This book seeks to bridge the gap between what is well known in economic research but has become long forgotten in practise. Focusing on the recent banking crisis, Cao looks at why the existing regulatory regime failed to prevent the financial meltdown, and emphasizes the impact of regulatory policies on the risky activities undertaken by individual financial institutions. The systemic risks in the financial system that need to be avoided by the regulatory rules are examined in detail, and Cao establishes a framework of evaluating the instruments in the regulator 's toolbox.

The author covers a range of important issues such as endogenous systemic liquidity risk, the failure of liquidity regulation with Lender of Last Resort policy or capital requirement and the impact of macro policy on micro incentives.

Wide coverage of different perspectives of banking, the book presents classical microeconomic thoeries of banking, but also covers central banking, financial frictions and banking-macro linkages, banking regulation in theory and practice etc., giving students a rounded picture of the world of banking, and also allowing instructors to design and create their own courses with different emphases A self-contained textbook making "linear" progress through chapters. Banking is all about imperfect market, market failure and frictions, therefore, market friction is the key to making progress throughout the book. Necessary elements from contract theory, game theory, dynamic macroeconomics and mathematical techniques will be provided through boxes and appendices, making the textbook self-contained An up-to-date textbook that presents both state-of-the-art research and the evolving reality, an evidence-based textbook that connects theory and practice.

This book is a review on the economic theories of systemic risks in the financial market and the topics in constructing the macroprudential framework for banking regulation in the future. It explains the reasons why the traditional microprudential regulatory framework missed its target in stabilizing the market and preventing the crisis, and discusses the principles and instruments for designing macroprudential rules.

This instructor's manual complements the textbook Money: Theory and Practice which provides an introduction to modern monetary economics for advanced undergraduates, highlighting the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis. The manual provides teachers with exercises and examples that reflect both the core New Keynesian model and recent advances, taking into account financial frictions, and discusses recent research on an intuitive level based on simple static and two-period models.

Wide coverage of different perspectives of banking, the book presents classical microeconomic thoeries of banking, but also covers central banking, financial frictions and banking-macro linkages, banking regulation in theory and practice etc., giving students a rounded picture of the world of banking, and also allowing instructors to design and create their own courses with different emphases A self-contained textbook making "linear" progress through chapters. Banking is all about imperfect market, market failure and frictions, therefore, market friction is the key to making progress throughout the book. Necessary elements from contract theory, game theory, dynamic macroeconomics and mathematical techniques will be provided through boxes and appendices, making the textbook self-contained An up-to-date textbook that presents both state-of-the-art research and the evolving reality, an evidence-based textbook that connects theory and practice.

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modeled as exogenous events. This paper analyzes the adequate policy response to endogenous exposure to systemic liquidity risk. We analyze the feedback between lender-of-last-resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante is a crucial requirement for sensible lender-of-last-resort policy. In addition, we analyze the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that both policies are strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender-of-last-resort policy.