Can we say that metaphysics is over? That we live, as post-phenomenology claims, after "end of metaphysics"? Through a close reading of Levinas's masterpiece Totality and Infinity, Raoul Moati shows that things are much more complicated. Totality and Infinity proposes not so much an alternative to Heidegger's ontology as a deeper elucidation of the meaning of "being" beyond Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The metaphor of the night becomes crucial in order to explore a nocturnal face of the events of being beyond their ontological reduction to the understanding of being. The deployment of being beyond its intentional or ontological reduction coincides with what Levinas calls "nocturnal events." Insofar as the light of understanding hides them, it is only through deformalizing the traditional phenomenological approach to phenomena that Levinas leads us to their exploration and their systematic and mutual implications. Following Levinas's account of these "nocturnal events," Moati elaborates the possibility of what he calls a "metaphysics of society" that cannot be integrated into the deconstructive grasp of the "metaphysics of presence." Ultimately, Levinas and the Night of Being opens the possibility of a revival of metaphysics after the "end of metaphysics".

An award-winning philosopher bridges the continental-analytic divide with an important contribution to the debate on the meaning of realism. Jocelyn Benoist argues for a philosophical point of view that prioritizes the concept of reality. The human mind's attitudes toward reality, he posits, both depend on reality and must navigate within it. Refusing the path of metaphysical realism, which would make reality an object of speculation in itself, independent of any reflection on our ways of approaching it or thinking about it, Benoist defends the idea of an intentionality placed in reality-contextualized. Intentionality is an essential part of any realist philosophical position; Benoist's innovation is to insist on looking to context to develop a renewed realism that draws conclusions from contemporary philosophy of language and applies them methodically to issues in the fields of metaphysics and the philosophy of the mind. "What there is"-the traditional subject of metaphysics-can be determined only in context. Benoist offers a sharp criticism of acontextual ontology and acontextual approaches to the mind and reality. At the same time, he opposes postmodern anti-realism and the semantic approach characteristic of classic analytic philosophy. Instead, Toward a Contextual Realism bridges the analytic-continental divide while providing the foundation for a radically contextualist philosophy of mind and metaphysics. "To be" is to be in a context.

This volume examines an often taken for granted concept-that of the concept itself. How do we picture what concepts are, what they do, how they arise in the course of everyday life? Challenging conventional approaches that treat concepts as mere tools at our disposal for analysis, or as straightforwardly equivalent to signs to be deciphered, the anthropologists and philosophers in this volume turn instead to the ways concepts are already intrinsically embedded in our forms of life and how they constitute the very substrate of our existence as humans who lead lives in language. Attending to our ordinary lives with concepts requires not an ascent from the rough ground of reality into the skies of theory, but rather acceptance of the fact that thinking is congenital to living with and through concepts. The volume offers a critical and timely intervention into both contemporary philosophy and anthropological theory by unsettling the distinction between thought and reality that continues to be too often assumed and showing how the supposed need to grasp reality may be replaced by an acknowledgement that we are in its grip. Contributors: Jocelyn Benoist, Andrew Brandel, Michael Cordey, Veena Das, Rasmus Dyring and Thomas Schwarz Wentzer, Michael D. Jackson, Michael Lambek, Sandra Laugier, Marco Motta, Michael J. Puett, and Lotte Buch Segal

"A remarkable book capable of reshaping what one takes philosophy to be." -Cora Diamond, Kenan Professor of Philosophy Emerita, University of Virginia Could there be a logical alien-a being whose ways of talking, inferring, and contradicting exhibit an entirely different logical shape than ours, yet who nonetheless is thinking? Could someone, contrary to the most basic rules of logic, think that two contradictory statements are both true at the same time? Such questions may seem outlandish, but they serve to highlight a fundamental philosophical question: is our logical form of thought merely one among many, or must it be the form of thought as such? From Descartes and Kant to Frege and Wittgenstein, philosophers have wrestled with variants of this question, and with a range of competing answers. A seminal 1991 paper, James Conant's "The Search for Logically Alien Thought," placed that question at the forefront of contemporary philosophical inquiry. The Logical Alien, edited by Sofia Miguens, gathers Conant's original article with reflections on it by eight distinguished philosophers-Jocelyn Benoist, Matthew Boyle, Martin Gustafsson, Arata Hamawaki, Adrian Moore, Barry Stroud, Peter Sullivan, and Charles Travis. Conant follows with a wide-ranging response that places the philosophical discussion in historical context, critiques his original paper, addresses the exegetical and systematic issues raised by others, and presents an alternative account. The Logical Alien challenges contemporary conceptions of how logical and philosophical form must each relate to their content. This monumental volume offers the possibility of a new direction in philosophy.

