Some of the most basic doctrines of property law are very old, many dating to the medieval era. How can legal rules that were born so long ago remain viable today? In Reappraisals in the Law of Property, author John V. Orth considers various topics in order to discover the forces that have been made and are continuing to remake these areas of the law. Orth proposes three forces in particular that have shaped the development of property law over time: the inertial force of tradition, the reforming power of judicial and legislative activism, and the constant challenge of academic criticism. Together, these themes form the foundation of a critical and challenging work, one that re-evaluates property law and demonstrates both its enduring consistency and the unique and often drastic ways in which it has evolved in the modern era.

Some of the most basic doctrines of property law are very old, many dating to the medieval era. How can legal rules that were born so long ago remain viable today? In Reappraisals in the Law of Property, author John V. Orth considers various topics in order to discover the forces that have been made and are continuing to remake these areas of the law. Orth proposes three forces in particular that have shaped the development of property law over time: the inertial force of tradition, the reforming power of judicial and legislative activism, and the constant challenge of academic criticism. Together, these themes form the foundation of a critical and challenging work, one that re-evaluates property law and demonstrates both its enduring consistency and the unique and often drastic ways in which it has evolved in the modern era.

This book restores to view a masterpiece of beauty and legal scholarship, which has been lost for almost two hundred years.  Produced anonymously in 1838, The Tree of Legal Knowledge is an elaborate visualization in five large colored plates of the law as stated in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.  Intended as “an assistant for students in the study of law,� the study aid was not a simple diagram but a beautiful tree with each branch and twig labeled with legal terms and concepts from the Commentaries.  Not for law students only, the original was also intended to be of use to the practicing attorney and educated gentleman “in consolidating his learning and forming an instructive and ornamental appendage to an office.� Although Blackstone’s Commentaries had been first published eighty years earlier, it remained the primary source for knowledge of English law and required reading for American law students.  The Commentaries remain relevant today and are frequently cited by the U.S. Supreme Court as a source for the original understanding of legal rights and obligations at the time of American Independence.  Despite its artistic beauty and academic significance, The Tree of Legal Knowledge had seemingly disappeared shortly after its publication.  It is not included in the collection of any library, including the Library of Congress or in Yale University’s Blackstone Collection, the largest in the world.  It is not listed in the comprehensive Bibliographical Catalog of William Blackstone, edited by Ann Jordan Laeuchli, published for the Yale Law Library in 2015.   The present volume reproduces the only extant copy of The Tree of Legal Knowledge.  It includes an introduction by the editor that places The Tree in historical context and identifies the anonymous author, an otherwise unknown lawyer.  In addition, it reprints the original author’s introduction and “explanation of the branches,� both extensively annotated.  This book restores this lost masterpiece to its proper place in legal history.  The Tree is a beautiful—and accurate—depiction of English law as expounded in Blackstone’s Commentaries, the single most important book in the history of the common law.

Many rights that Americans cherish today go unmentioned in the U.S. Constitution. Where do these freedoms come from? John V. Orth answers that question in this unique and gem-like history of due process.

No person's life, liberty, or property may be taken without "due process of law." What exactly that means has been one of the most frequently asked questions in American constitutional history. Today, the answer is usually given in two parts: what procedures the government must follow and-in exceptional cases-what the government cannot do even if it follows the proper procedures. The procedural aspect of this answer has been far less controversial than "substantive due process," which at one time limited government regulation of business and today forbids the states from outlawing abortions.

"Due process of law," as a phrase and as a concept, was already old at the time it was adopted by American constitution-writers, both state and federal. Mindful of the English background and of constitutional developments in the several states, Orth in a succinct and readable narrative traces the history of due process, from its origins in medieval England to its applications in the latest cases.

Departing from the usual approach to American constitutional law, Orth places the history of due process in the larger context of the common law. To a degree not always appreciated today, constitutional law advances in the same case-by-case manner as other legal rules. In that light, Orth concentrates on the general maxims or paradigms that guided the judges in their decisions of specific cases. Uncovering the links between one case and another, Orth describes how a commitment to fair procedures made way for an emphasis on the protection of property rights, which in turn led to a heightened sensitivity to individual rights in general.

