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JL Austin (1911-1960) exercised in Post-war Oxford an intellectual
authority similar to that of Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Although he
completed no books of his own and published only seven papers,
Austin became through lectures and talks one of the acknowledged
leaders in what is called 'Oxford philosophy' or 'ordinary language
philosophy'. Few would dispute that among analytic philosophers
Austin stands out as a great and original philosophical genius.
Three volumes of his writing, published after his death, have
become classics in analytical philosophy: Philosophical Papers;
Sense and Sensibilia; and How to Do Things with Words. First
published in 1979, this book is a collection of critical essays on
Austin's philosophy written by well-known philosophers, many of
whom knew Austin personally. A number of essays included were
especially written for this volume, but the majority have appeared
previously in various journals or books, not all easy to obtain.
J. L. Austin (1911-1960) exercised in Post-war Oxford an
intellectual authority similar to that of Wittgenstein in
Cambridge. Although he completed no books of his own and published
only seven papers, Austin became through lectures and talks one of
the acknowledged leaders in what is called Oxford philosophy or
ordinary language philosophy . Few would dispute that among
analytic philosophers Austin stands out as a great and original
philosophical genius. Three volumes of his writing, published after
his death, have become classics in analytical philosophy:
Philosophical Papers; Sense and Sensibilia; and How to Do Things
with Words.
First published in 1969, this book is a collection of critical
essays on Austin 's philosophy written by well-known philosophers,
many of whom knew Austin personally. A number of essays included
were especially written for this volume, but the majority have
appeared previously in various journals or books, not all easy to
obtain.
This monograph attempts to clarify one significant but much
neglected aspect of Peirce's contribution to the philosophy of
science. It was written in 1963 as my M. A. thesis at the Uni
versity of Illinois. Since the topic is still neglected it is hoped
that its pUblication will be of use to Peirce scholars. I should
like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Max Fisch who broached
this topic to me and who advised me con tinuously through its
development, assisting generously with his own insights and
unpublished Peirce manuscripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1. A
Current Issue in the Philosophy of Science 1 2. Peirce and His
Theory of Abduction 5 3. The General Character of Abduction 7 PART
I: THE EARLY THEORY 1. Peirce's Earliest Conception of Inference 11
2. Three Kinds of Inference and Three Figures of Syllogism 13 3.
Ampliative Inference and Cognition 17 4. Induction and Hypothesis
20 5. The Method of Methods 23 PART II: THE LATER THEORY 1. The
Transitional Period 28 2. Three Stages of Inquiry 31 3. Abduction
and Guessing Instinct 35 4. Logic as a Normative Science 38 5.
Hypothesis Construction and Selection 41 6. Abduction and
Pragmatism 44 7. Economy of Research 47 8. Justification of
Abduction 51 CONCLUSION 55 61 BIBLIOGRAPHY INTRODUCTION 1."
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