Modern developed nations are rich and politically stable in part because their citizens are free to form organizations and have access to the relevant legal resources. Yet in spite of the advantages of open access to civil organizations, it is estimated that eighty percent of people live in countries that do not allow unfettered access. Why have some countries disallow the formation of organizations as part of their economic and political system? The contributions to Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development seek to answer this question through an exploration of how developing nations throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, made the transition to allowing their citizens the right to form organizations. The transition, contributors show, was not an easy one. Neither political changes brought about by revolution nor subsequent economic growth led directly to open access. In fact, initial patterns of change were in the opposite direction, as political coalitions restricted access to specific organizations for the purpose of maintaining political control. Ultimately, however, it became clear that these restrictions threatened the foundation of social and political order. Tracing the path of these modern civil societies, Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development is an invaluable contribution to all interested in today's developing countries and the challenges they face in developing this organizational capacity.

All societies must deal with the possibility of violence, and they do so in different ways. This book integrates the problem of violence into a larger social science and historical framework, showing how economic and political behavior are closely linked. Most societies, which we call natural states, limit violence by political manipulation of the economy to create privileged interests. These privileges limit the use of violence by powerful individuals, but doing so hinders both economic and political development. In contrast, modern societies create open access to economic and political organizations, fostering political and economic competition. The book provides a framework for understanding the two types of social orders, why open access societies are both politically and economically more developed, and how some 25 countries have made the transition between the two types.

This book applies the conceptual framework of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast's Violence and Social Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2009) to nine developing countries. The cases show how political control of economic privileges is used to limit violence and coordinate coalitions of powerful organizations. Rather than castigating politicians and elites as simply corrupt, the case studies illustrate why development is so difficult to achieve in societies where the role of economic organizations is manipulated to provide political balance and stability. The volume develops the idea of limited-access social order as a dynamic social system in which violence is constantly a threat, and political and economic outcomes result from the need to control violence rather than promoting economic growth or political rights.

All societies must deal with the possibility of violence, and they do so in different ways. This book integrates the problem of violence into a larger social science and historical framework, showing how economic and political behavior are closely linked. Most societies, which we call natural states, limit violence by political manipulation of the economy to create privileged interests. These privileges limit the use of violence by powerful individuals, but doing so hinders both economic and political development. In contrast, modern societies create open access to economic and political organizations, fostering political and economic competition. The book provides a framework for understanding the two types of social orders, why open access societies are both politically and economically more developed, and how some 25 countries have made the transition between the two types.

Between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, the American economy began its dramatic transformation to a modern industrial system. Scholars have long speculated about the pace and pattern of economic growth curing this period and the effects of growth on standards of living. In this volume, leading economic historians bring together a generation of research on these central issues. The contributors survey a variety of sources - including censuses, tax lists, farm day books, military records, U.S. Treasury reports, and patent records - to assemble data on the labor force, wage rates, national income, the capital stock, prices, technical changes, and productivity improvements. The quantitative data reveal that there was a significant and sustained improvement in economic performance between 1790 and 1860. Moreover, rates of growth accelerated over the whole period, despite several temporary setbacks. Looking beyond traditional measures and answer, additional important questions: Was the improvement in income widely shared? What happened to the quality of life? Were there important human costs to industrialization? How was the nature of work affected? What happened to health and longevity? The preponderance of evidence shows that living standards improved across a wide spectrum of society. However, there are gaps in our knowledge of how the poorest Americans fared. Even though many enjoyed better incomes, there are indications that the disease environment deteriorated, with unfavorable consequences for morbidity and mortality. With these important findings, the contributors set the agenda for further research on standards of living during a critical period in American history.