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This book collects 13 papers that explore Wittgenstein's philosophy
throughout the different stages of his career. The author writes
from the viewpoint of critical rationalism. The tone of his
analysis is friendly and appreciative yet critical. Of these
papers, seven are on the background to the philosophy of
Wittgenstein. Five papers examine different aspects of it: one on
the philosophy of young Wittgenstein, one on his transitional
period, and the final three on the philosophy of mature
Wittgenstein, chiefly his Philosophical Investigations. The last of
these papers, which serves as the concluding chapter, concerns the
analytical school of philosophy that grew chiefly under its
influence. Wittgenstein's posthumous Philosophical Investigations
ignores formal languages while retaining the view of metaphysics as
meaningless -- declaring that all languages are metaphysics-free.
It was very popular in the middle of the twentieth century. Now it
is passe. Wittgenstein had hoped to dissolve all philosophical
disputes, yet he generated a new kind of dispute. His claim to have
improved the philosophy of life is awkward just because he
prevented philosophical discussion from the ability to achieve
that: he cut the branch on which he was sitting. This, according to
the author, is the most serious critique of Wittgenstein.
This book contributes to the theoretical discussions of equilibria
that rest on errorâin which we include mistaken choices of games
to play. Extant game theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of
actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash
equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy
alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that
fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its function
is to serve social planners ignorant of the preferences of the
people intended to play them. Our study of games avoidance adds to
game theory the meta-game of choosing what game to play and what
game to avoid playing, and that both players and planners can
generate. This comprises a shift from the maximalist position that
aims to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that aims at
minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on the question,
considering the public interest, what set of games is it advisable
to encourage? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some
groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing
other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory
much more applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game
to play is less practical than choosing what game not to play. This
invites legislation and similar incentives; their study should aim
at the improvement of their usefulness. Discussing the possibility
of changing both game and strategy renders game theory
part-and-parcel of social science. For this mathematical models
will not do: it requires a clear distinction between describing
options and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance efforts
at improvement.
The Philosophy of Practical Affairs: An Introduction addresses the
problems of everyday life, problems that from time to time fate
drops on normal twenty-first-century western individuals.
Addressing both students and philosophers, Joseph Agassi considers
the usefulness of the treatment of daily problems within academic
philosophy, including rationalism and fundamental issues of
practical wisdom, the community, and the individual's relationship
to community. Unlike most philosophy-of-life literatures from
pop-philosophy-especially religious homilies or wisdom literature,
including the (pseudo-)cabbalist or (pseudo-)Buddhist, and their
like-the book acknowledges real, disturbing situations. Warning the
reader against various kinds of intellectual dishonesty, and
committed to their rational autonomy, the author thinks through
philosophical concepts that are in the end practical issues of
philosophy of life.
Professor Joseph Agassi has published his Towards an
Historiography of Science in 1963. It received many reviews by
notable academics, including Maurice Finocchiaro, Charles
Gillispie, Thomas S. Kuhn, Geroge Mora, Nicholas Rescher, and L.
Pearce Williams. It is still in use in many courses in the
philosophy and history of science. Here it appears in a revised and
updated version with responses to these reviews and with many
additional chapters, some already classic, others new. They are all
paradigms of the author 's innovative way of writing fresh and
engaging chapters in the history of the natural sciences.
This book aims to familiarize readers in a very simple and easy
manner the rules and proper procedures of rational debate. It will
help reduce the frustration that many experience when engaging in
debates. The proper conduct of debate is both fun and mentally
stimulating, and we trust that implementing the rules of debate
outlined in this book will help you and your friends increase your
ability to learn, improve and engage in rational and intellectual
debates.
This volume examines Popper's philosophy by analyzing the criticism
of his most popular critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre
Lakatos. They all followed his rejection of the traditional view of
science as inductive. Starting from the assumption that Hume's
criticism of induction is valid, the book explores the central
criticism and objections that these three critics have raised.
Their objections have met with great success, are significant and
deserve paraphrase. One also may consider them reasonable protests
against Popper's high standards rather than fundamental criticisms
of his philosophy. The book starts out with a preliminary
discussion of some central background material and essentials of
Popper's philosophy. It ends with nutshell representations of the
philosophies of Popper. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. The middle
section of the book presents the connection between these
philosophers and explains what their central ideas consists of,
what the critical arguments are, how they presented them, and how
valid they are. In the process, the author claims that Popper's
popular critics used against him arguments that he had invented
(and answered) without saying so. They differ from him mainly in
that they demanded of all criticism that it should be constructive:
do not stop believing a refuted theory unless there is a better
alternative to it. Popper hardly ever discussed belief, delegating
its study to psychology proper; he usually discussed only objective
knowledge, knowledge that is public and thus open to public
scrutiny.
