It was only after I had finished this volume that I came across the book by Barry Bames, Scientific Knowledge and Sociologi- cal Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul). I am in full ag,reement with certain ideas expounded in that book, although it also contains others that I must object to. I have decided to make some remarks about them at the beginning of my book, as I believe that they may prove useful by way of int,roduction to the English version of this volume. I hope that anyone who has professional reasons to turn his attention to this volume will have acquainted himself with Scientific Knowledge and Socio- logical Theory before he proceeds any further. I fully share Barnes' view that it is possible and desirable to undertake descrtptive-sociological investigations of scientific research. The main subjeot of this research should be the na- tural science, and ,moreover, such findings in these sciences whose cognitive value has never been questioned by profession- als. These investigations must avoid becoming entangled in epistemologtical controversies, and through epi:stemo}. ogy in ,phi- losophical controversies. They must not defend any of the contended theses and must not Hrterally ,rely on evaluative pre- mises that have been questicmed.

This callectian 'Of essays is, generally speaking, a cantinuatian of the themes that I have discussed in my baak Z metodologicz- nych problemow interpretacji humanistycznej.l Naturally, by continuatian I mean a resumptian 'Of certain questions that were already dealt with in the previous baok. But I treated them rather summarily there, and naw I will present them in greater detail. While daing so, I will have to face new issues, which were ignared previously, but which have ta be salved, at least tentatively, in 'Order ta make it passible for me ta elabarate more fully the suggestions made a few years aga. Along with this reason, a sec and 'One can be added ta explain why in these Essays an the Theary 'Of Scientific Cognitian I tackle new problems, treated na mare than marginally in Z metodologicznych problemow interpretacji humanistycznej. The current elaboration of my earlier, incipient suggestians is based an the assumptions which may well serve as a starting paint for an investigation 'Of mare general questions funda- mental far epistemalogy and frequently far mula ted within its scope. Ta make at least a partial use of the oppartunity, I cancentrated an some of these questians, especially in the later chapters 'Of this baok.