This unconventional history of the concept of due process heightens the reader's understanding of an important and vexed question of Anglo-American law and constitutionalism. Tracing the evolution of substantive due process through paradigmatic and exemplary cases, Orth explains in understandable terms the sources of controversial judicial rulings like "Roe v. Wade."

Why do appellate courts always have an odd number of judges? And what does the answer tell us about changing concepts of law? How can common law be unconstitutional? Why does the power of judges depend on accurate court reporting?

Because legal education today has come to focus so much on teaching students "how to think like lawyers," some subjects do not fit comfortably in law school curricula. John Orth, a distinguished senior law scholar, here explores some of these neglected but important topics. His insightful volume invites students of the law to look at the origins of accepted legal practices as a means of gaining insight into the judicial role and the evolution of common law.

In six carefully reasoned and clearly argued articles-four never before published--Orth presents the familiar in a fresh light. He considers, in addition to the questions already mentioned, how the centuries-old common law tradition interacts with statutory law-making, why claims that individual rights are grounded in common law are suspect, and how the common law uses what it learns about the past.

In considering these questions related to common law and its remarkable longevity, Orth illuminates both its interaction with written constitutions and its longstanding preoccupation with procedure and property. And by questioning the assertion that individualism was the cornerstone of common law, he deftly resolves an objection that liberal scholars sometimes raise concerning common law--its connection to the Lochner era of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Together, these essays show that common law is constantly in motion, using and reusing techniques that have kept it viable for centuries.

How many judges does it take to make a supreme court? As Orth observes, the institutional novelty of odd numbers of judges provided a means to break ties but did nothing to guarantee acceptance of their decisions. By demonstrating that what seems obvious about the law today was not always so, he cogently addresses changing perceptions of law and invites its future practitioners not only to think like lawyers but also to be more fully grounded in the law.

Why do appellate courts always have an odd number of judges? And what does the answer tell us about changing concepts of law? How can common law be unconstitutional? Why does the power of judges depend on accurate court reporting?

Because legal education today has come to focus so much on teaching students "how to think like lawyers," some subjects do not fit comfortably in law school curricula. John Orth, a distinguished senior law scholar, here explores some of these neglected but important topics. His insightful volume invites students of the law to look at the origins of accepted legal practices as a means of gaining insight into the judicial role and the evolution of common law.

In six carefully reasoned and clearly argued articles-four never before published--Orth presents the familiar in a fresh light. He considers, in addition to the questions already mentioned, how the centuries-old common law tradition interacts with statutory law-making, why claims that individual rights are grounded in common law are suspect, and how the common law uses what it learns about the past.

In considering these questions related to common law and its remarkable longevity, Orth illuminates both its interaction with written constitutions and its longstanding preoccupation with procedure and property. And by questioning the assertion that individualism was the cornerstone of common law, he deftly resolves an objection that liberal scholars sometimes raise concerning common law--its connection to the Lochner era of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Together, these essays show that common law is constantly in motion, using and reusing techniques that have kept it viable for centuries.

How many judges does it take to make a supreme court? As Orth observes, the institutional novelty of odd numbers of judges provided a means to break ties but did nothing to guarantee acceptance of their decisions. By demonstrating that what seems obvious about the law today was not always so, he cogently addresses changing perceptions of law and invites its future practitioners not only to think like lawyers but also to be more fully grounded in the law.

Although less than fifty words long, the meaning of the seemingly simple Eleventh Amendment has troubled the Supreme Court at crucial points in American history and continues to spur sharp debate in present-day courts. The first amendment adopted after the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh Amendment limits the exercise of U.S. judicial power when American states are sued. Its modern meaning was largely shaped around cases concerning the liability of Southern states to pay their debts during and after Reconstruction; by shielding states from liability, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment eased the establishment of post-Reconstruction Southern society and left a maddeningly complicated law of federal jurisdiction. Here, Orth reconstructs the fascinating but obscure history of the Eleventh Amendment--the labyrinth of legal doctrine, the economic motives and consequences, the political context, and the legacy of the past--over the last two centuries. Using quotes from Wordsworth, Shaw, Mark Twain, Margaret Mitchell, and other writers to clarify and invigorate his narrative, Orth finally makes accessible an important but complex slice of constitutional history.