This book investigates the concept of procedural autonomy of Member States in the light of EU law. Does procedural autonomy still adequately describe the powers of national lawmakers and courts to design their civil procedural systems or is it misleading? For the last few decades, Europe has been in a period of increasing Europeanisation of civil procedure. Increased powers of the EU have resulted in hard law, case law and soft law that regulate many types of domestic and cross-border civil cases. These rules have both direct and indirect implications for national procedural law.Gaining insights from selected European jurisdictions (Belgium, England and Wales, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden), this book explores the concept of procedural autonomy from different angles: Is procedural autonomy an adequate term? How is procedural autonomy understood nationally, and is there variation among the Member States? Do some types of EU law or specific characteristics of EU civil procedural law restrain procedural autonomy more than other? How can these differences be explained and is it possible to identify the sources causing such discrepancies?Procedural Autonomy across Europe is a stimulating discussion for lawyers with an interest in civil procedure.

A range of international and European Union legal instruments exert influence on the national civil procedure rules of European Union member states. Some specifically aim for the harmonisation of national procedural law across Europe, while others primarily focus on facilitating cross-border litigation, enforcing rights or setting minimum standards. However, often the same time instruments cause fragmentation, reduce coherence and challenge prevailing concepts and doctrines of national civil procedure law.With a view to carefully selected North Western jurisdiction (EU and EEA member states) this book explores how EU, EEA, and international legislation, judicial activism on EU and national level, and new soft law instruments affect national civil procedure law and how, in turn, national rules may impact the development of international instruments. How are the respective countries affected by a particular (EU) regulation? Has the regulation generated changes of the national law? Are European rules, or national rules following from them, applied in court practice? Are there differences in the approach towards implementation and application of EU law, and if so why and with what consequences? Do international influences serve as an impetus for national reforms, or are they implemented mechanically? Do hard law approaches produce more harmonisation or convergence than soft law approaches?

John Sorabji examines the theoretical underpinnings of the Woolf and Jackson reforms to the English and Welsh civil justice system. He discusses how the Woolf reforms attempted, and failed, to effect a revolutionary change to the theory of justice that informed how the system operated. It elucidates the nature of those reforms, which through introducing proportionality via an explicit overriding objective into the Civil Procedure Rules, downgraded the court's historic commitment to achieving substantive justice or justice on the merits. In doing so, Woolf's new theory is compared with one developed by Bentham, while also exploring why a similarly fundamental reform carried out in the 1870s succeeded where Woolf's failed. It finally proposes an approach that could be taken by the courts following implementation of the Jackson reforms to ensure that they succeed in their aim of reducing litigation cost through properly implementing Woolf's new theory of justice.

John Sorabji examines the theoretical underpinnings of the Woolf and Jackson reforms to the English and Welsh civil justice system. He discusses how the Woolf reforms attempted, and failed, to effect a revolutionary change to the theory of justice that informed how the system operated. It elucidates the nature of those reforms, which through introducing proportionality via an explicit overriding objective into the Civil Procedure Rules, downgraded the court's historic commitment to achieving substantive justice or justice on the merits. In doing so, Woolf's new theory is compared with one developed by Bentham, while also exploring why a similarly fundamental reform carried out in the 1870s succeeded where Woolf's failed. It finally proposes an approach that could be taken by the courts following implementation of the Jackson reforms to ensure that they succeed in their aim of reducing litigation cost through properly implementing Woolf's new theory of justice.