The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental-physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind's place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of the Fourth Edition Includes a new chapter, 'Emergence and Panpsychism' (Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation' (Chapter 8), which was excised from the previous edition Updates 'Descartes' Legacy' (Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E. J. Lowe's arresting 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind's place in nature Updated 'Suggested Reading' lists at the end of each chapter

"In his introduction to this most welcome republication (and second edition) of his logic text, Heil clarifies his aim in writing and revising this book: 'I believe that anyone unfamiliar with the subject who set out to learn formal logic could do so relying solely on [this] book. That, in any case, is what I set out to create in writing An Introduction to First-Order Logic'. Heil has certainly accomplished this with perhaps the most explanatorily thorough and pedagogically rich text I've personally come across. "Heil's text stands out as being remarkably careful in its presentation and illuminating in its explanations -- especially given its relatively short length when compared to the average logic textbook. It hits all of the necessary material that must be covered in an introductory deductive logic course, and then some. It also takes occasional excursions into side topics, successfully whetting the reader's appetite for more advanced studies in logic." The book is clearly written by an expert who has put in the effort for his readers, bothering at every step to see the point and then explain it clearly to his readers. Heil has found some very clever, original ways to introduce, motivate, and otherwise teach this material. The author's own special expertise and perspective -- especially when it comes to tying philosophy of mind, linguistics, and philosophy of language into the lessons of logic -- make for a creative and fresh take on basic logic. With its unique presentation and illuminating explanations, this book comes about as close as a text can come to imitating the learning environment of an actual classroom. Indeed, working through its presentations carefully, the reader feels as though he or she has just attended an illuminating lecture on the relevant topics!" -- Jonah Schupbach, University of Utah

The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental-physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind's place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of the Fourth Edition Includes a new chapter, 'Emergence and Panpsychism' (Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation' (Chapter 8), which was excised from the previous edition Updates 'Descartes' Legacy' (Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E. J. Lowe's arresting 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind's place in nature Updated 'Suggested Reading' lists at the end of each chapter

This is the first transcultural mental health project focusing on sport. The book highlights the psychological problems and mental crisis of athletes beyond the competition from "Western" and Eastern cultural perspectives as reflected by DSM IV TR and Traditional Chinese Medical Psychology (TCMP). The first chapter offers an overview of the transcultural approach in sport. The second chapter presents a basic introduction of the diagnostical systems of DSM IV TR and TCMP. The third chapter is focusing on case studies of athletes from different cultural backgrounds, especially on Asian athletes, and mainly on the previous research on DSM depression and TCM You Y depression. It is useful to professionals in sport sciences, psychology, medicine, sociology, and cultural anthropology. Coaches, athletes in all sport disciplines and sport managers will equally benefit as everyone practicing or interested in sports.

Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations.

Edited by a renowned scholar in the field, this anthology provides an extensive and varied collection of classical and contemporary readings in the philosophy of mind. Especially noteworthy are the substantial authoritative introductions to each section, which set extracts in context and guide the reader through them. The volume is organised into 12 sections, providing instructors with flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses. It contains 50 important writings on the philosophy of mind, with introductions to each section, discussion questions and guides to further reading. Perfect for undergraduate courses, this book offers the ideal, self-contained introduction to the philosophy of mind.

Is the world hierarchically arranged, incorporating 'levels' of reality? What is the nature of objects and properties? What does 'realism' about ordinary objects or states of mind demand? When an assertion is true, what makes it true? Are natural properties best regarded as qualities or powers or some combination of these? What are colours? What explains the 'projective' character of intentionality? What is the nature of consciousness, and what relation do conscious experiences bear to material states and processes? From an Ontological Point of View endeavours to provide answers to such questions through an examination of ground-floor issues in ontology. The result is an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us and an application of this account to problems dominating recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The book, written in an accessible, non-technical style, is intended for non-specialists as well as seasoned

From an Ontological Point of View is a highly original and accessible exploration of fundamental questions about what there is. John Heil discusses such issues as whether the world includes levels of reality; the nature of objects and properties; the demands of realism; what makes things true; qualities, powers, and the relation these bear to one another. He advances an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us, and applies this account to problems that have plagued recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics (colour, intentionality, and the nature of consciousness).

The pieces collected in this volume present a survey of the best current work on a key topic in the philosophy of mind: the challenge of explaining how thought can make a difference in a material universe.

This book aims at reconciling the emerging conceptions of mind and their contents that have, in recent years, come to seem irreconcilable. Post-Cartesian philosophers face the challenge of comprehending minds as natural objects possessing apparently non-natural powers of thought. The difficulty is to understand how our mental capacities, no less than our biological or chemical characteristics, might ultimately be products of our fundamental physical constituents, and to do so in a way that preserves the phenomena. Externalists argue that the significance of thought turns on the circumstances of thinkers; reductionists hold that mental characteristics are physical; eliminationists contend that the concept of thought belongs to an outmoded folk theory of behavior. John Heil explores these topics and points the way to a naturalistic synthesis, one that accords the mental a place in the physical world alongside the non-mental.

This book aims at reconciling the emerging conceptions of mind and their contents that have, in recent years, come to seem irreconcilable. Post-Cartesian philosophers face the challenge of comprehending minds as natural objects possessing apparently non-natural powers of thought. The difficulty is to understand how our mental capacities, no less than our biological or chemical characteristics, might ultimately be products of our fundamental physical constituents, and to do so in a way that preserves the phenomena. Externalists argue that the significance of thought turns on the circumstances of thinkers; reductionists hold that mental characteristics are physical; eliminationists contend that the concept of thought belongs to an outmoded folk theory of behavior. John Heil explores these topics and points the way to a naturalistic synthesis, one that accords the mental a place in the physical world alongside the non-mental.

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick.