"Greenberg's survey of the earlier history of typology is without rivals, a must read for every linguist who is curious about the intellectual roots of current typology. This wouldn't be a work by Greenberg if it didn't go far beyond simple historiography, providing a highly original and readable framework for understanding the earlier efforts." Prof. Dr. Martin Haspelmath, Max-Planck-Institut fur Evolutionare Anthropologie

Offering a new and integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioral sciences, this book presents a theory forcing the specification of information currently neglected by game theory and offers a unified solution, or equilibrium, concept. Unifying the representation of social environments as situations, the theory extends the set of social environments included in current game theory, and accomodates coalition formation as well as bounded rationality concerning the perception and the computation abilities of the players. By applying the concept to game theory, the author relates many of the currently disparate solution concepts and suggests new and interesting ones.

This is a new release of the original 1946 edition.

This is a new release of the original 1946 edition.

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

Offering a new and integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioral sciences, this book presents a theory forcing the specification of information currently neglected by game theory and offers a unified solution, or equilibrium, concept. Unifying the representation of social environments as situations, the theory extends the set of social environments included in current game theory, and accomodates coalition formation as well as bounded rationality concerning the perception and the computation abilities of the players. By applying the concept to game theory, the author relates many of the currently disparate solution concepts and suggests new and interesting ones.