Today, approximately half of all American states have lobbying officesin Washington, DC, where governors are also represented by their ownnational, partisan, and regional associations. Jennifer M. Jensen’s TheGovernors’ Lobbyists draws on quantitative data, archival research, andmore than 100 in-depth interviews to detail the political development ofthis constellation of advocacy organizations since the early 20th centuryand investigate the current role of the governors’ lobbyists in the U.S.federal system. First, Jensen analyzes the critical ways in which state offices andgovernors’ associations promote their interests and, thus, complementother political safeguards of federalism. Next, she considers why, giventheir apparent power, governors engage lobbyists to serve as advocatesand why governors have created both individual state offices andseveral associations for this advocacy work. Finally, using interest grouptheory to analyze both material and political costs and benefits, Jensenaddresses the question of interest group variation: why, given the fairlyclear material benefit a state draws from having a lobbying office inWashington, doesn’t every state have one? This assessment of lobbying efforts by state governments and governorsreveals much about role and relative power of states within the U.S.federal system.