Private Company Law reform is among the most important topics for lawmakers and companies. This well-timed volume explains in details the legal reforms taking place in the principal European jurisdictions, the United States and Asia. The volume brings together a distinguished group of company law scholars to examine the factors leading to the rise of the new unincorporated entities in the US and Asia and explains in detail how private company law forms can be suitably adapted to meet a wide range of firms' needs. It examines the important reforms taking place in private company law across the EU and addresses how the reforms may lead to a more optimal environment for businesses to operate. Finally, it critically explores the advantages of introducing the European Private Company. This book is a valuable tool for scholars, corporate lawyers, practitioners, policymakers and advanced students in law, as well as for entrepreneurs in emerging and developed markets. Joseph A. McCahery is Professor of International Economic Law at Tilburg University, the Netherlands and Professor of Financial Market Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center. Levinus Timmerman is Advocate General in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands and Professor of Foundations of Company Law at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Erik P.M. Vermeulen is Professor of Business Law at Tilburg University, Professor of Financial Market Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center, and Vice President at the Corporate Legal Department of Philips International B.V.

This book offers four stimulating views on European integration and law. Four experts in the fields of European law, private law, criminal law and company law discuss to what extent European integration has affected their respective fields of interest. In addition to this, they offer their views on the future of European integration. This makes this book indispensable to anyone interested in the European Union and its all pervasive influence on national law. The contributors are Deirdre Curtin, Jan Smits, Andr Klip and Joseph A. McCahery. This volume marks the 25th anniversary of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University. In these 25 years, the Maastricht Faculty of Law has become a forerunner in European legal education and research. It offers the European Law School program and hosts the Ius Commune Research School.

This book examines the limited liability business forms that have recently emerged, and seeks to identify the forces that have led to the emergence of new business forms for small and medium-sized businesses. Focusing on the US, UK, and continental Europe, the contributors analyse the Limited Liability Company, the Limited Liability Partnership, and the new business forms proposed in Europe.

The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies. More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.

This book seeks to examine the relationship between corporate law rules and economic performance. Contributors examine the design of the two main systems of corporate governance to ascertain which bundle of rules is likely to support the emergence of a strong system of governance. They seek to show that the performance of companies is linked to different patterns of shareholding, legal rules, and non-legal relationships.

The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies. More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.

Studies of corporate governance traditionally focus on the governance problems of large publicly held firms, and policymakers' recommendations often focus on such firms. However most small firms, and in many countries, even many large companies, are non-listed. This book provides a comprehensive account of non-listed businesses and their particular governance problems. It explores current discussions and reforms in Europe, the United States, and Asia providing a state of the art account of the law and the economics. Non-listed firms encompass a vast range, from corporations with the potential to go public through family-owned firms, group-owned firms, private equity and hedge funds, to joint ventures and unlisted mass-privatized corporations with a relatively high number of shareholders. The governance of non-listed companies has traditionally been concerned with protecting investors and creditors from managerial opportunism. However, the virtual elimination of the distinction between partnerships and corporations means that an effective legal governance framework must also offer mechanisms to protect shareholders from the misconduct of other shareholders. This volume examines policy and economic measurements to develop a framework for understanding what constitutes good governance in non-listed companies. The authors examine how control is gained and explore the mechanisms that contribute to the development of a modern and efficient governance framework. The book concludes with an exploration of how the closely held firm is likely to stimulate growth and extend innovation and development.

Studies of corporate governance traditionally focus on the governance problems of large publicly held firms, and policymakers' recommendations often focus on such firms. However most small firms, and in many countries, even many large companies, are closely held. This book provides a comprehensive account of closely held businesses and their particular governance problems. It explores current discussions and reforms in Europe, the United States, and Asia providing a state of the art account of the law and the economics.
Closely held firms encompass a vast range, from corporations with the potential to go public through family-owned firms, group-owned firms, private equity and hedge funds, to joint ventures and unlisted mass-privatized corporations with a relatively high number of shareholders.
The governance of closely held companies has traditionally been concerned with protecting investors and creditors from managerial opportunism. However, the virtual elimination of the distinction between partnerships and corporations means that an effective legal governance framework must also offer mechanisms to protect shareholders from the misconduct of other shareholders.
This volume examines policy and economic measurements to develop a framework for understanding what constitutes good governance in closely held companies. The authors examine how control is gained in the various types of closely held firms and explore the mechanisms that contribute to the development of a modern and efficient governance framework for these companies. The book concludes with an exploration of how the closely held firm is likely to stimulate growth and extend innovation and development.

Against the backdrop of an ever-changing financial landscape sometimes characterized by an abundance of funding and start-up opportunities, but usually characterized by down rounds and decreasing valuations (leading to funding, investment and liquidity gaps), ""venture capital"" has taken on a new uncertainty and complexity. In this review, we suggest that venture capital should not exclusively - or even primarily - be defined in terms of providing risk capital (and advise) to founder-entrepreneurs. Such an approach to venture capital, which is often described in terms of a ""venture capital cycle"", seems to represent the conventional wisdom in most recent discussion. According to this perspective, the solution to the funding, investment, and liquidity gaps is for new sources of capital - be they government, corporate or crowd - to step in and provide founder-entrepreneurs with money, capacities and connections that allows them to start, scale, and grow their businesses. These ingredients are necessary but not sufficient to maximize the economic potential of start-ups. Clearly we need something more. Recently, alternative forms of finance and a new breed of venture capital providers have emerged which focus more on collaborations and the process of building long-term relationships constructed around sharing, mutual trust and respect (partnering) than making money (venturing). Online platforms, such as AngelList, play an important role in encouraging these collaborative models. Some investors have labeled this process as ""venture capital 2.0"". We explore the view that reforms that relax rules and regulations governing initial public offerings should attract new ""venture capital 2.0"" investors and high volumes of business. However, the growth rates for new segment listings in Europe and the United States have stalled recently, casting doubts on the usefulness of the of the IPO route for both young firms and investors. We suggest that a renewed focus on private IPOs, followed by a trade-sale or public IPO, is necessary to accommodate the preferences of entrepreneurs and investors.

At the end of the twentieth century it was thought by many that the Anglo-American system of corporate governance was performing effectively and some observers claimed to see an international trend towards convergence around this model. There can be no denying that the recent corporate governance crisis in the US has caused many to question their faith in this view. This collection of essays provides a comprehensive attempt to answer the following questions: firstly, what went wrong - when and why do markets misprice the value of firms, and what was wrong with the incentives set by Enron? Secondly, what has been done in response, and how well will it work - including essays on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, UK company law reform and European company law and auditor liability reform, along with a consideration of corporate governance reforms in historical perspective. Three approaches emerge. The first two share the premise that the system is fundamentally sound, but part ways over whether a regulatory response is required. The third view, in contrast, argues that the various scandals demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in the Anglo-American system itself, which cannot hope to be repaired by the sort of reforms that have taken place. "This collection of papers by leading US and European corporate law scholars provides fresh and rigorous analyses of the recent corporate governance scandals and the strategies devised by regulators to guard against future governance failures." Randall Thomas, John Beasley Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Vanderbilt University.