On 28 March 2003, Task Force 2-70 Armor was detached from the 3rd Infantry Division and attached to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) West of Al Kifl, Iraq. The tactical relationship between the Army's Air Assault Division and a heavy Task Force was a success even though the soldiers at the Captain level and below had never worked together nor trained with the other force. The logistical relationship between the two organizations was a logistical failure because the two forces never developed a logistical structure that would have allowed the heavy Task Force to maintain and regenerate its heavy equipment and operate with the light division longer than it did. This problem is not unique, for none of our Army's light forces are prepared to logistically support a heavy Task Force and the training relationship between light and heavy forces is almost nonexistent especially at the Battalion and lower tactical levels. As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom it appears that the U.S. Army can place a heavy Task Force into a Light Infantry organization during combat operations and the resultant combined arms team will be immediately effective. Throughout our Army's history we have fought together as a Heavy-Light force and have recognized that the Heavy-Light force is the correct organization in many wartime tactical situations but we have matriculated back to separate and distinct light and heavy forces in peacetime. Our Heavy and Light forces are marginally prepared to fight as a Heavy-Light Team and are unprepared to support each other logistically for extended periods of time. In many tactical scenarios the best solution is a Heavy-Light team with durable armored vehicles combined with many Infantrymen on the ground. This is particularly true in urban terrain and as the world's population continues to grow more and more terrain is becoming semi-urban and urban. The Army has no ready and standing organization with this structure. The Army is transforming to a mod