Originally published in 1991, the essays in this volume are written by philosophers who were convinced that Wittgenstein's investigations in philosophical psychology were of direct relevance to current experimental psychology at the time. Rather than reflecting on the nature of psychological theory at a high level of abstraction, they examined leading theories and controversies in the experimental study of vision and of language in order to reveal the conceptual problems that they raise and the philosophical theories that have exerted an influence upon them. Under the section headings 'Language and Behaviour' and 'Perception and Representation', the essays examine the work of Chomsky, Gregory, Marr, Weiskrantz and others, and discuss problems ranging from artificial intelligence to animal communications, from blindsight to machine vision. The collection aims to demonstrate that philosophical investigations can contribute to psychological science by extirpating conceptual confusions which have been woven into the fabric of empirical research. The majority of the essays had been specially commissioned, and the contributors include several of the most distinguished exponents of Wittgenstein's philosophical legacy at the time.

Originally published in 1991, the essays in this volume are written by philosophers who were convinced that Wittgenstein's investigations in philosophical psychology were of direct relevance to current experimental psychology at the time. Rather than reflecting on the nature of psychological theory at a high level of abstraction, they examined leading theories and controversies in the experimental study of vision and of language in order to reveal the conceptual problems that they raise and the philosophical theories that have exerted an influence upon them. Under the section headings 'Language and Behaviour' and 'Perception and Representation', the essays examine the work of Chomsky, Gregory, Marr, Weiskrantz and others, and discuss problems ranging from artificial intelligence to animal communications, from blindsight to machine vision. The collection aims to demonstrate that philosophical investigations can contribute to psychological science by extirpating conceptual confusions which have been woven into the fabric of empirical research. The majority of the essays had been specially commissioned, and the contributors include several of the most distinguished exponents of Wittgenstein's philosophical legacy at the time.

Peter Hacker is one of the most notable interpreters of Wittgenstein's work, a powerful and sophisticated exponent of Wittgensteinian ideas, and a distinguished historian of the analytic tradition. Thirteen leading philosophers and Wittgenstein scholars offer specially written essays in honour of Hacker. Their contributions deal with a variety of themes associated with Wittgenstein. Some deal with issues of Wittgenstein scholarship and interpretation, including areas that have attracted an increasing amount of attention, such as ethics and religion. Others deal with central topics from the history of analytic philosophy. Finally there are essays that explore and assess Wittgensteinian ideas, in some cases as developed by Hacker, in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, or in related areas such as the philosophy of action and the philosophy of neuroscience.

One of the most exciting developments in philosophy in the last fifty years is the resurgence in the philosophy of action. The concept of action now occupies a central place in ethics, metaphysics and jurisprudence. This collection of original essays, by some of the most astute and influential philosophers working in this area, covers the entire range of the philosophy of action. Topics covered include the nature of actions themselves; how the concepts of act, agent, cause and event are related to each other; self-knowledge, emotion, autonomy and freedom in human life; and the place of the concept of action in criminal law. The volume concludes with a major essay by one of America's leading authorities in the philosophy of law on 'the 3.5 billion dollar question': was the destruction of the World Trade Center one event or two?

What is the difference between the movements in our bodies we cause personally ourselves, such as the movements of our legs or our lips when we walk or speak, and the movements we do not cause personally, such as the contraction of the heart? Is an act that is done under duress done voluntarily, out of choice? Should duress exculpate a defendant completely, or should it merely mitigate the criminality of an act? When we explain an intentional act by stating our reasons for doing it, do we explain it causally or teleologically, or both? Should we care whether our choices are guided by knowledge or mere true belief? In Action, Knowledge, and Will, John Hyman explores these and other central problems in the philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. The main premise of the book is that human action has four irreducibly different dimensions, each with its own family of concepts: - a physical dimension, in which the principal concepts are those of agent, power, and causation; - a psychological dimension, with the concepts of desire, aim, and intention; - an ethical dimension, with the concepts of voluntariness and choice; - an intellectual dimension, with the concepts of reason, knowledge, and belief. Studying each of these dimensions of human action separately yields a string of original results, culminating in a new analysis of the relationship between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.

Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions - psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical - which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Twentieth-century philosophers criticized the idea that acts are caused by 'willing' or 'volition', but the study of human action continued to be governed by a tendency to equate these dimensions of agency, or to reduce one to another. Cutting across the branches of philosophy, from logic and epistemology to ethics and jurisprudence, Action, Knowledge, and Will defends comprehensive theories of action and knowledge, and shows how thinking about agency in four dimensions deepens our understanding of human conduct and its causes.