First Published in 1981. The essays collected together in this volume deal, for the most part, with the two themes which have seemed to the author the most significant and the most intriguing in the passage made by the military in Britain from the Victorian age to World War. The major theme is that of the transition of military strategy and policy from a preoccupation with the limited, though by no means undemanding, requirements of a sprawling empire in an age of diplomatic self-sufficiency to the enormous burdens of continental involvement in Europe against Germany, as the mass army replaced the capital fleet in the world's military pecking order.

John Gooch's book is a concise introduction to the unification of the Italian states and the legacy of this union. Starting in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the book goes on to explain how, despite the causes of disunity, these Italian states shared racial, linguistic, and cultural factors, which led to their eventual political unity.

First published in 2007. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The war in South Africa (1899-1902) marked a turning point in British military history, after the war many aspects of British policy-making and military organisation were scrutinised. The first part of this book focuses on these issues as they have been represented by scholars in the light of recent works. The bias towards work on the failures of the British is here redressed with the inclusion of studies of the roles of the Boers, Afrikaaners and Zulus by four South African historians. The social and cultural dimensions of the war as viewed from the South African perspective is also analyzed. The final section of the book concentrates on how the conflict was presented to the public back in Britain, explaining how manipulation of the media helped to centre the Boer War within British history.

The rapid development of airpower has been one of the most marked features of warfare in the twentieth century. It has been attended by great controversy, both among its practitioners and between historians and political scientists who seek to understand and explain it. The nine contributions to this volume focus on key issues in these debates. In dealing with the many topics within this book, methodological issues are also tackled in a manner of interest and importance both to historians and to political scientists. Airpower: Theory and Practice spans almost the entire history of air warfare, from World War I to the Second Gulf War (1991). It considers the role of the individual propagandist for the new arm, Alexander P. de Seversky and his book Victory Through Air Power (1942) adapted for the cinema screen by Walt Disney, and the influence of institutions on a new armed service, which constrained the birth of the French Air Force between the wars. One study looks at a decisive yet modest aerial intervention in a modern but limited internal war, the role of the German Condor Legion in the Spanish Civil War. Three of the essays analyse in detail the nature of Anglo-American air doctrine and co-operation, during 1941-45, both in the strategic bombing of Germany and in the Atlantic maritime war against the U-boat menace.

This book's contribution to the discussion on the origin's of the First World War is a pioneering study of both the British General Staff and the evolution of military strategy in the period immediately prior to the war. It describes the development of the General Staff, Britain's agency for strategic planning, and goes on to give an account of its role in devising strategy. Problems are examined as they arose at grass-roots level in the War Office and progressed upward towards the Cabinet. The complex cross-currents involving the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Treasury and individuals from Edward VII downwards are charted. The account covers British military policy up to 1916, interpreting the Gallipoli campaign and explanation for its failure.

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Success or defeat in the Second World War turned less on winning or losing battles than on winning or losing campaigns. This volume reassesses the importance of seven major campaigns for the outcome of the war. The authors examine a wide range of factors which influence success or failure including strategic planning, logistics, combat performance, command and military intelligence. This book represents a novel contribution to the study of the Second World War.

Success or defeat in the Second World War turned less on winning or losing battles than on winning or losing campaigns. This volume reassesses the importance of seven major campaigns for the outcome of the war. The authors examine a wide range of factors which influence success or failure including strategic planning, logistics, combat performance, command and military intelligence. This book represents a novel contribution to the study of the Second World War.

This book, originally published in 1980, is a study of the nature and purposes of peace-time military organization in Europe, and of the characteristics and outcome of the major wars fought during these years. It charts the rise of mass armies and the role of conscription as a socializing agent and a military instrument, as well as discussing the growing involvement of society in war both as agent and target of military activity, the mounting effort required of a society in order to ahcieve victory, culminating in the 'Total War' of 1939-45. Among other subjects explored are the development of war economies, the genesis and significance of war aims, the importance of social cohesion in modern war and the impact of technology.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203182332

This book, originally published in 1980, is a study of the nature and purposes of peace-time military organization in Europe, and of the characteristics and outcome of the major wars fought during these years. It charts the rise of mass armies and the role of conscription as a socializing agent and a military instrument, as well as discussing the growing involvement of society in war both as agent and target of military activity, the mounting effort required of a society in order to ahcieve victory, culminating in the 'Total War' of 1939-45. Among other subjects explored are the development of war economies, the genesis and significance of war aims, the importance of social cohesion in modern war and the impact of technology.

This title available in eBook format. Click here for more information.
Visit our eBookstore at: www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk.

