In today's rapidly changing technological world, it is increasingly important that web and desktop applications be accessible to everyone, including those of us with special needs. However, the legal requirements for accessibility are often convoluted and diffucult to understand, making it impossible for most developers to comply with the laws. In the first book on the market to address the topic, Author John Paul Mueller leads you through the maze of Section 508the congressional law ensuring that all Americans have access to information technologyand offers comprehensive guidance on how to quickly and easily update your applications to conform to Section 508 requirements.

To begin, Mueller outlines the Section 508 requirements that are relevant to web and desktop application developers, and explains the laws in language you can understand. Using extensive and varied program examples, Mueller continues on to teach you to write web and desktop applications that not only conform to Section 508 standards, but look forward to ensure long-term universal accessibility for all types of computer users. Specific topics include writing accessible web applications and desktop applications using Visual Basic .NET and Visual C# .NET, developing special application capabilities, using Microsoft and other third-party tools to develop accessible features, developing accessible scripting solutions, and more. The book even includes a directory of helpful organizations, agencies, and resources to help you with any further accessibility concerns you may have.

Polls are at their best as indicators of public opinion when they allow comparisons over extended periods of time. Yet all too often changes in question working and in questionnare content make over-time comparisons impossible. This work overcomes this difficulty by bringing together for the first time a compendium of results using identically worded questions on a wide range of social, political, and economic topics of importance to the American people. Chapter introductions summarize trends in the various areas surveyed and discuss problems of interpretation. The chapters on political behavior and attitudes present findings on party identification, political tolerance, voting, civil liberties, international affairs, and related issues. Chapters on work, the family, and sexuality cover such topics as job prestige and satisfaction, the role of women, divorce, family size, sex education, abortion, premarital and extramarital sex, homosexuality, and pornography. Other issues addressed include crime and violence, race, death and dying, life style, and general attitudes toward life. Trend analysis based on General Social Surveys conducted regularly by The National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago since 1972 is supplemented by data from 25 other sources extending as far back as the 1930s. The questions chosen are meaningful and standardized and have been asked in interviews over a significant period. Survey results are displayed in a highly readable format that facilitates comparisons over time. An appropriate choice for the library reference collection, this book is a valuable research tool and source for scholars in political science, psychology, and sociology, as well as journalists, policy makers, and other professionals concerned with public opinion.

It could be said that American foreign policy since 1945 has been one long miscue; most international threats - including during the Cold War - have been substantially exaggerated. The result has been agony and bloviation, unnecessary and costly military interventions that have mostly failed. A policy of complacency and appeasement likely would have worked better. In this highly readable book, John Mueller argues with wisdom and wit rather than ideology and hyperbole that aversion to international war has had considerable consequences. There has seldom been significant danger of major war. Nuclear weapons, international institutions, and America's super power role have been substantially irrelevant; post-Cold War policy has been animated more by vast proclamation and half-vast execution than by the appeals of liberal hegemony; and post-9/11 concerns about international terrorism and nuclear proliferation have been overwrought and often destructive. Meanwhile, threats from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, or from cyber technology are limited and manageable. Unlikely to charm Washington, Mueller explains how, when international war is in decline, complacency and appeasement become viable diplomatic devices and a large military is scarcely required.

As we enter a new century, world affairs have been transformed. The leading countries confront no compelling or immediate major threats of a military sort; they all see the world in essentially the same way; there has been an enormous expansion of international trade and economic interconnections; and rapid technological expansion has facilitated i

The recent economic crisis in the United States has highlighted a crisis of understanding. In this volume, Bradley C. S. Watson and Joseph Postell bring together some of America's most eminent thinkers on political economy an increasingly overlooked field wherein political ideas and economic theories mutually inform each other. Only through a restoration of political economy can we reconnect economics to the human good. Economics as a discipline deals with the production and distribution of goods and services. Yet the study of economics can-indeed must be employed in our striving for the best possible political order and way of life. Economic thinkers and political actors need once again to consider how the Constitution and basic principles of our government might give direction and discipline to our thinking about economic theories, and to the economic policies we choose to implement. The contributors are experts in economic history, and the history of economic ideas. They address basic themes of political economy, theoretical and practical: from the relationship between natural law and economics, to how our Founding Fathers approached economics, to questions of banking and monetary policy. Their insights will serve as trusty guides to future generations, as well as to our own."

