A number of jurisdictions world-wide have changed or are considering changing their homicide laws. Important changes have now been recommended for England and Wales, and these changes are an important focus in the book, which brings together leading experts from jurisdictions across the globe (England and Wales; France; Germany; Scotland; Australia; The United States of America; Canada; Singapore and Malaysia) to examine key aspects of the law of homicide. Key areas examined include the structure of the law of homicide and the meaning of fault elements. For example, the definition of murder, or its equivalent, is very different in France and Germany from the definition used in England and Wales. French law, like the law in a number of American states, ties the definition of murder to the presence or absence of premeditation, unlike the law in England and Wales. Unlike most other jurisdictions, German law makes the killer's motive, such as a sadistic sexual motive, relevant to whether or not he or she committed the worst kind of homicide. England and Wales is in a minority of English-speaking jurisdictions in that it does not employ the concept of 'wicked' recklessness, or of extreme indifference, as a fault element in homicide. Understanding these often subtle differences between the approaches of different jurisdictions to the definition of homicide is an essential aspect of the law reform process, and of legal study and scholarship in the criminal law. Every jurisdiction tries to learn from the experience of others, and this book seeks to make a contribution to that process, as well as providing a lively and informative resource for scholars and students.

The fourth collection of essays in this long-established series brings together some of the leading contributors to the study of the philosophical foundations of common law . Key issues in

contract, tort, and criminal law are subjected to philosophical scrutiny, the aim being to provide an exciting new basis for advanced teaching and further research.

The Bribery Act 2010 is the most significant reform of UK bribery law in a century. This critical analysis offers an explanation of the Act, makes comparisons with similar legislation in other jurisdictions and provides a critical commentary, from both a UK and a US perspective, on the collapse of the distinction between public and private sector bribery. Drawing on their academic and practical experience, the contributors also analyse the prospects for enforcement and the difficulties facing lawyers seeking asset recovery following the laundering of the proceeds of bribery. International perspectives are provided via comparisons with the law in Spain, Hong Kong, the USA and Italy, together with broader analysis of the application of the law in relation to EU anti-corruption initiatives, international development and the arms trade.

When should someone who may have intentionally or knowingly committed criminal wrongdoing be excused? Excusing Crime examines what excusing conditions are, and why familiar excuses, such as duress, are thought to fulfil those conditions. The 'classical' view of excuses sees them as rational defects (such as mistake) in the motive force behind an action, but contrasts them with 'denials of responsibility', such as insanity, where the rational defect in that motive force is attributable to a mental defect in the agent him- or herself. This classical view of excuses has a long heritage, and is enshrined in different forms in many of the world's criminal codes, both liberal and non-liberal; however, in this book, Jeremy Horder contends that it is now time to move beyond it. Horder develops a 'liberal' account of excuses, arguing that the 'classical' distinction between rational defects and 'denials of responsibility' is too sharp, and also that the classical view of excuses is too narrow. He contends that it can be right to treat claims as excusatory even if they rely on a combination of elements of rational defect in the motive force behind the action, even if that defect is in part attributable to a mental deficiency in the agent him or herself ('diminished capacity'). Further, he argues that there can be a sound case for excuse even when people can give full rational assent to their actions, such as when they could not reasonably have been expected to do more than what they did to avoid committing wrongdoing ('due diligence'), or, more rarely, when their conscience understandably left them with no moral freedom to do other than commit the wrong ('demands-of-conscience').

Little has been written by lawyers about the effect of provocation on culpability for homicide in English law, yet the question of what our moral attitudes should be towards someone who kills or injures another in anger has been a source of lively debate for centuries. The first philosophical inquiry into the moral character of actions in anger, it seeks to resolve the philosophical controversies generated by setting them in the context of an examination of the place of anger in human nature throughout history. A previously unexplored area of research, this work breaks new ground in its use of historical and philosophical sources not normally linked with criminal law, providing a colorful and fascinating history of the plea of provocation as a defense to murder in England.

