Originally published in 1982, this is the most comprehensive handbook on arms control ever published. It contains an analysis of the bilateral and multilateral agreements reached since World War II. An assessment is made of the extent to which each agreement has affected the arms race, reduced the likelihood of war or otherwise contributed to the overall goal of disarmament. Ongoing arms control negotiations are also analyzed. The complex problem of verification of compliance with arms control obligations is critically examined, and the shortcomings of the existing arrangements are pointed out. The critique is searching, objective and free of the usual biases of official government reports. The analysis of the arms control agreements is preceded by an historical overview, beginning with the Hague Peace Conferences, held at the turn of this century, through the League of Nations' attempts to bring about a universal reduction of armaments, to the activities of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and general disarmament. The present arms control negotiating machinery is described. The texts of the relevant documents are reproduced for handy reference and the status of the implementation of the most important multilateral arms control agreements is presented in tabular form. Tables and figures facilitate the reading.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.

The debate on no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been conducted on a number of fronts. First use of nuclear weapons has come under challenge from many different directions: from church synods, from international lawyers, in debates at the United Nations, and from strategic thinkers. Originally published in 1984, this book takes stock for and against no-first-use and examines the political, military and arms control implications of such a commitment.

This book, first published in 1982, provides a well-informed historical overview, insightful analysis and searching critique of arms control agreements and negotiations from the Hague Declaration of 1899 to the SALT Treaties and Conventions of the 1970s and 1980s. Arms control agreements of international importance and historical merit are assessed, for the extent to which each affected the arms race or reduced the likelihood of war.

This book, first published in 1982, provides a well-informed historical overview, insightful analysis and searching critique of arms control agreements and negotiations from the Hague Declaration of 1899 to the SALT Treaties and Conventions of the 1970s and 1980s. Arms control agreements of international importance and historical merit are assessed, for the extent to which each affected the arms race or reduced the likelihood of war.

The debate on no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been conducted on a number of fronts. First use of nuclear weapons has come under challenge from many different directions: from church synods, from international lawyers, in debates at the United Nations, and from strategic thinkers. Originally published in 1984, this book takes stock for and against no-first-use and examines the political, military and arms control implications of such a commitment.

Originally published in 1982, this is the most comprehensive handbook on arms control ever published. It contains an analysis of the bilateral and multilateral agreements reached since World War II. An assessment is made of the extent to which each agreement has affected the arms race, reduced the likelihood of war or otherwise contributed to the overall goal of disarmament. Ongoing arms control negotiations are also analyzed. The complex problem of verification of compliance with arms control obligations is critically examined, and the shortcomings of the existing arrangements are pointed out. The critique is searching, objective and free of the usual biases of official government reports. The analysis of the arms control agreements is preceded by an historical overview, beginning with the Hague Peace Conferences, held at the turn of this century, through the League of Nations' attempts to bring about a universal reduction of armaments, to the activities of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and general disarmament. The present arms control negotiating machinery is described. The texts of the relevant documents are reproduced for handy reference and the status of the implementation of the most important multilateral arms control agreements is presented in tabular form. Tables and figures facilitate the reading.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.