The Battle of the Bulge lives in history as the U.S. Army's largest and bloodiest battle of World War II. This innovative study of American military leadership in action during the battle examines the performance of six generals in the days and weeks after the German attack in December 1944. * Generals covered include Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley, among others * Five levels of command are studied: supreme coalition, army group, army, corps, and division/armored combat command * A unique and important history that will appeal to buffs, scholars, and soldiers

World War I had a profound impact on the United States of America, which was forced to 'grow' an army almost overnight. The day the United States declared war on Germany, the US Army was only the 17th largest in the world, ranking behind Portugal - the Regular Army had only 128,00 troops, backed up by the National Guard with some 182,000 troops. By the end of the war it had grown to 3,700,000, with slightly more than half that number in Europe. Until the United States did so, no country in all history had tried to deploy a 2-million-man force 3,000 miles from its own borders, a force led by American Expeditionary Forces Commander-in-Chief General John J. Pershing. This was America's first truly modern war and rising from its ranks was a new generation of leaders who would control the fate of the United States armed forces during the interwar period and into World War II. This book reveals the history of the key leaders working for and with John J. Pershing during this tumultuous period, including George S. Patton (tank commander and future commander of the US Third Army during World War II); Douglas MacArthur (42nd Division commander and future General of the Army) and Harry S. Truman (artillery battery commander and future President of the United States). Edited by Major General David T. Zabecki (US Army, Retired) and Colonel Douglas V. Mastriano (US Army, Retired), this fascinating title comprises chapters on individual leaders from subject experts across the US, including faculty members of the US Army War College.

In the many decades since the German army smashed into the American lines in the Battle of the Bulge, opinion of the U.S. senior command's leadership capabilities has fluctuated between hero worship and scorn, with the latter view becoming more predominant as the initial glow of victory faded. Rather than a conventional study of the Ardennes offensive, "Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge" studies five examples of American command leadership at different levels to answer two questions: what characteristics of leadership did these generals display, and how did they affect the overall battle? Based on extensive documentation and personal interviews with participants, "Generals of the Ardennes" provides a description and analysis of: Dwight Eisenhower's role as coalition commander; Omar Bradley's direction of the 12th Army Group during the crisis; Lieutenant General William Simpson's contribution to the Ninth Army's part in defeating the German onslaught; Major General Troy Middleton's stand with the VIII Corps in the center of the fighting; Major General Alan Jones and Brigadier General Bruce Clarke and how they dealt with the challenges and confusions at "the point of the spear." Amid the countless books in many languages that tell and retell the history of the Battle of the Bulge, this one is unique in its focus on American generalship during those epic and decisive weeks that turned the tide of World War II in Europe. For that reason, it stands as both a significant history and an important document for the study of command and control. First published in 1994. 452 pages. ill.

Reprint of 1995 study. Contains a series of essays a series of essays analyzing various combat engagement and military leaders throughout history. They include examples of brilliant success and dismal failure. Most of all, they offer today's military professional perspective insight into the essence of their calling: command and leadership. Topics in this issue include: Gustavus Adolphus & the Crossing of the Lech, Frederick the Great and the Battle of Leuthen, Old Fritz Stumbles: Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf, 1759, Andrew Jackson's Iron Will in the Creek War, 1813-1814, Jacob Brown & Winfield Scott in the Niagara Campaign of 1814, Menshikov at Inkerman: A Failure to Command, Battle Command Incompetencies: John C. Pemberton in the Vicksburg Campaign, William S. Rosecrans & Battle Command Competencies, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger at Chickamauga, 20 Sept 1863, Senior-Level Leadership at the Battle of the Crater, intuitive Vision Versus Practical Realities: Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, William M. Campsey; Custer's Vision, Leadership at Plevna, 11-12 September 1877, The Rock of Gallipoli, Originality & Success: Lieut. Gen. Monash & the Battle of Hamel, Jul 1918, Seeing the Battlefield: Brigadier Gen. Norman D. Cota's Bastard Brigade at Omaha Beach, Harmon and Collins at the Bulge: Committing the 2d Armored Div., 22-28 Dec 1944, Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command, Chen Yi and Deng Ziaoping Question a Mission, Douglas MacArthur & the Advance to the Yalu, Nov 1950, Invoking Force of Will to Move the Force, Capt. William E. Barber, Commander, Fox Company, 7th Marine Regt, Toktong Pass, North Korea, 27 Nov-2 Dec 1950, Military Operations Other Than War: Dominican Intervention of 1965-66.

The Six Day War of June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Force (IDF) achieve a decisive military victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while sustaining relatively few casualties. Despite the subsequent image of Israel as a regional military superpower, Egypt attacked again in 1973, eventually resulting in a peace treaty that promised to return the entire Sinai to Egypt. It is the contention of "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory" that the IDF's dramatic 1967 victory unconsciously created an albatross in the form of a belief in its own invulnerability coupled with the belief that Egypt would perform as poorly in the next war as it had in this one. In a spirit of overconfidence, Israel prepared to fight its next war just as it had in 1967. The 1973 attack caught Israel off guard, the Egyptians performed much better than expected, and, even after the IDF recovered from its initial stumbles, Egypt was by no means out of the game militarily. Once a cease-fire took effect, the Israelis quickly grasped how ill prepared their army had been for war and the resultant three weeks of hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties. As the author notes, "If the United States had experienced equivalent losses in the Vietnam War, it would have suffered 200,000 American dead - a figure four times the actual number." Given this situation, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat quickly proposed a negotiated peace, which a suddenly war-weary Israeli public warily accepted. Both as an incisive narrative of the 1973 war and an analysis of the self-deception and overconfidence that too decisive a victory can breed, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" is an invaluable work of scholarship as well as a cautionary tale for students and practitioners of modern warfare. Orginally published in 1996: 104 p. maps. ill.