This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition--with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses.
The book's primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl's writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology.
Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description.
This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition--with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses.
The book's primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl's writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology.
Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description.
This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.

L'idee domine largement encore que, des dernieres annees du XIXe siecle a nos jours, le developpement de la philosophie est parcouru par une opposition a la fois centrale et radicale entre un courant analytique surgi avec Frege et Russell, et un courant phenomenologique initie par Husserl. L'investigation rigoureuse du passe a neanmoins commence de mettre a nu une realite historique bien plus complexe, soulevant par la des interrogations aussi vastes qu'essentielles a la pleine comprehension de notre modernite philosophique. Jusqu'a quel point un schisme analytico-phenomenologique s'est-il effectivement produit au sein de la philosophie? A quel moment au juste et selon quelles modalites precises? Comment ce schisme s'est-il remodele au fil du temps? Quel en est, a travers ses differentes figures, l'objet le plus essentiel? Autant de questions qui, malgre l'interet croissant qu'elles suscitent, demeurent objet de controverse. Rhin et Danube apporte une nouvelle contribution a ce debat, degageant les fondements d'une interpretation originale qu'il confronte de facon prioritaire avec celle proposee par le philosophe Michael Dummett, dont il salue la profondeur souvent meconnue en meme temps qu'il en denonce les erreurs et les insuffisances.