"If a science has to be supported by fraudulent means, let it
perish. " With these words of Kepler, Agassi plunges into the
actual troubles and glories of science (321). The SOciology of
science is no foreign intruder upon scientific knowledge in these
essays, for we see clearly how Agassi transforms the tired
internalistJexternalist debate about the causal influences in the
history of science. The social character of the entire intertwined
epistemological and practical natures of the sciences is intrinsic
to science and itself split: the internal sociology within science,
the external sociology of the social setting without. Agassi sees
these social matters in the small as well as the large: from the
details of scientific communication, changing publishing as he
thinks to 'on-demand' centralism with less waste (Ch. 12), to the
colossal tension of romanticism and rationality in the sweep of
historical cultures. Agassi is a moral and political philosopher of
science, defending, dis turbing, comprehending, criticizing. For
him, science in a society requires confrontation, again and again,
with issues of autonomy vs. legitimation as the central problem of
democracy. And furthermore, devotion to science, pace Popper,
Polanyi, and Weber, carries preoccupational dangers: Popper's
elitist rooting out of 'pseudo-science', Weber's hard-working
obsessive . com mitment to science. See Agassi's Weberian gloss on
the social psychology of science in his provocative 'picture of the
scientist as maniac' (437)."
One of the questions that philosophers discuss is: How can we
avoid, or at least reduce, errors when explaining the world? The
skeptical answer to this question is: We cannot avoid errors since
no statement is certain or even definitely plausible, but we can
eliminate some past errors. This book advocates the skeptical
position and discusses its practical applications in science,
ethics, aesthetics, and politics. It brings philosophy down to
earth and comprises an outline of a skeptical guide to the real
world.
"If a science has to be supported by fraudulent means, let it
perish. " With these words of Kepler, Agassi plunges into the
actual troubles and glories of science (321). The sociology of
science is no foreign intruder upon scientific knowledge in these
essays, for we see clearly how Agassi transforms the tired
internalist/externalist debate about the causal influences in the
history of science. The social character of the entire intertwined
epistemological and practical natures of the sciences is intrinsic
to science and itself split: the internal sociology within science,
the external sOciology of the social setting without. Agassi sees
these social matters in the small as well as the large: from the
details of scientific communication, changing publishing as he
thinks to 'on-demand' centralism with less waste (Ch. 12), to the
colossal tension of romanticism and rationality in the sweep of
historical cultures. Agassi is a moral and political philosopher of
science, defending, dis turbing, comprehending, criticizing. For
him, science in a society requires confrontation, again and again,
with issues of autonomy vs. legitimation as the central problem of
democracy. And furthermore, devotion to science, pace Popper,
Polanyi, and Weber, carries preoccupational dangers: Popper's
elitist rooting out of 'pseudo-science', Weber's hard-working
obsessive com mitment to science. See Agassi's Weberian gloss on
the social psychology of science in his provocative 'picture of the
scientist as maniac' (437)."
Professor Joseph Agassi has published his Towards an
Historiography of Science in 1963. It received many reviews by
notable academics, including Maurice Finocchiaro, Charles
Gillispie, Thomas S. Kuhn, Geroge Mora, Nicholas Rescher, and L.
Pearce Williams. It is still in use in many courses in the
philosophy and history of science. Here it appears in a revised and
updated version with responses to these reviews and with many
additional chapters, some already classic, others new. They are all
paradigms of the author's innovative way of writing fresh and
engaging chapters in the history of the natural sciences.
This collection of the writings of Paul Feyerabend is focused on
his philosophy of quantum physics, the hotbed of the key issues of
his most debated ideas. Written between 1948 and 1970, these
writings come from his first and most productive period. These
early works are important for two main reasons. First, they
document Feyerabend's deep concern with the philosophical
implications of quantum physics and its interpretations. These
ideas were paid less attention in the following two decades.
Second, the writings provide the crucial background for
Feyerabend's critiques of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. Although
rarely considered by scholars, Feyerabend's early work culminated
in the first version of Against Method. These writings guided him
on all the key issues of his most well-known and debated theses,
such as the incommensurability thesis, the principles of
proliferation and tenacity, and his particular version of
relativism, and more specifically on quantum mechanics.
To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing (in 2014), this
special book features studies on Alexandre Koyre (1892-1964), one
of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century,
who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy
of science. In particular, it explores Koyre's intellectual matrix
and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical,
epistemological and philosophical scientific thought. Koyre is
rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and
development of modern science and for his interest in philosophical
questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and
1950s his activities in the United States established a crucial
bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies
and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of
historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book
brings together contributions from leading experts in the field,
and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical,
nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an
absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and
scientists alike.
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