Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” is a cutting intervention in modern philosophy that shows the full power of good evaluative and analytical critical thinking skills.

Though only 16 pages long, Anscombe’s paper set out to do nothing less than reform the entire field of modern moral philosophy – something that could only be done by carefully examining the existing arguments of the giants of the field. To do this, she deployed the central skills of evaluation and analysis.

In critical thinking, analysis helps understand the sequence and features of arguments: it asks what reasons these arguments produce, what implicit reasons and assumptions they rely on, what conclusions they arrive at. Evaluation involves judging whether or not the arguments are strong enough to sustain their conclusions: it asks how acceptable, adequate, and relevant the reasons given are, and whether or not the conclusions drawn from them are really valid.

In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe dispassionately turns these skills on figures that have dominated moral philosophy since the 18th-century, revealing the underlying assumptions of their work, their weaknesses and strengths, and showing that in many ways the supposed differences between their arguments are actually negligible. A brilliantly incisive piece, “Modern Moral Philosophy” radically affected its field, remaining required – and controversial – reading today.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s 1981 After Virtue was a ground-breaking contribution to modern moral philosophy. Dissatisfied with the major trends in the moral philosophy of his time, MacIntyre argued that modern moral discourse had no real rational basis. Instead, he suggested, if one wanted to build a rational theory for morality and moral actions, one would have to go all the way back to Aristotle. To build his arguments – which are widely acknowledged to be as important as they are complex – MacIntyre relies on two critical thinking skills above all others: evaluation and interpretation.

The primary goal of evaluation is to judge the strength or weakness of arguments, asking how acceptable a given line of reasoning is, and how adequate it is to the situation. In After Virtue, MacIntyre applies incisive evaluation skills to major positions and figures in moral philosophy one after the other – showing how and why Aristotle’s template remains a stronger way of considering moral questions. Throughout this process, MacIntyre also relies on his interpretative skills. As MacIntyre knows, clarifying meanings, questioning definitions, and laying down definitions of his key terms is as vital to advancing his arguments as it is to evaluating those of other philosophers.

Alasdair MacIntyre's 1981 After Virtue was a ground-breaking contribution to modern moral philosophy. Dissatisfied with the major trends in the moral philosophy of his time, MacIntyre argued that modern moral discourse had no real rational basis. Instead, he suggested, if one wanted to build a rational theory for morality and moral actions, one would have to go all the way back to Aristotle. To build his arguments - which are widely acknowledged to be as important as they are complex - MacIntyre relies on two critical thinking skills above all others: evaluation and interpretation. The primary goal of evaluation is to judge the strength or weakness of arguments, asking how acceptable a given line of reasoning is, and how adequate it is to the situation. In After Virtue, MacIntyre applies incisive evaluation skills to major positions and figures in moral philosophy one after the other - showing how and why Aristotle's template remains a stronger way of considering moral questions. Throughout this process, MacIntyre also relies on his interpretative skills. As MacIntyre knows, clarifying meanings, questioning definitions, and laying down definitions of his key terms is as vital to advancing his arguments as it is to evaluating those of other philosophers.

This book provides a new account of the emergence of the philosophy of personal identity in the early modern period. Reflection on personal identity is often thought to have begun in earnest with John Locke's famous consciousness-based account, published in the 2nd Edition of the Essay in 1694. The present work argues that we ought to understand modern notions of personal identity, including Locke's own, as emerging from within debates about the metaphysics of resurrection across the seventeenth century. It recovers and analyses theories of personal identity and resurrection in Locke and Leibniz, as well as largely-forgotten theories from the Cambridge Platonists, Thomas Jackson, and Francisco Suarez. The book narrates a time of radical change in conceptions of personal identity: the period begins with a near-consensus on hylomorphism, according to which the body is an essential metaphysical part of the person. The re-emergence of platonism in the period then undermines the centrality of the body for personal identity, and this lays the groundwork for a more thoroughly 'psychological' account of personal identity in Locke. This work represents the first scholarly study to thoroughly situate early modern conceptions of personal identity, embodiment, and the afterlife within the context of late scholasticism. Finally, due to its focus on the arguments of the authors in question, the work will be of interest to philosophers of religion as well as historians of philosophy.