Notwithstanding the mythical demise of "introspection," self-observation has always been an integral aspect of the social sciences. In the century following the "behavioral revolution," psychology has seen a reduction not so much in the frequency as in the rigor with which self-observation is practiced. A great deal of self-observation has been renamed or obscured (as, for example, "self-report"), but this has served only to defer and impoverish important theoretical and technical work. This volume, which contributes to the development of a rigorous theory of self-observation, is organized around three general objectives: to re-animate a discourse on self-observation through a historical analysis of various self-observation traditions; to outline and begin to address some of the unique theoretical challenges of self-observation; and to elaborate some of the technical and practical details necessary for realizing a program of research dedicated to self-observation. In the first section of the book, three historians of psychology trace the evolution of self-observation. In the second, three scholars who are currently working in contemporary traditions of self-observation discuss the basic theoretical and practical challenges involved in conducting self-observation research. In the final two sections of the book, scholars from the phenomenological and narrative traditions trace the history, theory, and practice of self-observation in their respective traditions. Self-Observation in the Social Sciences continues the fine tradition set by Transaction's History and Theory of Psychology series edited by Jaan Valsiner. It is of interest to psychologists and to those who study methodology within the social sciences.

Notwithstanding the mythical demise of "introspection," self-observation has always been an integral aspect of the social sciences. In the century following the "behavioral revolution," psychology has seen a reduction not so much in the frequency as in the rigor with which self-observation is practiced. A great deal of self-observation has been renamed or obscured (as, for example, "self-report"), but this has served only to defer and impoverish important theoretical and technical work.

This volume, which contributes to the development of a rigorous theory of self-observation, is organized around three general objectives: to re-animate a discourse on self-observation through a historical analysis of various self-observation traditions; to outline and begin to address some of the unique theoretical challenges of self-observation; and to elaborate some of the technical and practical details necessary for realizing a program of research dedicated to self-observation.

In the first section of the book, three historians of psychology trace the evolution of self-observation. In the second, three scholars who are currently working in contemporary traditions of self-observation discuss the basic theoretical and practical challenges involved in conducting self-observation research. In the final two sections of the book, scholars from the phenomenological and narrative traditions trace the history, theory, and practice of self-observation in their respective traditions. Self-Observation in the Social Sciences continues the fine tradition set by Transaction's History and Theory of Psychology series edited by Jaan Valsiner. It is of interest to psychologists and to those who study methodology within the social sciences.

Contemporary mainstream psychology has moved toward methodological specificity bounded by instrumental experimentalism. However, this institutional reduction of sanctioned methods has not been fully embraced by all social scientists, nor even by all experimental psychologists. The social sciences are rife with examples of practicing empirical scientists disaffected with the reductionism and atomism of traditional experimentalism. The empirical theory and practice of four of these disaffected social scientists--Lev Vygotsky, James Baldwin, James Gibson, and Kurt Lewin--is explored in this volume. Each of the scientists considered here argued for a rigorously empirical method while still maintaining a clear anti-reductionist stance. They justified their disaffection with the dominant psychological paradigms of their respective eras in terms of a fidelity to their phenomena of study, a fidelity they believed would be compromised by radical reductionism and ontological atomism. The authors in this collection explore the theory and practice of these eminent researchers and from it find inspiration for contemporary social science. The primary argument running through these analyses is that the social sciences should take seriously the notion of holistic empirical investigation. This means, among other things, re-establishing the indissoluble ties between theory, method and procedure and resisting the manualization of research procedures. It also means developing theories of relations and not simply of elemental properties. Such theories would concern particular units, fields, or systems of relations and not be reduced to, or interpreted in the terms of, other systems. Finally, a holistic social science requires integration of the active agent into theory, method, and procedure, an integration that points toward both participatory and emancipatory methods.

Contemporary mainstream psychology has moved toward methodological specificity bounded by instrumental experimentalism. However, this institutional reduction of sanctioned methods has not been fully embraced by all social scientists, nor even by all experimental psychologists. The social sciences are rife with examples of practicing empirical scientists disaffected with the reductionism and atomism of traditional experimentalism.

The empirical theory and practice of four of these disaffected social scientists--Lev Vygotsky, James Baldwin, James Gibson, and Kurt Lewin--is explored in this volume. Each of the scientists considered here argued for a rigorously empirical method while still maintaining a clear anti-reductionist stance. They justified their disaffection with the dominant psychological paradigms of their respective eras in terms of a fidelity to their phenomena of study, a fidelity they believed would be compromised by radical reductionism and ontological atomism.

The authors in this collection explore the theory and practice of these eminent researchers and from it find inspiration for contemporary social science. The primary argument running through these analyses is that the social sciences should take seriously the notion of holistic empirical investigation. This means, among other things, re-establishing the indissoluble ties between theory, method and procedure and resisting the manualization of research procedures. It also means developing theories of relations and not simply of elemental properties. Such theories would concern particular units, fields, or systems of relations and not be reduced to, or interpreted in the terms of, other systems. Finally, a holistic social science requires integration of the active agent into theory, method, and procedure, an integration that points toward both participatory and emancipatory methods.

Good Science is an account of psychological research emphasizing the moral foundations of inquiry. This volume brings together existing disciplinary critiques of scientism, objectivism, and instrumentalism, and then discusses how these contribute to institutionalized privilege and to less morally responsive research practices. The author draws on historical, critical, feminist, and science studies traditions to provide an alternative account of psychological science and to highlight the irreducibly moral foundations of everyday scientific practice. This work outlines a theoretical framework for thinking about and practicing psychology in ways that center moral responsibility, collective commitment, and justice. The book then applies this framework, describing psychological research practices in terms of the their moral dilemmas. Also included are materials meant to aid in methods instruction and mentoring.

Good Science is an account of psychological research emphasizing the moral foundations of inquiry. This volume brings together existing disciplinary critiques of scientism, objectivism, and instrumentalism, and then discusses how these contribute to institutionalized privilege and to less morally responsive research practices. The author draws on historical, critical, feminist, and science studies traditions to provide an alternative account of psychological science and to highlight the irreducibly moral foundations of everyday scientific practice. This work outlines a theoretical framework for thinking about and practicing psychology in ways that center moral responsibility, collective commitment, and justice. The book then applies this framework, describing psychological research practices in terms of the their moral dilemmas. Also included are materials meant to aid in methods instruction and mentoring.