This book collects the key essays, together with updating notes and commentary, of Professor John Mueller on war and the role of ideas and opinions. Mueller has maintained that war (and peace) are, in essence, merely ideas, and that war has waned as the notion that 'peace' is a decidedly good idea has gained currency. The first part of the book extends this argument, noting that as ideas have spread, war is losing out not only in the developed world, but now in the developing one, and that even civil war is in marked decline. It also assesses and critiques theories arguing that this phenomenon is caused by the rising acceptance of democracy and/or capitalism. The second part argues that the Cold War was at base a clash of ideas that were seen to be threatening, not of arms balances, domestic systems, geography, or international structure. It also maintains that there has been a considerable tendency to exaggerate security threats -- currently, in particular, the one presented by international terrorism -- and to see them in excessively military terms. The third section deals with the role public opinion plays in foreign policy, and argues that many earlier conclusions about opinion during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, including especially ones concerning the importance of casualties in determining popular support for war, apply to more recent military ventures in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It also assesses the difficulties leaders and idea entrepreneurs often encounter when they try to manage or manipulate public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of international relations, security studies, foreign policy and international history.

This book collects the key essays, together with updating notes and commentary, of Professor John Mueller on war and the role of ideas and opinions. Mueller has maintained that war (and peace) are, in essence, merely ideas, and that war has waned as the notion that 'peace' is a decidedly good idea has gained currency. The first part of the book extends this argument, noting that as ideas have spread, war is losing out not only in the developed world, but now in the developing one, and that even civil war is in marked decline. It also assesses and critiques theories arguing that this phenomenon is caused by the rising acceptance of democracy and/or capitalism. The second part argues that the Cold War was at base a clash of ideas that were seen to be threatening, not of arms balances, domestic systems, geography, or international structure. It also maintains that there has been a considerable tendency to exaggerate security threats -- currently, in particular, the one presented by international terrorism -- and to see them in excessively military terms. The third section deals with the role public opinion plays in foreign policy, and argues that many earlier conclusions about opinion during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, including especially ones concerning the importance of casualties in determining popular support for war, apply to more recent military ventures in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It also assesses the difficulties leaders and idea entrepreneurs often encounter when they try to manage or manipulate public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of international relations, security studies, foreign policy and international history.

Since 2001, the United States has created or reorganized more than two counterterrorism organizations for every terrorist arrest or apprehension it has made of people plotting to do damage within the country. Central to this massive enterprise is 'ghost-chasing,' as less than one alarm in 10,000 is an actual threat-the rest all point to ghosts. And the vast majority of the leads deemed to be productive have led to terrorist enterprises that were either trivial or at most aspirational. As John Mueller and Mark Stewart suggest in Chasing Ghosts, this is often an exercise in dueling delusions: a Muslim hothead has delusions about changing the world by blowing something up, and the authorities have delusions that he might actually be able to overcome his patent inadequacies to do so. Mueller and Stewart systematically examine this expensive, exhausting, bewildering, chaotic, and paranoia-inducing process. They evaluate the counterterrorism efforts of the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and local policing agencies. In addition, applying a new set of case studies, they appraise the capacities of the terrorist 'adversary' and discuss what they calls 'the myth of the mastermind.' They also assess public opinion, a key driving force for counterterrorism efforts. The yearly chance an American will be killed by a terrorist within the country is about one in four million under present conditions. However, polling data suggest that, although over a trillion dollars has been spent on domestic counterterrorism since 2001, Americans continue to be alarmed and say they do not feel safer. No defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective as long as officials and the population at large continue to believe that the threat from terrorism is massive, even existential. Mueller and Stewart do not argue that there is nothing for the ghost-chasers to find-the terrorist 'adversary' is real and does exist. The question that is central to the exercise, but one the ghost-chasers never really probe, is an important and rather straight-forward one to which standard evaluative procedures can be applied: is the chase worth the effort? Or is it excessive given a serious consideration of the danger that terrorism actually presents?

In today's rapidly changing technological world, it is increasingly important that web and desktop applications be accessible to everyone, including those of us with special needs. However, the legal requirements for accessibility are often convoluted and diffucult to understand, making it impossible for most developers to comply with the laws. In the first book on the market to address the topic, Author John Paul Mueller leads you through the maze of Section 508-the congressional law ensuring that all Americans have access to information technology-and offers comprehensive guidance on how to quickly and easily update your applications to conform to Section 508 requirements. To begin, Mueller outlines the Section 508 requirements that are relevant to web and desktop application developers, and explains the laws in language you can understand. Using extensive and varied program examples, Mueller continues on to teach you to write web and desktop applications that not only conform to Section 508 standards, but look forward to ensure long-term universal accessibility for all types of computer users. Specific topics include writing accessible web applications and desktop applications using Visual Basic .NET and Visual C# .NET, developing special application capabilities, using Microsoft and other third-party tools to develop accessible features, developing accessible scripting solutions, and more. The book even includes a directory of helpful organizations, agencies, and resources to help you with any further accessibility concerns you may have.

