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Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of
knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge
is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this
inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The
Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan
Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore
the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of
the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that
knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts.
Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig
tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and
comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than
generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book
will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.
Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology--that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that it is less valuable than generally assumed. The book will appeal to students and professional philosophers in epistemology.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume
offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this
longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth
of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a
distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any
area of philosophy of religion.
Jonathan Kvanvig presents a compelling new work in philosophical
theology on the universe, creation, and the afterlife. Organised
thematically by the endpoints of time, the volume begins by
addressing eschatological matters-the doctrines of heaven and
hell-and ends with an account of divine deliberation and creation.
Kvanvig develops a coherent theistic outlook which reconciles a
traditional, high conception of deity, with full providential
control over all aspects of creation, with full providential
control over all aspects of creation, with a conception of human
beings as free and morally responsible. The resulting position and
defense is labeled "Philosophical Arminianism," and deserves
attention in a broad range of religious traditions.
Jonathan Kvanvig presents a compelling new work in philosophical
theology on the universe, creation, and the afterlife. Organised
thematically by the endpoints of time, the volume begins by
addressing eschatological matters--the doctrines of heaven and
hell--and ends with an account of divine deliberation and creation.
Kvanvig develops a coherent theistic outlook which reconciles a
traditional, high conception of deity, with full providential
control over all aspects of creation, with full providential
control over all aspects of creation, with a conception of human
beings as free and morally responsible. The resulting position and
defense is labeled "Philosophical Arminianism," and deserves
attention in a broad range of religious traditions.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume
offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this
longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth
of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a
distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any
area of philosophy of religion.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume
offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this
longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth
of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a
distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any
area of philosophy of religion.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume
offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this
longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth
of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a
distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any
area of philosophy of religion.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume
offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this
longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth
of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a
distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any
area of philosophy of religion.
The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch
in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of
truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has
not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the
paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to
which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to
express that idea than to maintain that all truths are knowable? In
the face of the paradox, however, such a characterization threatens
to undermine antirealism. If Fitch's proof is valid, then one can
be an antirealist of this sort only by endorsing the conclusion of
the proof that all truths are known.
Realists about truth have tended to stand on the sidelines and
cheer the difficulties faced by their opponents from Fitch's proof.
Kvanvig argues that this perspective is wholly unwarranted. He
argues that there are two problems raised by the paradox, one that
threatens antirealism about truth and the other that threatens
everybody's view about truth, realist or antirealist. The problem
facing antirealism has had a number of proposed solutions over the
past 40 years, and the results have not been especially promising
with regard to the first problem. The second problem has not even
been acknowledged, however, and the proposals regarding the first
problem are irrelevant to the second problem.
This book thus provides a thorough investigation of the literature
on the paradox, and also proposes a solution to the deeper of the
two problems raised by Fitch's proof. It provides a complete
picture of the paradoxicality that results from Fitch's proof, and
presents a solution to the paradox thatclaims to address both
problems raised by the original proof.
The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch
in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of
truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has
not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the
paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to
which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to
express that idea than to maintain that all truths are knowable? In
the face of the paradox, however, such a characterization threatens
to undermine antirealism. If Fitch's proof is valid, then one can
be an antirealist of this sort only by endorsing the conclusion of
the proof that all truths are known. Realists about truth have
tended to stand on the sidelines and cheer the difficulties faced
by their opponents from Fitch's proof. Kvanvig argues that this
perspective is wholly unwarranted. He argues that there are two
problems raised by the paradox, one that threatens antirealism
about truth and the other that threatens everybody's view about
truth, realist or antirealist. The problem facing antirealism has
had a number of proposed solutions over the past 40 years, and the
results have not been especially promising with regard to the first
problem. The second problem has not even been acknowledged,
however, and the proposals regarding the first problem are
irrelevant to the second problem. This book thus provides a
thorough investigation of the literature on the paradox, and also
proposes a solution to the deeper of the two problems raised by
Fitch's proof. It provides a complete picture of the paradoxicality
that results from Fitch's proof, and presents a solution to the
paradox that claims to address both problems raised by the original
proof.
In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current
Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that
warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and
true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of
warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by
Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new
essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to
contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a
broad array of views, not only gives readers a critical perspective
on Plantinga's landmark work, but also provides in one volume a
clear statement of the variety of approaches to the nature of
warrant within contemporary epistemology, and to the connections
between epistemology and metaphysics. Positions covered include
internalism and externalism, reliabilism, coherentism and
foundationalism, virtue theories, and defensibility theories. Alvin
Plantinga responds to the essays in his own contribution.
The doctrine of hell presents the most intractable version of the
problem of evil, for though it might be argued that ordinary pain
and evil can somehow be compensated for by the course of future
experience, the pain and suffering of hell leads nowhere. This work
develops an understanding of hell that is common to a broad variety
of religious perspectives, and argues that the usual understandings
of hell are incapable of solving the problem of hell. Kvanvig first
argues that the traditional understanding of hell found in
Christianity suffers from moral and epistemological inadequacies.
Historically, these shortcomings lead to alternatives to the
traditional doctrine of hell, such as universalism,
annihilationism, or the second chance doctrine. Kvanvig shows,
however, that the typical alternatives to the traditional
understanding are inadequate as well. He argues that both the
traditional understanding and the typical alternatives fail to
solve the problem of hell because they share the common flaw of
being constructed on a retributive model of hell. Kvanvig then
develops a philosophical account of hell which does not depend on a
retributive model and argues that it is adequate on both
philosophical and theological grounds.
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