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This collection of essays focuses on the interface between
delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions
and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those
seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception
entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception
also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of
self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do
affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how
might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays
in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and
conceptual perspectives. Some contributors focus on the general
question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our
taxonomy of psychological states. Some contributors ask whether
particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia
for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and
affective factors. And some contributors provide general models of
motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological
belief-formation might be measured. The volume will be of interest
to cognitive scientists, clinicians, and philosophers interested in
the nature of belief and the disturbances to which it is subject.
This collection of essays focuses on the interface between
delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions
and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those
seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception
entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception
also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of
self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do
affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how
might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays
in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and
conceptual perspectives. Some contributors focus on the general
question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our
taxonomy of psychological states. Some contributors ask whether
particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia
for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and
affective factors. And some contributors provide general models of
motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological
belief-formation might be measured. The volume will be of interest
to cognitive scientists, clinicians, and philosophers interested in
the nature of belief and the disturbances to which it is subject.
Jordi Fernandez here offers a philosophical investigation of
memory, one which engages with memory's philosophically puzzling
characteristics in order to clarify what memory is. Memories
interact with mental states of other types in a particular way, and
they also have associated feelings that these other mental states
lack. They are special in terms of their representational capacity
too, since one can have memories of objective events as well as
memories of one's own past experiences. Finally, memories are
epistemically unique, in that beliefs formed on the basis of
memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification,
and are justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive
capacity other than memory. To explain these unique features,
Fernandez proposes that memories have a particular functional role
which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the
past. He suggests that memories have a particular content as well,
namely that they represent themselves as having a certain causal
origin. Fernandez then explains the feelings associated with our
memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories
represent, things such as our own past experiences, or the fact
that memories originate in those experiences. He also accounts for
the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in
terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a
unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of
memory, one that will appeal to philosophers of mind,
metaphysicians, and epistemologists alike.
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