Examines ways in which the UK Ministry of Defence can reduce the whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the Royal Navy's two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs). In 2012 and 2015, respectively, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence will replace its three Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs), the largest ships ever constructed for the Royal Navy. The research described in this report focuses on possible reductions in whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the carriers.

The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) moved from a position of significant authority and responsibility in submarine design and development to one in which its acquisition responsibilities were largely transferred to a prime contractor. Now it is trying to re-engage. This book recommends measures and structures the UK Ministry of Defence can adopt to better manage its risks and responsibilities in the acquisition of nuclear submarines.

Explores the reasons for and ways to anticipate schedule delays in shipbuilding programmes. 450-character abstract: The Defence Procurement Agency, part of the UK Ministry of Defence, asked Rand to analyze how major shipbuilders and contractors monitor programme progress, to consider what information would be useful for shipbuilders to provide the agency, and to understand why ships are delivered late and why commercial shipbuilders maintain a much better schedule performance than do military builders. This monograph presents the researchers' findings and recommendations, which was based on surveys of major US, UK, and other European shipbuilders and other extensive industry research.

This report evaluates the feasibility of restarting weapon system production lines in response to a resurgent major threat and suggests steps that might be taken at shutdown to ease restart. The cost and schedule advantages of restart relative to new-system production are quantified. Criteria are identified for deciding which systems ought to be regarded as candidates for restart, and the application of the criteria is illustrated. Other reconstitution options (e.g. maintaining "warm" production lines, excess production for stockpiling) are briefly reviewed.

In January 1993, the RAND National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production.