As such things happen, several manuscripts in the present volume were under review prior to the ones that appeared in Volume I of the Annals. A major difficulty encountered in the preparation of these volumes apart from working up to three years in advance of publication-is elic iting appropriate commentary. If this format is to succeed, the com mentary must be both engaging to the reader and satisfying to the author. It is not yet clear how successful we have been in this regard and, indeed, we do not feel bound to publish commentary with each manuscript that is accepted for publication. Nevertheless, we do invite readers' commentaries on published materials. The contributions by Jan Smedslund and Benjamin Wolman in this volume have been through an inordinately long publication lag. We have been in receipt of both manuscripts since early in 1981 and Dr. Smedslund, especially, has since clarified and advanced his views else where in print. K. B. Madsen and Joseph Rychlak submitted their man uscripts in the fall of 1981 while Michael Hyland and J. Philippe Rushton had first drafts of their manuscripts accepted for publication in the fall of 1982. We are grateful to our contributors for their expressed com mitment to the Annals and assure potential contributors that the delay in publication is a mere matter of getting the series off the ground.

The intention of this paper is to review the evidence support ing the major thesis that a knowledge of genetic architecture within a species gives clues to the evolution of behavior. To this end, a study of some of the origins of this idea, both within genetics and psychology, will be embarked upon, together with a review of the experimental evidence supportive of it. This review will concentrate on behavioral phenotypes, though not to the exclusion of other, usually morphological, character on which the original enunciation of the proposition was based. Essentially, the rationale is disarmingly simple. The study of the gene action governing a behavioral or other characteristic, by revealing the genetic architecture of the organism or species, indicates the forces of natural selection which have moulded the genetic architecture in the way that it is observed today. Thus natural selection leaves its imprint on the genome and it is argued that a sophisticated analysis of that genome in turn allows an inferential statement about the nature of those forces. It will be at once apparent that the substructure for this type of argument is that of Darwinian evolutionary theory, which is so widely and so pervasively accepted in contemporary biology that it seems hardly necessary to argue its case."

As such things happen, several manuscripts in the present volume were under review prior to the ones that appeared in Volume I of the Annals. A major difficulty encountered in the preparation of these volumes apart from working up to three years in advance of publication-is elic iting appropriate commentary. If this format is to succeed, the com mentary must be both engaging to the reader and satisfying to the author. It is not yet clear how successful we have been in this regard and, indeed, we do not feel bound to publish commentary with each manuscript that is accepted for publication. Nevertheless, we do invite readers' commentaries on published materials. The contributions by Jan Smedslund and Benjamin Wolman in this volume have been through an inordinately long publication lag. We have been in receipt of both manuscripts since early in 1981 and Dr. Smedslund, especially, has since clarified and advanced his views else where in print. K. B. Madsen and Joseph Rychlak submitted their man uscripts in the fall of 1981 while Michael Hyland and J. Philippe Rushton had first drafts of their manuscripts accepted for publication in the fall of 1982. We are grateful to our contributors for their expressed com mitment to the Annals and assure potential contributors that the delay in publication is a mere matter of getting the series off the ground."