- offers most comprehensive and up to date0 history of the IAEA’s six decades - features essay by leading academics and policymakers - makes an important contribution to security and nonproliferation studies, as well as to the field of international organizations and global governance

Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.

- offers most comprehensive and up to date0 history of the IAEA's six decades - features essay by leading academics and policymakers - makes an important contribution to security and nonproliferation studies, as well as to the field of international organizations and global governance

Introduction. Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes beyond 1995 (R.M. Timerbaev). Nuclear Arms Control in the Postcold War Era (R. Imai). Toward a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint (M.A. Khan). The NPT's Prospects (J.F. Pilat). The Last Nuclear Summit? (M. Reiss). 1995: A Time for Optimism? (B. Sanders). India and the NPT after the Cold War (R.G.C. Thomas). Perspectives of Nonproliferation: A View from Russia (O.A. Grinevsky). The Future of the NPT: A German Perspective (J. Krause). Beyond 1995: The NPT and Europe (H. Muller). The NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Future of Nonproliferation (J.R. Redick). Avoiding Amendment of the NPT (C.N. Van Doren). What Happens to Safeguards if the NPT Goes? (D. Fischer). Does the NPT Matter? (L. Scheinman). Appendix: Toward 1995: United Nations Documents Relating to the Establishment and Functioning of the NPT, 1959-1993. Index.

This book analyzes the future role of the U.S. in international affairs, the nature of controls over nuclear cooperation and trade, and the scope and limitations of international cooperation in nuclear energy and nonproliferation matters.

Thirty years ago, President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal to the United Nations provided the basis for development of nuclear cooperation, trade, and nonproliferation policy in the noncommunist world. Ever since its inception, however, the policy has sparked widespread debate, and it remains controversial today. Exploring the past, present, and future significance of Atoms for Peace, the contributors to this volume analyze the future role of the United States in international affairs, the nature of controls over nuclear cooperation and trade, the scope and limitations of international cooperation in nuclear energy and nonproliferation matters, and the prospects for multinational and international institutional measures to achieve these ends.

Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.