Thompson examines the U.S. role--both governmental and that of Irish-Americans--in attempting to bring a resolution to the strife in Northern Ireland. He concentrates on the efforts since 1967, particularly the growth of American efforts to become the central humanitarian player in the peace process.

The U.S. government stance was initially one of strict non-involvement. However, in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, diminished White House authority encouraged Irish-American groups to challenge the traditional Irish policy. Movement away from strict non-involvement began with Congressional concern for the rising specter of Irish-American anger at the treatment of northern Irish Catholics. An important transition to humanitarian policy occurred during the Reagan Administration. Contributing factors that helped the U.S. government take a new direction in foreign policy were America's failure to respond to the escalation of Northern Ireland violence, a strong personal ethnic tie between the U.S. President and Speaker of the House O'Neill, a personal link between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, and intense lobbying by Irish-Americans and the Irish government. After a brief period of silent diplomacy during the Bush administration, the Clinton administration succeeded in a public blitz to endorse steps necessary to bring peace closer.

In the summer of 1968 as killing and starvation escalated in Biafra in a war that used famine as a weapon, the West African conflict attracted media attention and U.S. officials felt strong domestic pressure to expand American involvement in Nigeria's civil war. The official U.S. policy of neutrality eventually encompassed an activist policy of humanitarian assistance for Biafra. Joseph E. Thompson's comprehensive study describes the events and decisions that led to increased American involvement in the Nigeria/Biafra War of 1966-1970--a complex period during which the U.S. was attempting to extricate itself from involvement in Vietnam. Professor Thompson provides a thorough examination of both the domestic and international pressures that resulted in dichotomous U.S. policies and analyzes the reasons for their longevity. The volume's contribution to an understanding of U.S. policy formation is important because the U.S. is the major respondent to international famine, one of the most serious contemporary problems of the developing world. An introductory essay, surveys the Nigerian political system and military coups of 1966 and details initial U.S. responses to these violent changes. An Epilogue scrutinizes the increased U.S. public and private relief for Biafra and compares it to the present African famine situation. The first three chapters consider the contrasting perceptions of Nigeria transmitted to Washington, detail both internal and external disruptions caused by Nigerian military activity, and review attempts to resolve the fratricidal conflict. Evolving U.S. policy, the role of church relief groups on governmental, technological and logistical obstacles, and bureaucraticroadblocks inherent in the structures of both government and humanitarian groups are explored in the next three chapters. Chapter 7 zeroes in on U.S. diplomatic efforts to skirt humanitarian issues, and Chapter 8 assesses U.S. difficulties in following a course of political non-involvement in Nigeria while supplying humanitarian relief to Biafra. Fifteen valuable tables and figures and 5 maps complete this distinguished contribution to African Studies literature.