In this book, the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process, he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality. The approach is radical: It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or even self-interest maximizing. Yet, not all actions are to be understood in these terms. Actions oriented around social roles, for example, cannot count as irrational only because there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic. The concept of bounded rationality tries to embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive capabilities and selective perceptions. However, the agent is still left within the realm of cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that drive agency. Hence, they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning.

The theory of practical rationality does not belong to one academic discipline alone. There are quite divergent philosophical, economical, sociological, psychological and politological contributions. Sometimes the disciplinary boundaries impede theoretical progress. On the other hand it is an indication for the high complexity of the subject that so many divergent paradigms compete with one another, or - what is worse - live separately in a kind of splendid isolation. Decision theory in the broader sense, embracing the theory of games and collective choice theory, can help to understand practical reason in philosophical analysis. But there are interesting aspects which cannot be dealt with adequately within a decision-theoretic conceptual framework. To have both of these convictions justifies to neglect dis ciplinary boundaries and poses a problem for the orthodoxies of either sides. All the essays of this volume focus on the relation between economic rationality and practical reason and discuss different aspects of the same problem, i. e. a basic deficiency in the standard economic theory of practical rationality. But philosophical analysis would not be of much help if it just rejected the economic paradigm. It must rather help to integrate economic aspects into a broader view on practical reason."

It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.

It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.

The theory of practical rationality does not belong to one academic discipline alone. There are quite divergent philosophical, economical, sociological, psychological and politological contributions. Sometimes the disciplinary boundaries impede theoretical progress. On the other hand it is an indication for the high complexity of the subject that so many divergent paradigms compete with one another, or - what is worse - live separately in a kind of splendid isolation. Decision theory in the broader sense, embracing the theory of games and collective choice theory, can help to understand practical reason in philosophical analysis. But there are interesting aspects which cannot be dealt with adequately within a decision-theoretic conceptual framework. To have both of these convictions justifies to neglect dis ciplinary boundaries and poses a problem for the orthodoxies of either sides. All the essays of this volume focus on the relation between economic rationality and practical reason and discuss different aspects of the same problem, i. e. a basic deficiency in the standard economic theory of practical rationality. But philosophical analysis would not be of much help if it just rejected the economic paradigm. It must rather help to integrate economic aspects into a broader view on practical reason."

In this book, German philosopher Julian Nida-Rumelin presents a theory of practical reason that is objectivist, or rather realist, as an alternative to the widespread subjectivism in the theory of rationality. This theory has pragmatic traits that can be read as a constructive counterpart to Nida-Rumelin's critique of consequentialism whilst embedding its conception of rationality in the conceptual framework of decision and game theory.

This open access book deals with cultural and philosophical aspects of artificial intelligence (AI) and pleads for a "digital humanism". This term is beginning to be en vogue everywhere. Due to a growing discontentment with the way digitalization is being used in the world, particularly formulated by former heroes of Internet, social media and search engine companies, philosophical as well as industrial thought leaders begin to plead for a humane use of digital tools. Yet the term "digital humanism" is a particular terminology that lacks a sound conceptual and philosophical basis and needs clarification still - and this gap is exactly filled by this book. It propagates a vision of society in which digitization is used to strengthen human self-determination, autonomy and dignity and whose time has come to be propagated throughout the world. The advantage of this book is that it is philosophically sound and yet written in a way that will make it accessible for everybody interested in the subject. Every chapters begins with a film scene illustrating a precise philosophical problem with AI and how we look at it - making the book not only readable, but even entertaining. And after having read the book the reader will have a clear vision of what it means to live in a world where digitization and AI are central technologies for a better and more humane civilization.

Culture is a uniquely human property. Although precursors to cultural practices are found in (non-human) primates and other animals, these precursors differ in kind from the conditions of human culture that have emerged through evolutionary processes. In order to illuminate the mutual dependence of biological-genetic and cultural evolution, the author investigates technology and the use of tools, as well as the way these abilities are transmitted, in order to understand what properties and abilities separate human beings from animals.

Everybody who thinks or speaks possesses consciousness a " but nobody is capable of defining exactly what consciousness is. The phenomenon a ~consciousnessa (TM), therefore, is a persistent enigma which is being continually addressed by various disciplines. This volume encompasses the functions of consciousness as analysed by a consortium of scholars from the life sciences and humanities. Empirical results taken from psychiatry and psychology,linguistic and philosophical act and speech analyses, as well as, historical perspectives are all placed in context with one another. renowned contributors provides an extensive and systematic introduction

The volume includes proceedings of the International Conference of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Munich 1997. Papers selected contribute to the development of the discipline, and address topics of general interest. Among the contributors are: Onora O'Neill, Wolfgang Kuenne, Hans Kamp, Martin Hollis, John McDowell, Richard Boyd, Nicolas Rescher.

Grundlagenwerk der rationalen Entscheidungstheorie fur Volks- und Betriebswirte, Soziologen, Politikwissenschaftler und Philosophen."

Die Frage des Menschen nach sich selbst beschaftigt Menschen zu allen Zeiten und an allen Orten, so auch in der Gegenwart. Die hier versammelten Wissenschaftler, Politiker, Theologen, Journalisten und Schriftsteller aus verschiedenen kulturellen Traditionen geben in uber funfzig pragnanten Beitragen ihre persoenliche Antwort auf die aufgeworfene Frage. Was ist davon zu erwarten? Sicherlich keine abschliessende Loesung der Frage. Doch ist ein schillerndes Spektrum aktueller Positionen zum menschlichen Selbstverstandnis entstanden - zugleich kritisch und konstruktiv, pointiert und tiefgrundig. Eingeleitet und kommentiert wird die Sammlung mit Beitragen von Volker Gerhardt, Julian Nida-Rumelin, Detlev Ganten und Jan-Christoph Heilinger.