Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. Joseph Almog is a Descartes analyst whose last book WHAT AM I? focused on the second half of this expression, Sum--who is the "I" who is existing-and-thinking and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This volume looks at the first half of the proposition--cogito. Almog calls this the "thinking man's paradox": how can there be, in the the natural world and as part and parcel of it, a creature that... thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact obtains and he maintains that it is self-evident; but as Almog points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism, it is far from obvious that there could be a thinking-man. How can it be that a thinking human be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did "thinking" arise in an otherwise "thoughtless" universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? Almog goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own aposteriori cognitive methodology--his naturalistic, scientific, approach to the study of man--tries to answer the question.

In Everything in Its Right Place, Joseph Almog develops the unitarian and universalist metaphysics of Spinoza. Spinoza's ground zero thesis is that "Nature is one and all. " Everything (including God, mathematics, morals, our own thoughts) finds its place within Spinoza's (capital N) Nature. It is the place that each thing occupies within the grid of Nature-from God on down the cosmic tree of being-that determines its fundamental (lowercase n) nature. For Spinoza, one's nature is determined by one's place in Nature or, in terms of the fundamental axiom of the book-the Nature-unfolding axiom: the nature of x=Nature at x. Almog's reading of Spinoza is distinct in its understanding of the deductive abstractions of part I-II of the Ethics by means of the concrete illustrations of Spinoza's intended subject matter in his political writings, where he tells us directly (i) what Nature is and (ii) how man's nature is not a separate kingdom from the Nature-kingdom but merely an unfolding of it. This leads, as in the Ethics, to a final chapter on what it meant to Spinoza to live in symbiosis with Nature and, therefore, to be one with it-and with God.

This anthology is composed of articles derived from a conference, entitled "Themes from Kaplan", at Stanford University which discussed the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language. A variety of philosophers participated in the conference including Robert Adams, Roderick Chisholme, Nathan Salmon, and Scott Soames. Their papers treat a broad range of themes related to Kaplan's work: some address his work directly, others are independent treatments of issues provoked by Kaplan's thought. The book also contains Kaplan's own previously unpublished essay, "Demonstratives."This essay formed the basis of Kaplan's John Locke lectures at Oxford. The essay has been one of the most influential pieces in the philosophy of language over the last twenty years.

Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose insights reached into metaphysics, action theory, the history of philosophy, and of course the philosophy of mind and language. This volume collects the best critical essays on Donnellan's forty-year body of work. The pieces by such noted philosophers as Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and John Perry, discuss Donnellan's various insights particularly offering new readings of his views on language and mind.

David Kaplan's intellectual influence on 20th century analytic philosophy has been transformative. He introduced lasting innovations in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Just as important, however, is Kaplan's way of doing philosophy; generous but incisive, his profoundly interactive style mentored countless generations of students, many of whom contribute to this volume.
This volume collects new, previously unpublished articles on Kaplan, analyzing a broad spectrum of topics ranging from cutting edge linguistics and the philosophy of mathematics, to metaphysics, the foundations of pragmatics, and the theory of communication.
With its historical introduction and personal tributes, The Philosophy of David Kaplan also reveals much of Kaplan's life and times, highlighting the key players of analytic philosophy of the last century, and underscoring Kaplan's substantial impact on contemporary philosophy.

This volume is focused on understanding a key idea in modern semantics-direct reference-and its integration into a general semantics for natural language. In the first three chapters, foundational analyses from three philosophers -Saul Kripke, David Kaplan and Keith Donnellan-are dissected in detail. The differences between their respective ideas lead to varying consequences in the philosophy of mind, the metaphysics of necessity, and the epistemological idea of a priori knowledge. In the last chapter, two central puzzles said to threaten direct reference are raised. One is Frege's puzzle about judgments of cognitive significance and informativeness. This puzzle is analyzed and is shown to be the opposite of a threat; informative identities are, in effect, a consequence of the new cognitive insights behind direct reference. The second puzzle, the Partee-Kaplan, is a threat: how to unify the referential semantics of nouns with the seemingly non referential semantics of denoting phrases? The volume criticizes the concept of a unifying methodology-assimilating the referential nouns to the complex denoting phrases by way of (set theoretic) "ontological sublimation "-as proposed by Montague-and launches an orthogonal unification methodology generalizing direct reference to the common nouns anchoring the denoting phrases.

In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop into Descartes's main philosophical preoccupation: the Mind-Body distinction.
How can Mind and Body be independent entities, yet joined--essentially so--within a single human being? If Mind and Body are really distinct, are human beings merely a "construction"? On the other hand, if we respect the integrity of humans, are Mind and Body merely aspects of a human being and not subjects in and of themselves?
For centuries, philosophers have considered this classic philosophical puzzle. Now, in this compact, engaging, and long-awaited work, UCLA philosopher Joseph Almog closely decodes the French philosopher's argument for distinguishing between the human mind and body while maintaining simultaneously their essential integration in a human being. He argues that Descartes constructed a solution whereby the trio of Human Mind, Body, and Being are essentially interdependent yet remain each a genuine individual subject.
Almog's reading not only steers away from the most popular interpretations of Descartes, but also represents a scholar coming to grips directly with Descartes himself. In doing so, Almog creates a work that Cartesian scholars will value, and that will also prove indispensable to philosophers of language, ontology, and the metaphysics of mind."

Keith Donnellan, Emeritus of UCLA, is one of the major figures in 20th century philosophy of language, a key part of the highly influential generation of scholars that included Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke, and David Kaplan. Like many of these philosophers, his primary contributions were published in article form rather than books. This volume presents a highly focussed collection of articles by Donnellan. In the late sixties and early seventies, the philosophy of language and mind went through a paradigm shift, with the then-dominant Fregean theory losing ground to the "direct reference" theory sometimes referred to as the direct reference revolution. Donnellan played a key role in this shift, focusing on the relation of semantic reference, a touchstone in the philosophy of language and the relation of "thinking about" - a touchstone in the philosophy of mind. The debates around the direct reference theory ended up forming the agenda of the philosophy of language and related fields for decades to come, and Donnellan's contributions were always considered essential. His ideas spawned a scholarly debate that continues to the present day. This volume collects his key contributions datng from the late 1960's through the early 1980's, along with a substantive introduction by the editor Joseph Almog, which disseminates the work to a new audience and for posterity.