This book contains a systematic analysis of allocation rules related to cost and surplus sharing problems. Broadly speaking, it examines various types of rules for allocating a common monetary value (cost) between individual members of a group (or network) when the characteristics of the problem are somehow objectively given. Without being an advanced text it o?ers a comprehensive mathematical analysis of a series of well-known allocation rules. The aim is to provide an overview and synthesis of current kno- edge concerning cost and surplus sharing methods. The text is accompanied by a description of several practical cases and numerous examples designed to make the theoretical results easily comprehensible for both students and practitioners alike. The book is based on a series of lectures given at the University of Copenhagen and Copenhagen Business School for graduate students joining the math/econ program. I am indebted to numerous colleagues, conference participants and s- dents who during the years have shaped my approach and interests through collaboration, commentsandquestionsthatweregreatlyinspiring.Inparti- lar, I would like to thank Hans Keiding, Maurice Koster, Tobias Markeprand, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Herv e Moulin, Bezalel Peleg, Lars Thorlund- Petersen, Jorgen Tind, Mich Tvede and Lars Peter Osterdal."

A comprehensive overview of networks and economic design, presenting models and results drawn from economics, operations research, and computer science; with examples and exercises. This book explores networks and economic design, focusing on the role played by allocation rules (revenue and cost-sharing schemes) in creating and sustaining efficient network solutions. It takes a normative approach, seeking economically efficient network solutions sustained by distributional fairness, and considers how different ways of allocating liability affect incentives for network usage and development. The text presents an up-to-date overview of models and results currently scattered over several strands of literature, drawing on economics, operations research, and computer science. The book's analysis of allocation problems includes such classic models from combinatorial optimization as the minimum cost spanning tree and the traveling salesman problem. It examines the planner's ability to design mechanisms that will implement efficient network structures, both in large decentralized networks and when there is user-agent information asymmetry. Offering systematic theoretical analyses of various compelling allocation rules in cases of fixed network structures as well as discussions of network design problems, the book covers such topics as tree-structured distribution systems, routing games, organizational hierarchies, the "price of anarchy," mechanism design, and efficient implementation. Appropriate as a reference for practitioners in network regulation and the network industry or as a text for graduate students, the book offers numerous illustrative examples and end-of-chapter exercises that highlight the concepts and methods presented.

This book contains a systematic analysis of allocation rules related to cost and surplus sharing problems. Broadly speaking, it examines various types of rules for allocating a common monetary value (cost) between individual members of a group (or network) when the characteristics of the problem are somehow objectively given. Without being an advanced text it o?ers a comprehensive mathematical analysis of a series of well-known allocation rules. The aim is to provide an overview and synthesis of current kno- edge concerning cost and surplus sharing methods. The text is accompanied by a description of several practical cases and numerous examples designed to make the theoretical results easily comprehensible for both students and practitioners alike. The book is based on a series of lectures given at the University of Copenhagen and Copenhagen Business School for graduate students joining the math/econ program. I am indebted to numerous colleagues, conference participants and s- dents who during the years have shaped my approach and interests through collaboration,commentsandquestionsthatweregreatlyinspiring.Inparti- lar, I would like to thank Hans Keiding, Maurice Koster, Tobias Markeprand, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Herv' e Moulin, Bezalel Peleg, Lars Thorlund- Petersen, Jorgen Tind, Mich Tvede and Lars Peter Osterdal.