Web Matrix Developer's Guide provides a complete view of what you can accomplish with Web Matrix (Microsoft's free Web site creation program)--everything from generating simple Web pages to developing Web service applications to building mobile applications. Expert author John Mueller covers all the major features of Web Matrix, including the ASP.NET page designer, SQL and MSDE database management, data-bound UI generation, XML Web Services, and FTP workspaces. Web Matrix Developer's Guide shows you how to create a wealth of application types beginning with simple HTML and moving on to XML and ASP.NET. You'll learn how to use CSS and XSLT to create content for both PDAs and cellular telephones. Finally, you'll learn about the database management functionality that Web Matrix provides.

As we enter a new century, world affairs have been transformed. The leading countries confront no compelling or immediate major threats of a military sort; they all see the world in essentially the same way; there has been an enormous expansion of international trade and economic interconnections; and rapid technological expansion has facilitated international interconnections that substantially skirt standard political arrangements. This makes possible a reallocation of national effort from security to material concerns and a reasonable prospect for an unparalleled era of prosperity and peace.But less benign forces also persist. Ethnic conflict continues to plague the world, and a new challenge to the international order could be launched by an emergent or resurgent state. Moreover, the positive prospects of the global economy are not yet available for all nations. In result, politics - political choice - remains important.In this book, a group of political scientists, economists, and historians assess these important developments. They agree that important historical changes are occurring in international politics, but they differ in their perspectives and proffer different speculations about the new era and about the consequences of the emerging relationship between politics and economics. They also vary in the degree to which they are optimistic or pessimistic about the way things appear to be going.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"
In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, andMoney has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

The Persian Gulf crisis may well have been the most extensively polled episode in U.S. history as President Bush, his opponents, and even Saddam Hussein appealed to, and tried to influence, public opinion. As well documented as this phenomenon was, it remains largely unexplained. John Mueller provides an account of the complex relationship between American policy and public opinion during the Gulf crisis.
Mueller analyzes key issues: the actual shallowness of public support for war; the effect of public opinion on the media (rather than the other way around); the use and misuse of polls by policy makers; the American popular focus on Hussein's ouster as a central purpose of the War; and the War's short-lived impact on voting. Of particular interest is Mueller's conclusion that Bush succeeded in leading the country to war by increasingly convincing the public that it was inevitable, rather than right or wise.
Throughout, Mueller, author of "War, Presidents, and Public Opinion," an analysis of public opinion during the Korean and Vietnam wars, places this analysis of the Gulf crisis in a broad political and military context, making comparisons to wars in Panama, Vietnam, Korea, and the Falklands, as well as to World War II and even the War of 1812. The book also collects nearly 300 tables charting public opinion through the Gulf crisis, making "Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War" an essential reference for anyone interested in recent American politics, foreign policy, public opinion, and survey research.

Are We Safe Enough? Measuring and Assessing Aviation Security explains how standard risk analytic and cost-benefit analysis can be applied to aviation security in systematic and easy-to-understand steps. The book evaluates and puts into sensible context the risks associated with air travel, the risk appetite of airlines and regulators and the notion of acceptable risk. It does so by describing the effectiveness, risk reduction and cost of each layer of aviation security, from policing and intelligence to checkpoint passenger screening to arming pilots on the flight deck.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"
In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, andMoney has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

Why have there been no terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11? It is ridiculously easy for a single person with a bomb-filled backpack, or a single explosives-laden automobile, to launch an attack. So why hasn't it happened? The answer is surely not the Department of Homeland Security, which cannot stop terrorists from entering the country, legally or otherwise. It is surely not the Iraq war, which has stoked the hatred of Muslim extremists around the world and wasted many thousands of lives. Terrorist attacks have been regular events for many years -- usually killing handfuls of people, occasionally more than that.

Is it possible that there is a simple explanation for the peaceful American homefront? Is it possible that "there are no al-Qaeda terrorists here"? Is it possible that the war on terror has been a radical overreaction to a rare event? Consider: 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants have been subjected to fingerprinting and registration, and more than 5,000 foreign nationals have been imprisoned -- yet there has not been a single conviction for a terrorist crime in America. A handful of plots -- some deadly, some intercepted -- have plagued Europe and elsewhere, and even so, the death toll has been modest.

We have gone to war in two countries and killed tens of thousands of people. We have launched a massive domestic wiretapping program and created vast databases of information once considered private. Politicians and pundits have berated us about national security and patriotic duty, while encroaching our freedoms and sending thousands of young men off to die.

It is time to consider the hypothesis that dare not speak its name: we have wildly overreacted. Terrorism has been used by murderous groups for many decades, yet even including 9/11, the odds of an American being killed by international terrorism are microscopic. In general, international terrorism doesn't do much damage when considered in almost any reasonable context.

The capacity of al-Qaeda or of any similar group to do damage in the United States pales in comparison to the capacity other dedicated enemies, particularly international Communism, have possessed in the past. Lashing out at the terrorist threat is frequently an exercise in self-flagellation because it is usually more expensive than the terrorist attack itself and because it gives the terrorists exactly what they are looking for. Much, probably most, of the money and effort expended on counterterrorism since 2001 (and before, for that matter) has been wasted.

