ought to counterbalance this threat by engaging with the "periphery" of the Arab world through clandestine diplomacy. Based on original research in the Israeli diplomatic archives and interviews with key past and present decision-makers, this book shows that this concept of a periphery was, and remains, a core driver of Israel's foreign policy. The periphery was borne out of the debates among Zionist circles concerning the geopolitics of the nascent Israeli State. The evidence from Israel's contemporary policies shows that these principles survived the historical relationships with some countries (Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia) and were emulated in other cases: Azerbaijan, Greece, South Sudan, and even to a certain extent in the attempted exchanges by Israel with Gulf Arab kingdoms. The book enables readers to understand Israel's pessimistic - or realist, in the traditional sense - philosophy when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy. The history of the periphery doctrine sheds light on fundamental issues, such as Israel's role in the regional security system, its overreliance on military and intelligence cooperation as tools of diplomacy, and finally its enduring perception of inextricable isolation. Through a detailed appraisal of Israel's periphery doctrine from its birth in the fifties until its contemporary renaissance, this book offers a new perspective on Israel's foreign policy, and will appeal to students and scholars of Middle East Politics and History, and International Relations.

In the last decade, rulers in Gulf regimes have aspired to greater strategic autonomy and distance from the West. Coined the "Gulf moment" by local commentators, this regional trend reflects a redistribution of power in the Arab world. This is the first book to examine the military dimensions of these shifts. Gulf military strategy has prioritised the improvement of local armed forces and the diversification of defence partnerships towards countries such as Russia, Turkey or China. However, this book shows how this has led to the militarisation of Gulf societies, the further erosion of multilateral initiatives - including the Gulf Cooperation Council - and the Gulf's perilous involvement in the war in Yemen. The book also highlights enduring reliance on the West. Each chapter covers a key aspect of defence policy from governance of armed forces, military education and power projection capabilities to regional security cooperation and lessons from warfighting experiences. Close attention is paid to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, countries that have enjoyed prominent roles in the region’s security affairs during the last ten years. The research is based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with major decision-makers, officials, and diplomatic and military representatives. It is also uses recently declassified official documents to gain rare insight into what Gulf countries intend for their defence policies.

For over 60 years, Israel's foreign policy establishment has looked at its regional policy through the lens of a geopolitical concept named "the periphery doctrine." The idea posited that due to the fundamental hostility of neighboring Arab countries, Israel ought to counterbalance this threat by engaging with the "periphery" of the Arab world through clandestine diplomacy. Based on original research in the Israeli diplomatic archives and interviews with key past and present decision-makers, this book shows that this concept of a periphery was, and remains, a core driver of Israel's foreign policy. The periphery was borne out of the debates among Zionist circles concerning the geopolitics of the nascent Israeli State. The evidence from Israel's contemporary policies shows that these principles survived the historical relationships with some countries (Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia) and were emulated in other cases: Azerbaijan, Greece, South Sudan, and even to a certain extent in the attempted exchanges by Israel with Gulf Arab kingdoms. The book enables readers to understand Israel's pessimistic - or realist, in the traditional sense - philosophy when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy. The history of the periphery doctrine sheds light on fundamental issues, such as Israel's role in the regional security system, its overreliance on military and intelligence cooperation as tools of diplomacy, and finally its enduring perception of inextricable isolation. Through a detailed appraisal of Israel's periphery doctrine from its birth in the fifties until its contemporary renaissance, this book offers a new perspective on Israel's foreign policy, and will appeal to students and scholars of Middle East Politics and History, and International Relations.

This book analyses the emergence of the Indian Ocean as security complex and a strategic space of central importance and also looks at its prospective future. As well as US-China rivalry, the India-China rivalry is now the defining factor in the Indian Ocean - irrespective of the strategic asymmetry. This new situation has opened a space for middle-powers, old and new, to intervene. The authors argue that this situation may turn into an additional source of instability and that the creation of an inclusive and comprehensive regional security architecture, as well as the strengthening of regional multilateralism, should be the priority of all stakeholders in the coming decade.

Strategic Hedging in the Arab Peninsula: The Politics of the Gulf-Asian Rapprochement offers a new perspective on the geopolitics of Gulf-Asian relations. Jean-Loup Samaan explores the dynamics underpinning the evolution of strategic partnerships between the Gulf States and Asian partners. He looks at how Gulf countries have pursued a diversification strategy in response to the risk of a potential retreat from the region on the part of traditional partners such as the US, and argues that, rather than being the result of a deliberate common policy on the part of the Gulf States, this trend derives from unilateral choices by Gulf leaders, best explained by the concept of 'strategic hedging'.