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Since the events of 11 September 2001, the United States military
counternetwork operations, theory, and doctrine have failed to
account for the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular
networks used by both interstate insurgencies, such as those in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as by global insurgencies like
al-Qaeda and its associated movements. The failure to understand
the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks has
led to the incorrect application of counternetwork operations based
on ill-informed counternetwork theories. This monograph defines
counternetwork operations as a subset of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations. Like counterguerrilla operations,
counternetwork operations are focused on a specific element of the
insurgency. In this case, counternetwork operations are conducted
against the clandestine cellular networks within an insurgency,
specifically the underground and auxiliary, not the overt guerrilla
elements. This is a counter organizational operational construct,
not a strategy in-of-itself, as has happened with
counterterrorism-a counter "tactic"-turned strategy. Although
counternetwork operations are not specifically discussed in U.S.
joint or service doctrine, since 9/11, these operations have been
the primary offensive effort of both Special Operations and
conventional forces, normally referred to as raids, direct-action,
or intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill high-value
individuals in the insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan, and
globally against al-Qaeda and its associated movements. During this
time, counternetwork operations have primarily focused on targeting
key leaders, facilitators, individuals with special skills, or
highly-connected individuals, all of which intuitively seem to be
the correct targets for disconnecting clandestine cellular
networks. However, there has been little comparative analysis done
to verify if these operations are in fact having the overall effect
required to disrupt, neutralize, defeat, or ultimately destroy
these networks. Understanding the form, function, and logic of
clandestine cellular networks reveals that the removal of single
individuals, regardless of function, is well within the tolerance
of this type of organizational structure and thus has little
long-term effect. Counternetwork operations focused on critical
individuals, known as high-value individuals or targets (HVI or
HVT), have not proven overly successful for this reason. They gain
media attention, provide a momentary lift in the spirits of the
counterinsurgent or counterterrorist effort, but rarely produce
strategic effects as anticipated. A contemporary example of this
was the death of Abu Musab Zarqawi (AMZ), the infamous al-Qaeda
leader in Iraq, who was killed in 2006. At the time, there was
speculation that the death of Zarqawi would end the insurgency or
at least seriously degrade the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. However,
it had little overall effect. His organization was resilient enough
that his deputy, Abu Ayyub al Masri (AAM), assumed his leadership
role and continued to lead al-Qaeda in Iraq until AAM was himself
finally killed in 2010. With AAM's death, his replacement was
quickly announced, and al-Qaeda in Iraq continued to conduct
attacks in Iraq at the time of publication of this onograph.
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