Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

Leadership remains at the core of the military profession. Gaining a reputation as an effective and ethical leader is the foundation for a successful career as a commissioned and noncommissioned officer. Naturally, a great deal of attention in pre-commissioning and professional military schools, as well as experiential learning in a variety of demanding positions, is necessary for advancement. Understanding the ideas and best practices of expert leaders as individuals and as a member of groups, teams, organizations, and institutions remain an important area of research and study for individual and organizational learning. Learning leaders and learning organizations are the focus of this monograph. Specific attention is placed on identifying the key ideas and actions, or best practices, in comparing the leadership studies and research literature that bridge the guiding civilian and military approaches, and compares ideas and practices across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.

The George Bush School of Government and Public Service, the European Center of Excellence at Texas A&M University, the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation, the Department of the Army's Eisenhower National Security Series, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute were proud to sponsor the Future of Transatlantic Security Relations Conference held at the Bush Presidential Conference Center in College Station, Texas, on March 8, 2006. A number of scholars from all over the United States and Europe came great distances to participate in the discussions and seminars. We appreciated their efforts, and I believe we have captured their remarks and ideas faithfully within this conference report. The Transatlantic Security Relationship has been an anchor of European and U.S. foreign policy since the closing days of World War II. As the conflict drew to a close, a new one rose from its ashes.

The interagency process was the focus of a Capstone project and Research Symposium at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University during the 2006-07 academic year. The Bush School's Capstone seminar is a semester-long graduate course in the Master's Program in International Affairs that provides a research experience for students in the final semester of the 2-year program. As part of their leadership development, the students operate in teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client. In this case, the client was the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. Our thanks to Colonel Richard Lacquement and Dr. Janine Davidson for sponsoring our Capstone interagency project.

On March 20, 2008, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and the European Union Center of Excellence of Texas A&M University teamed with the LBJ School of the University of Texas at Austin and with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute for a program to examine the choices facing the American voter in foreign and defense policy in the November 2008 elections. This colloquium examined the conditions existing in the contemporary threat environment and how they may shape American security policy for the next presidential administration. Integral to this objective is articulating how U.S. threats, policies, and strategies have changed since 2001, and how the national security system has been slow in adjusting to changing operating requirements. The colloquium highlighted differing notions of national security and the difficulty of aligning and synchronizing competing visions and missions represented by various government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, military services...

On April 22, 2010, the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, conducted a colloquium in Washington, DC, on "2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in the Obama Administration." This conference marked the fifth collaboration between the Bush School and SSI. The first, "The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations," was held in 2006. In 2007, a workshop was held in College Station, Texas, on "The Interagency and Counter-insurgency Warfare." The third conference, "Reform and the Next President's Agenda," was held in March 2008, also in College Station, Texas. That conference was also co-sponsored by the nonpartisan Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), which includes re-tired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft as a member of its Guiding Coalition. The PNSR guiding coalition also originally included several key members of the Obama administration. The fourth conference, "Leadership and Government Reform," took place in June 2009. Two major topics were discussed: leader development in professional schools and leadership and "whole of government" reforms. The theme of the 2010 colloquium continued the discussion of "whole of government" reforms, but added three new areas of emphasis. The first identified the critical need for congressional leadership in carrying out transformational national security re-forms. The second addressed improving methods of strategic planning and assessment to meet the current U.S. fiscal constraints. The third discussed the transition from military to civilian leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq. Strategic Studies Institute.

This monograph examines the conduct of operations of the United States'; Eighth Army under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War. During the period of Ridgway's command, from late December of 1950 through April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped an offensive campaign being conducted by Chinese Communist Forces. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway's Army mounted a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and reestablish a defensive line along the 38th Parallel. Thus, this case study examines the campaign of an operational commander who successfully wrested the initiative back from the enemy and illustrates the significance of the AirLand Battle tenet of "initiative" at the operational level of war. The monograph is divided into four major sections. After an introduction in Section I, Section II discusses the current doctrine concerning the tenet of initiative as described in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Section III examines the theoretical foundations of the concept of initiative as expressed in the writings of Clausewitz. Section IV describes Ridgway's conduct of withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations in early 1951. The concluding section evaluates Ridgway's operational design using the key concepts found in FM 100-5 -- centers of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points. In sum, this monograph uses classical theory, current doctrine, and history in evaluating Ridgway's operational design, planning and execution during the Eighth Army's withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations. This case study examines the linkages between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The physical, cybernetic and moral domains of war are employed as a framework for analysis. Several insights emerge from this case study including the significance of: gaining and retaining the initiative in the conduct of both defensive and offensive operations; seeking tactical and operational success,

On April 22, 2010, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a colloquium in Washington, DC, on a mid-term assessment of leadership and national security reform in the Obama administration. Panelists included experts from the Project on National Security Reform; the Foreign Policy Research Institute; the Hudson Institute; the Council on Foreign Relations; the Reserve Officers Association; the American Security Project; and Creative Associates International, Inc. The colloquium theme focused on the need for advancing the research and study of national security reform by engaging the invited participants in sharing their expertise on ways to develop a deeper awareness and understanding of the reform issues facing the U.S. Government. Three panels of national security experts discussed: "Assessing National Security Reform;" "Legislative Imperatives;" and "Assessing National Security Reform--The Way Forward."

This monograph investigates two periods of change in the role of the corps artillery. The key change agents examined are peacetime doctrinal development and combat experience. The comparison of these periods, first, during the development of AirLand Battle doctrine and, second, during World War II shows the U.S. Army's and Field Artillery's ability to change in both peace and war. Section II examines the role of the corps artillery in AirLand Battle doctrine. This section traces the evolution of operational concepts that began in 1977 and led to the adoption of the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Included is a review of the Central Battle, the Integrated Battlefield, the Extended Battlefield, and Corps 86. Finally, this section focuses on the AirLand Battle's tenet of synchronization. Section III examines the changes in the role of the corps artillery during the combat experience of World War II. The uses of the American artillery at the Battles of Kasserine and the Ardennes are compared. An analysis of America's "first battle" at Kasserine reveals the IIId Corps'; failures in synchronizing operations and properly employing its fire support assets. A review of the IIId Corps'; offensive in the Battle of the Ardennes shows the growth in the effectiveness of the corps artillery. This study reveals that change can be a double-edged sword. The corps artillery demonstrated its importance on the battlefields of World War II. The adoption of the Active Defense doctrine, in 1976, and the subsequent decline in the role and size of the corps artillery headquarters, proved to be a step backwards. The acceptance of the AirLand Battle doctrine, in 1982, with its emphasis on the corps as a tactical, warfighting headquarters, has had a positive impact on the corps artillery. One significant consequence of this latest doctrinal change is the expanded role and size of the corps artillery headquarters. AirLand Battle doctrine's emphasis on the corps presents the corp

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.