First Published in 1981. The essays collected together in this volume deal, for the most part, with the two themes which have seemed to the author the most significant and the most intriguing in the passage made by the military in Britain from the Victorian age to World War. The major theme is that of the transition of military strategy and policy from a preoccupation with the limited, though by no means undemanding, requirements of a sprawling empire in an age of diplomatic self-sufficiency to the enormous burdens of continental involvement in Europe against Germany, as the mass army replaced the capital fleet in the world's military pecking order.

The nine contributors to this volume study the rapid development of airpower during the twentieth century as well as the methodological problems involved in assessing such change.

This book's contribution to the discussion on the origin's of the First World War is a pioneering study of both the British General Staff and the evolution of military strategy in the period immediately prior to the war. It describes the development of the General Staff, Britain's agency for strategic planning, and goes on to give an account of its role in devising strategy. Problems are examined as they arose at grass-roots level in the War Office and progressed upward towards the Cabinet. The complex cross-currents involving the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Treasury and individuals from Edward VII downwards are charted. The account covers British military policy up to 1916, interpreting the Gallipoli campaign and explanation for its failure.

This collections of essays by leading British and South African scholars, looking at the Boer War, focuses on three aspects: how the British Military functioned; the role of the Boers, Afrikaners and Zulus; and the media presentation of the war to the public.

This is a major new account of the role and performance of the Italian army during the First World War. Drawing from original, archival research, it tells the story of the army's bitter three-year struggle in the mountains of Northern Italy, including the eleven bloody battles of the Isonzo, the near-catastrophic defeat at Caporetto in 1917 and the successful, but still controversial defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army at Vittorio Veneto on the eve of the Armistice. Setting military events within a broader context, the book explores pre-war Italian military culture and the interactions between domestic politics, economics and society. In a unique study of an unjustly neglected facet of the war, John Gooch illustrates how General Luigi Cadorna, a brutal disciplinarian, drove the army to the edge of collapse, and how his successor, general Armando Diaz, rebuilt it and led the Italians to their greatest victory in modern times.

This is the first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 to the catastrophic defeat of 1940. Using extensive new research, John Gooch explores the nature and development of the three armed forces, their relationships with Mussolini and the impact of his policies and command, the development of operational and strategic thought, and the deployment and use of force in Libya, Abyssinia and Spain. He emphasizes Mussolini's long-term expansionist goals and explains how he responded to the structural pressures of the international system and the contingent pressures of events. This compelling account shows that while Mussolini bore ultimate responsibility for Italy's fateful entry into the Second World War, his generals and admirals bore a share of the blame for defeat through policies that all too often rested on irrationality and incompetence.

This is a major new account of the role and performance of the Italian army during the First World War. Drawing from original, archival research, it tells the story of the army's bitter three-year struggle in the mountains of Northern Italy, including the eleven bloody battles of the Isonzo, the near-catastrophic defeat at Caporetto in 1917 and the successful, but still controversial defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army at Vittorio Veneto on the eve of the Armistice. Setting military events within a broader context, the book explores pre-war Italian military culture and the interactions between domestic politics, economics and society. In a unique study of an unjustly neglected facet of the war, John Gooch illustrates how General Luigi Cadorna, a brutal disciplinarian, drove the army to the edge of collapse, and how his successor, general Armando Diaz, rebuilt it and led the Italians to their greatest victory in modern times.

WINNER OF THE 2021 DUKE OF WELLINGTON MEDAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY A DAILY TELEGRAPH BOOK OF THE YEAR 2020 From an acclaimed military historian, the definitive account of Italy's experience of the Second World War While staying closely aligned with Hitler, Mussolini remained carefully neutral until the summer of 1940. Then, with the wholly unexpected and sudden collapse of the French and British armies, Mussolini declared war on the Allies in the hope of making territorial gains in southern France and Africa. This decision proved a horrifying miscalculation, dooming Italy to its own prolonged and unwinnable war, immense casualties and an Allied invasion in 1943 which ushered in a terrible new era for the country. John Gooch's new book is the definitive account of Italy's war experience. Beginning with the invasion of Abyssinia and ending with Mussolini's arrest, Gooch brilliantly portrays the nightmare of a country with too small an industrial sector, too incompetent a leadership and too many fronts on which to fight. Everywhere - whether in the USSR, the Western Desert or the Balkans - Italian troops found themselves against either better-equipped or more motivated enemies. The result was a war entirely at odds with the dreams of pre-war Italian planners - a series of desperate improvizations against Allies who could draw on global resources and against whom Italy proved helpless. This remarkable book rightly shows the centrality of Italy to the war, outlining the brief rise and disastrous fall of the Italian military campaign. 'It is hard to imagine a finer account, both of the sweep of Italy's wars, and of the characters caught up in them' Caroline Moorhead, The Guardian