Described by The New York Times as 'Britain's foremost scholar of criminal law', Professor Glanville Williams was one of the greatest academic lawyers of the twentieth century. To mark the centenary of his birth in 2011, leading criminal law theorists and medical law ethicists from around the world were invited to contribute essays discussing the sanctity of life and criminal law while engaging with Williams' many contributions to these fields. In re-examining his work, the contributors have produced a provocative set of original essays that make a significant contribution to the current debate in these areas.

Ashworth's Principles of Criminal Law, now in its tenth edition, takes a distinctive approach to the subject of criminal law, whilst still covering all of the vital topics found on criminal law courses. Uniquely theoretical, it begins with an exploration of the underlying principles and theoretical foundations of the criminal law, givng the reader the necessary context and tools to critically engage with and analyse the law in the later chapters. This is essential reading for students seeking a sophisticated and critically engaging exploration of the subject. Digital Formats The tenth edition is available for students and institutions to purchase in a variety of formats. The e-book offers a mobile experience and convenient access along with functionality tools, navigation features and links that offer extra learning support: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/ebooks This edition is supported by online resources, including: - Additional chapters on bribery and money laundering, public order offences, and communication offences - Links to useful websites

In this challenging collection of new essays, leading philosophers and criminal lawyers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada break with the tradition of treating the philosophical foundations of criminal law as an adjunct to the study of punishment. Focusing clearly on the central issues of moral luck, mistake, and mental illness, this volume aims to reorient the study of criminal law. In the process of retrieving valuable material from traditional law classifications, the contributors break down false associations, reveal hidden truths, and establish new patterns of thought. Their always illuminating and sometimes startling conclusions makes this essential reading for all those interested in the philosophy of criminal law.

In this challenging collection of new essays, leading philosophers and criminal lawyers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada break with the tradition of treating the philosophical foundations of criminal law as an adjunct to the study of punishment. Focusing clearly on the central issues of moral luck, mistake, and mental illness, this volume aims to reorient the study of criminal law. In the process of retrieving valuable material from traditional law classifications, the contributors break down false associations, reveal hidden truths, and establish new patterns of thought. Their always illuminating and sometimes startling conclusions makes this essential reading for all those interested in the philosophy of criminal law.

Criminal Fraud and Election Disinformation is about the state's approach to fraud and distortion of the truth in politics, especially during election campaigns. Deliberate mischaracterisation of political opponents and their policies has always been a part of politics; however, lying, dishonesty, and distortion of the facts remain morally wrong and have the potential to obstruct important political interests. For example, a false or misleading claim publicised about an election candidate may lead someone to lose an election that they might otherwise have won. So, does-and should-the law seek to provide protection from the risk of this happening, by directly prohibiting the making of false or misleading political claims, or by obliging internet platforms to censor such content? In attempting to answer this question, Jeremy Horder draws a key distinction between what is called 'political viewpoint' fraud and 'electoral participation' fraud. In the interests of protecting freedom of speech, false or misleading claims (disinformation) involving political viewpoint content should be tolerated, not only by the criminal law but also by the internet platforms which host political content. By contrast, in the interests of preserving the integrity of democratic electoral processes, disinformation involving electoral participation information should be prohibited by the criminal law and censored by internet platforms. This book explains how the criminal law in various jurisdictions frequently prohibits false or misleading political claims falling into both categories of disinformation, instead of concentrating on electoral participation fraud. By contract, the right response to political viewpoint disinformation is the provision of more information that challenges people to question their beliefs and prejudices.