The terrorism industry and its allies in the White House and Congress have preyed on our fears and caused enormous damage. It is time to rethink the entire enterprise and spend much smaller amounts on only those things that do matter: intelligence, law enforcement, and disruption of radical groups overseas. Above all, it is time to stop playing into the terrorists' hands, by fear-mongering and helping spread terror itself.

"War . . . is merely an idea, an institution, like dueling or slavery, that has been grafted onto human existence. It is not a trick of fate, a thunderbolt from hell, a natural calamity, or a desperate plot contrivance dreamed up by some sadistic puppeteer on high. And it seems to me that the institution is in pronounced decline, abandoned as attitudes toward it have changed, roughly following the pattern by which the ancient and formidable institution of slavery became discredited and then mostly obsolete." from the Introduction

War is one of the great themes of human history and now, John Mueller believes, it is clearly declining. Developed nations have generally abandoned it as a way for conducting their relations with other countries, and most current warfare (though not all) is opportunistic predation waged by packs often remarkably small ones of criminals and bullies. Thus, argues Mueller, war has been substantially reduced to its remnants or dregs and thugs are the residual combatants.

Mueller is sensitive to the policy implications of this view. When developed states commit disciplined troops to peacekeeping, the result is usually a rapid cessation of murderous disorder. The Remnants of War thus reinvigorates our sense of the moral responsibility bound up in peacekeeping. In Mueller's view, capable domestic policing and military forces can also be effective in reestablishing civic order, and the building of competent governments is key to eliminating most of what remains of warfare."

Ever since the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the prospect of nuclear annihilation has haunted the modern world. But as John Mueller reveals in this eye-opening, compellingly argued, and very reassuring book, our obsession with nuclear weapons is unsupported by history, scientific fact, or logic. Examining the entire atomic era, Mueller boldly contends that nuclear weapons have had little impact on history. Although they have inspired overwrought policies and distorted spending priorities, for the most part they have proved to be militarily useless, and a key reason so few countries have taken them up is that they are a spectacular waste of money and scientific talent. Equally important, Atomic Obsession reveals why anxieties about terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons are essentially baseless: a host of practical and organizational difficulties make their likelihood of success almost vanishingly small. Mueller, one of America's most distinguished yet provocative international relations scholars, goes even further, maintaining that our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have produced more suffering and violence than the bombs themselves, and that proliferation of the weapons, while not necessarily desirable, is unlikely to be a major danger or to accelerate. "The book will certainly make you think. Added bonus: It's immensely fun to read." -Stephen M. Walt, ForeignPolicy.com "Meticulously researched and punctuated with a dry wit. Mueller deserves praise for having the guts to shout that the atomic emperor has no clothes." -Arms Control Today "Mueller performs an important service in puncturing some of the inflated rhetoric about nuclear weapons.... An unusual and fruitful perspective on nuclear history." -Science Magazine

Democracy is overrated. Capitalism, on the other hand, doesn't get enough credit. In this provocative and engaging book, John Mueller argues that these mismatches between image and reality create significant political and economic problems--inspiring instability, inefficiency, and widespread cynicism. We would be far better off, he writes, if we recognized that neither system is ideal or disastrous and accepted instead the humdrum truth that both are "pretty good." And, to Mueller, that means good enough. He declares that what is true of Garrison Keillor's fictional store "Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery" is also true of democracy and capitalism: if you can't get what you want there, "you can probably get along without it."

Mueller begins by noting that capitalism is commonly thought to celebrate greed and to require discourtesy, deceit, and callousness. However, with examples that range from car dealerships and corporate boardrooms to the shop of an eighteenth-century silk merchant, Mueller shows that capitalism in fact tends to reward behavior that is honest, fair, civil, and compassionate. He argues that this gap between image and reality hampers economic development by encouraging people to behave dishonestly, unfairly, and discourteously to try to get ahead and to neglect the virtuous behavior that is an important source of efficiency and gain.

The problem with democracy's image, by contrast, is that our expectations are too high. We are too often led by theorists, reformers, and romantics to believe that democracy should consist of egalitarianism and avid civic participation. In fact, democracy will always be chaotic, unequal, and marked by apathy. It offers reasonable freedom and security, but not political paradise. To idealize democracy, Mueller writes, is to undermine it, since the inevitable contrast with reality creates public cynicism and can hamper democracy's growth and development.

Mueller presents these arguments with sophistication, wit, and erudition. He combines mastery of current political and economic literature with references to figures ranging from Plato to P. T. Barnum, from Immanuel Kant to Ronald Reagan, from Shakespeare to Frank Capra. Broad in scope and rich in detail, the book will provoke debate among economists, political scientists, and anyone interested in the problems (or non-problems) of modern democracy and capitalism.