|
Showing 1 - 5 of
5 matches in All Departments
It has been frequently argued that democracy is protected and
realized under constitutions that protect certain rights and
establish the conditions for a functioning representative
democracy. However, some democrats still find something profoundly
unsettling about contemporary constitutional regimes. The
participation of ordinary citizens in constitutional change in the
world's most "advanced" democracies (such as the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom) is weak at best: the power of
constitutional reform usually lies in the exclusive hands of
legislatures. How can constitutions that can only be altered by
those occupying positions of power be considered democratically
legitimate? This book argues that only a regime that provides an
outlet for constituent power to manifest from time to time can ever
come to enjoy democratic legitimacy. In so doing, it advances a
democratic constitutional theory, one that combines a strong or
participatory conception of democracy with a weak form of
constitutionalism. The author engages with Anglo-American
constitutional theory as well as examining the theory and practise
of constituent power in different constitutional regimes (including
Latin American countries) where constituent power has become an
important part of the left's legal and political discourse. Weak
Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of
Constituent Power will be of particular interest to legal/political
theorists and comparative constitutional lawyers. It also provides
an introduction to the theory of constituent power and its
relationship to constitutionalism and democracy.
This book examines the interstices among statutory enactment,
constitutional convention and formal constitution in which
quasi-constitutionality exists. It provides a focal resource that
can serve as a point of reference for scholars interested in
quasi-constitutionality as a whole, from national and transnational
perspectives, expanding on its many forms, functions, and
applications with recourse to comparative insights. The book is
divided in three main Parts, each of them preceded by a separate
critical introduction in which an informed scholar contextualizes
the chapters and offers reflections on the themes they develop. The
first Part, titled 'Forms', is composed of chapters that address,
from a theoretical and comparative perspective, questions related
to the recognition of constitutional statutes and
quasi-constitutional legislation. The second Part is titled
'Functions', and contains chapters that explore the explanatory
power of quasi-constitutionality in different institutional
contexts. The third Part, titled 'Applications', considers the ways
in which constitutional statutes and quasi-constitutionality
operate in relation to particular tensions and debates present in
various jurisdictions.
It has been frequently argued that democracy is protected and
realized under constitutions that protect certain rights and
establish the conditions for a functioning representative
democracy. However, some democrats still find something profoundly
unsettling about contemporary constitutional regimes. The
participation of ordinary citizens in constitutional change in the
world's most "advanced" democracies (such as the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom) is weak at best: the power of
constitutional reform usually lies in the exclusive hands of
legislatures. How can constitutions that can only be altered by
those occupying positions of power be considered democratically
legitimate? This book argues that only a regime that provides an
outlet for constituent power to manifest from time to time can ever
come to enjoy democratic legitimacy. In so doing, it advances a
democratic constitutional theory, one that combines a strong or
participatory conception of democracy with a weak form of
constitutionalism. The author engages with Anglo-American
constitutional theory as well as examining the theory and practise
of constituent power in different constitutional regimes (including
Latin American countries) where constituent power has become an
important part of the left's legal and political discourse. Weak
Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of
Constituent Power will be of particular interest to legal/political
theorists and comparative constitutional lawyers. It also provides
an introduction to the theory of constituent power and its
relationship to constitutionalism and democracy.
This book examines the interstices among statutory enactment,
constitutional convention and formal constitution in which
quasi-constitutionality exists. It provides a focal resource that
can serve as a point of reference for scholars interested in
quasi-constitutionality as a whole, from national and transnational
perspectives, expanding on its many forms, functions, and
applications with recourse to comparative insights. The book is
divided in three main Parts, each of them preceded by a separate
critical introduction in which an informed scholar contextualizes
the chapters and offers reflections on the themes they develop. The
first Part, titled 'Forms', is composed of chapters that address,
from a theoretical and comparative perspective, questions related
to the recognition of constitutional statutes and
quasi-constitutional legislation. The second Part is titled
'Functions', and contains chapters that explore the explanatory
power of quasi-constitutionality in different institutional
contexts. The third Part, titled 'Applications', considers the ways
in which constitutional statutes and quasi-constitutionality
operate in relation to particular tensions and debates present in
various jurisdictions.
Constituent power is the power to create new constitutions.
Frequently exercised during political revolutions, it has been
historically associated with extra-legality and violations of the
established legal order. This book examines the relationship
between constituent power and the law. It considers the place of
constituent power in constitutional history, focusing on the legal
and institutional implications that theorists, politicians, and
judges have derived from it. Commentators and citizens have relied
on the concept of constituent power to defend the idea that
electors have the right to instruct representatives, to negate the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and to argue that the
creation of new constitutions must take place through
extra-legislative processes, including primary assemblies open to
all citizens. More recently, several Latin American constitutions
explicitly incorporate the theory of constituent power and allow
citizens, acting through popular initiative, to trigger
constitution-making episodes that may result in the replacement of
the entire constitutional order. Constitutional courts have also at
times employed constituent power to justify their jurisdiction to
invalidate constitutional amendments that alter the fundamental
structure of the constitution and thus amount to a
constitution-making exercise. Some governments have used it to
defend the legality of attempts to transform the constitutional
order through procedures not contemplated in the constitution's
amendment rule, but considered participatory enough to be
equivalent to 'the people in action', sometimes sanctioned by
courts. Building on these findings, Constituent Power and the Law
argues that constituent power, unlike sovereignty, should be
understood as ultimately based on a legal mandate to produce a
particular type of juridical content. In practice, this makes it
possible for a constitution-making body to be understood as legally
subject to popularly ratified substantive limits.
|
You may like...
Ab Wheel
R209
R149
Discovery Miles 1 490
|