What makes murder, murder? How should we understand the difference between intentional and reckless killing? Should offenders be punished differently according to the perceived severity of their crime and when should they be excused? These questions are the topic of intense debate within legal circles and beyond in the UK, the US, and the rest of world. Jeremy Horder's role as the Law Commissioner for England and Wales on criminal law has given him unique insight into these questions and the debates surrounding them. Here he analyses the recent political and legal reform movements, offering a political history of homicide law reform from the 19th century to the modern era. Using homicide as a starting point, Horder raises deeper questions of who is and should be responsible for making and changing the law. What role should there be for expert bodies, judges, and politicians? What role should there be for the general public? These questions invoke strong emotional responses. Horder argues that comprehensive research into, and a degree of difference to, public opinion on the scope of homicide is essential to the reform process. It is essential principally as a means of conferring true legitimacy on homicide reform in a democracy. Elite or expert opinion alone will never authentically secure such legitimacy. Offering an insider's view into the processes of achieving law reform, Horder expresses criticism of a system that excludes the vast majority of people from consultation on reform of the laws that govern them.

When should someone who may have intentionally or knowingly committed criminal wrongdoing be excused? Excusing Crime examines what excusing conditions are, and why familiar excuses, such as duress, are thought to fulfil those conditions. The 'classical' view of excuses sees them as rational defects (such as mistake) in the motive force behind an action, but contrasts them with 'denials of responsibility', such as insanity, where the rational defect in that motive force is attributable to a mental defect in the agent him- or herself. This classical view of excuses has a long heritage, and is enshrined in different forms in many of the world's criminal codes, both liberal and non-liberal; however, in this book, Jeremy Horder contends that it is now time to move beyond it. Horder develops a 'liberal' account of excuses, arguing that the 'classical' distinction between rational defects and 'denials of responsibility' is too sharp, and also that the classical view of excuses is too narrow. He contends that it can be right to treat claims as excusatory even if they rely on a combination of elements of rational defect in the motive force behind the action, even if that defect is in part attributable to a mental deficiency in the agent him or herself ('diminished capacity'). Further, he argues that there can be a sound case for excuse even when people can give full rational assent to their actions, such as when they could not reasonably have been expected to do more than what they did to avoid committing wrongdoing ('due diligence'), or, more rarely, when their conscience understandably left them with no moral freedom to do other than commit the wrong ('demands-of-conscience').

Should the criminal law be used to deter and punish corruption in politics: from employing family members at public expense to improper spending on elections, lobbying, and cronyism? How did so many MPs avoid facing charges after the 2009 government expenses scandal? In this book, Jeremy Horder tackles these questions and more. As well as offering the first treatment of the history, philosophy, and politics of the application of the offence of misconduct in office to Members of Parliament in England and Wales, Horder explains how political corruption might be dealt with in future, and how politicians could be held accountable for their actions so that they are deterred from betraying the public's trust. Use of the criminal law should not be the sole or even the main way to remedy all corruption in politics. Nevertheless, for too long the offence of misconduct in a public office has had an ambiguous status in the political realm. If we are to preserve the good health of government it must be seen as a constitutional fundamental. A charge of misconduct provides a way in which corrupt conduct on the part of legislators can be punished with an appropriate label, holding them to account for the misuse of power by reference to the standards of ordinary people. When other - civil law or regulatory - means prove insufficient, it should be possible for ordinary members of a jury, and not for Parliamentarians or other officials, to decide whether, for example, the expenditure of public money on legislators' private income and benefits amounts to a criminal abuse of the public's trust. This book offers an authoritative and accessible account of a 'bottom-up' (jury standards-led), as opposed to a 'top-down' (officials applying their own standards), approach to the role of the criminal law in constitutional contexts.

Described by The New York Times as 'Britain's foremost scholar of criminal law', Professor Glanville Williams was one of the greatest academic lawyers of the twentieth century. To mark the centenary of his birth in 2011, leading criminal law theorists and medical law ethicists from around the world were invited to contribute essays discussing the sanctity of life and criminal law while engaging with Williams' many contributions to these fields. In re-examining his work, the contributors have produced a provocative set of original essays that make a significant contribution to the current debate in these areas.