Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Lenczowski, offers a solution to one of the greatest weaknesses in U.S. foreign policy that has exacerbated the unprecedented anti-Americanism of recent years the U.S. Government's inability to conduct the 'full spectrum' of diplomatic arts and to integrate them with the other arts of statecraft at the level of grand strategy. The analysis presents a critique of how the Department of State's focus on traditional, government-to-government diplomacy comes at the expense of public diplomacy. 'Public Diplomacy' is defined in the broadest sense as including all those arts that involve relations with, and influence over, foreign publics and opinion leaders, including: cultural diplomacy, exchanges, information policy, strategic communications, psychological strategy, political action, political warfare, and wars of ideas. Author John Lenczowski, one of the first modern advocates for the strategic integration of all the instruments of national power, calls for the development of an 'influence culture' in U.S. foreign policy, and provides a road map for the reform of the structure and culture of American diplomacy. While addressing contemporary U.S. foreign policy, this study presents lessons in statecraft and grand strategy that are applicable for all times and places. Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy thus raises issues that are relevant not only to diplomats, but to practitioners of intelligence, counterintelligence, military strategy, and economic statecraft.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.

Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Lenczowski, offers a solution to one of the greatest weaknesses in U.S. foreign policy that has exacerbated the unprecedented anti-Americanism of recent years the U.S. Government's inability to conduct the "full spectrum" of diplomatic arts and to integrate them with the other arts of statecraft at the level of grand strategy. The analysis presents a critique of how the Department of State's focus on traditional, government-to-government diplomacy comes at the expense of public diplomacy. "Public Diplomacy" is defined in the broadest sense as including all those arts that involve relations with, and influence over, foreign publics and opinion leaders, including: cultural diplomacy, exchanges, information policy, strategic communications, psychological strategy, political action, political warfare, and wars of ideas. Author John Lenczowski, one of the first modern advocates for the strategic integration of all the instruments of national power, calls for the development of an "influence culture" in U.S. foreign policy, and provides a roadmap for the reform of the structure and culture of American diplomacy. While addressing contemporary U.S. foreign policy, this study presents lessons in statecraft and grand strategy that are applicable for all times and places. Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy thus raises issues that are relevant not only to diplomats, but to practitioners of intelligence, counterintelligence, military strategy, and economic statecraft.

Emerging from discussion between the top American and European statesmen, policymakers, and officials in government, The TransAtlantic Drift Debates offers readers a bridge for the growing diplomatic divide between the United States and Europe. A range of issues-including war in Iraq, America's perceived foreign policy unilateralism, and the future direction of the struggle against the scourge of international terrorism-pose challenges to what was once a strong alliance between Washington and European capitals. The pages herein offer advice and hope that the United States and Europe can rebuild their relationship and form the foundation of a true twenty-first century partnership.

Emerging from discussion between the top American and European statesmen, policymakers, and officials in government, The TransAtlantic Drift Debates offers readers a bridge for the growing diplomatic divide between the United States and Europe. A range of issues_including war in Iraq, America's perceived foreign policy unilateralism, and the future direction of the struggle against the scourge of international terrorism_pose challenges to what was once a strong alliance between Washington and European capitals. The pages herein offer advice and hope that the United States and Europe can rebuild their relationship and form the foundation of a true twenty-first century partnership.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.