This volume examines an often taken for granted concept-that of the concept itself. How do we picture what concepts are, what they do, how they arise in the course of everyday life? Challenging conventional approaches that treat concepts as mere tools at our disposal for analysis, or as straightforwardly equivalent to signs to be deciphered, the anthropologists and philosophers in this volume turn instead to the ways concepts are already intrinsically embedded in our forms of life and how they constitute the very substrate of our existence as humans who lead lives in language. Attending to our ordinary lives with concepts requires not an ascent from the rough ground of reality into the skies of theory, but rather acceptance of the fact that thinking is congenital to living with and through concepts. The volume offers a critical and timely intervention into both contemporary philosophy and anthropological theory by unsettling the distinction between thought and reality that continues to be too often assumed and showing how the supposed need to grasp reality may be replaced by an acknowledgement that we are in its grip. Contributors: Jocelyn Benoist, Andrew Brandel, Michael Cordey, Veena Das, Rasmus Dyring and Thomas Schwarz Wentzer, Michael D. Jackson, Michael Lambek, Sandra Laugier, Marco Motta, Michael J. Puett, and Lotte Buch Segal

Can we say that metaphysics is over? That we live, as post-phenomenology claims, after "end of metaphysics"? Through a close reading of Levinas's masterpiece Totality and Infinity, Raoul Moati shows that things are much more complicated. Totality and Infinity proposes not so much an alternative to Heidegger's ontology as a deeper elucidation of the meaning of "being" beyond Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The metaphor of the night becomes crucial in order to explore a nocturnal face of the events of being beyond their ontological reduction to the understanding of being. The deployment of being beyond its intentional or ontological reduction coincides with what Levinas calls "nocturnal events." Insofar as the light of understanding hides them, it is only through deformalizing the traditional phenomenological approach to phenomena that Levinas leads us to their exploration and their systematic and mutual implications. Following Levinas's account of these "nocturnal events," Moati elaborates the possibility of what he calls a "metaphysics of society" that cannot be integrated into the deconstructive grasp of the "metaphysics of presence." Ultimately, Levinas and the Night of Being opens the possibility of a revival of metaphysics after the "end of metaphysics".

Unverkennbar gibt es seit einigen Jahren in der Philosophie Europas wieder ein programmatisches Bekenntnis zum Realismus. Es ist das Resultat einer am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts fällig gewordenen Korrektur. Gleichzeitig lässt sich auch eine Renaissance idealistischer Denkansätze feststellen. Dieser Band vereinigt französische, deutsche und italienische Autorinnen und Autoren, die den Dialog zwischen Realismus und Idealismus aus historischer, erkenntnistheoretischer, phänomenologischer und ästhetischer Perspektive fortsetzen. Dieser Dialog, so zeigt sich, dient nach wie vor zur philosophischen Orientierung.

Es gibt keine realistische Phänomenologie. In dieser gedanklichen Fluchtlinie präsentiert Jocelyn Benoist im vorliegenden Werk die Summe seiner bisherigen Arbeiten, die ihn immer weiter von der Phänomenologie weggeführt haben - hin zu einem kontextuellen Realismus, der die Unhintergehbarkeit des Wirklichen betont: Wirklichkeit ist keine Eigenschaft, die dem Sinnhaften zukommen kann oder nicht. Sie ist vielmehr etwas, das immer schon da ist, das wir je schon haben. Aber dass wir immer schon inmitten des Wirklichen leben, heißt nicht, dass es uns auch immer schon verständlich wäre. Und dass wir es nicht verstehen, nimmt dem Wirklichen nichts von seiner Realität. Die Kategorie der Wirklichkeit als eine des Sinns zu begreifen nimmt der Realität vielmehr die Macht, zu überraschen und zu enttäuschen. Dennoch ist es gerade dieses Vorurteil zugunsten des Sinns, das für Benoist die Philosophie seit der transzendentalen Wende Kants beherrscht. Seine stärkste Ausprägung hat es dabei in der Phänomenologie Husserls und Heideggers und deren Rezeption in Frankreich gefunden: Husserls Theorie bewusster Bezugnahme setzt ebenso wie Heideggers Fundamentalontologie die Sinnhaftigkeit des Seins voraus. Aber auch gegen den "neuen Realismus“, den Markus Gabriel in den letzten Jahren entwickelt hat, wendet Benoist ein, dass eine Ontologie der "Sinnfelder" Sein und Sinn leichtfertig engführt. Seine Monographie positioniert sich so nicht nur gegenüber den Klassikern der deutschen Philosophie, sondern erneuert auch den Dialog zwischen der Gegenwartsphilosophie in Frankreich und in Deutschland.

S'il n'est pas, ne peut plus etre question ici, de definir l'essence de la realite, il s'agit en revanche de clarifier la facon dont, en diverses occurrences, nous mettons en oeuvre ce concept. A quelles occasions, et comment, parlons-nous de realite ? Quel role cette idee joue-t-elle dans nos pensees et nos vies? Ce role, a l'analyse, apparaitra constitutif. Ce qu'on appelle realite se decouvrira ainsi un trait de notre esprit meme: ce par rapport a quoi celui-ci, dans ses attitudes et ses contenus, a seulement un sens - c'est-a-dire peut, selon sa vocation propre, en deployer un.