This book examines how major powers in the Indo-Pacific region cope with and respond to the potential order transition against the background of the strategic competition between the US and China. The world is in a crisis and the liberal international order is at stake with the Covid pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war indicating a possible order transition in the international system. The Indo Pacific region has become the focal point of intense competition between the United States and China. Against this backdrop, the chapters in this volume explore how policy elites in the area have attempted to address the potential order transition, and how different states - including great and middle powers - have been employing various strategies to deal with the security and economic challenges in the region. The complexity of the international order has made this order transition particularly challenging, making it a difficult time for both state leaders and scholars alike. It is the best of times, and it is the worst of times. This book provides an academic platform for graduate students, scholars and policy experts to approach this topic from different theoretical and national perspectives. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of The Pacific Review.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has experienced several notable interstate crises: the 1999 'embassy bombing' incident, the 2001 EP-3 mid-air collision with a United States aircraft, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with Japan. China's response to each incident, however, has varied considerably. Drawing from a wealth of primary sources and interviews, this book offers a systematic analysis of China's crisis behavior in order to identify the factors which determine when Chinese leaders decide to escalate or scale down their response to crises. Inspired by prospect theory - a Nobel Prize-winning behavioral psychology theory - Kai He proposes a 'political survival prospect' model as a means to understand the disparities in China's behavior. He argues that China's response depends on a combination of three factors that shape leaders' views on the prospects for their 'political survival status', including the severity of the crisis, leaders' domestic authority, and international pressure.

In the 1990s there was a wave of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific, led primarily by ASEAN. Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, however, many non-ASEAN states have attempted to seize the initiative, including the USA, Japan, China, South Korea, and Australia. Kai He and his contributors debate the reasons for this contested multilateralism and the impacts it will have on the region's security and political challenges. Will the "Indo-Pacific turn" be a blessing or a curse for regional stability and prosperity? Using a diverse range of theoretical and empirical perspectives, these leading scholars contribute views on this question and on the diverse strategies of the great and middle powers in the region. This collection will be of great interest to scholars and students of international relations in the Asia Pacific and of great value to policy makers in the region and beyond.

In the 1990s there was a wave of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific, led primarily by ASEAN. Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, however, many non-ASEAN states have attempted to seize the initiative, including the USA, Japan, China, South Korea, and Australia. Kai He and his contributors debate the reasons for this contested multilateralism and the impacts it will have on the region's security and political challenges. Will the "Indo-Pacific turn" be a blessing or a curse for regional stability and prosperity? Using a diverse range of theoretical and empirical perspectives, these leading scholars contribute views on this question and on the diverse strategies of the great and middle powers in the region. This collection will be of great interest to scholars and students of international relations in the Asia Pacific and of great value to policy makers in the region and beyond.

How does China see the rest of the world? One way to answer this question is to look at the work of China's scholars in the field of International Relations (IR). This leads to a second question - to what extent do Chinese IR scholars influence Beijing's foreign policy and outlook? The contributors to this book seek to answer these key questions, drawing on their own first- and second-hand experiences of involvement in scholarly IR debates in China. Discussing fundamental aspects of China's foreign policy such as China's view of the international structure, soft power projection, maritime disputes, and the principle of non-interference, this book provides insights into the hinterland of Chinese foreign policy-making. It is an invaluable reference for global IR scholars, especially those with a direct interest in understanding and predicting China's actions and reactions on a range of international issues.

Why does North Korea behave erratically in pursuing its nuclear weapons program? Why did the United States prefer bilateral alliances to multilateral ones in Asia after World War II? Why did China become "nice"-no more military coercion-in dealing with the pro-independence Taiwan President Chen Shuibian after 2000? Why did China compromise in the negotiation of the Chunxiao gas exploration in 2008 while Japan became provocative later in the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea? North Korea's nuclear behavior, U.S. alliance strategy, China's Taiwan policy, and Sino-Japanese territorial disputes are all important examples of seemingly irrational foreign policy decisions that have determined regional stability and Asian security. By examining major events in Asian security, this book investigates why and how leaders make risky and seemingly irrational decisions in international politics. The authors take the innovative step of integrating the neoclassical realist framework in political science and prospect theory in psychology. Their analysis suggests that political leaders are more likely to take risky actions when their vital interests and political legitimacy are seriously threatened. For each case, the authors first discuss the weaknesses of some of the prevailing arguments, mainly from rationalist and constructivist theorizing, and then offer an alternative explanation based on their political legitimacy-prospect theory model. This pioneering book tests and expands prospect theory to the study of Asian security and challenges traditional, expected-utility-based, rationalist theories of foreign policy behavior.

Why does North Korea behave erratically in pursuing its nuclear weapons program? Why did the United States prefer bilateral alliances to multilateral ones in Asia after World War II? Why did China become "nice"-no more military coercion-in dealing with the pro-independence Taiwan President Chen Shuibian after 2000? Why did China compromise in the negotiation of the Chunxiao gas exploration in 2008 while Japan became provocative later in the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea? North Korea's nuclear behavior, U.S. alliance strategy, China's Taiwan policy, and Sino-Japanese territorial disputes are all important examples of seemingly irrational foreign policy decisions that have determined regional stability and Asian security. By examining major events in Asian security, this book investigates why and how leaders make risky and seemingly irrational decisions in international politics. The authors take the innovative step of integrating the neoclassical realist framework in political science and prospect theory in psychology. Their analysis suggests that political leaders are more likely to take risky actions when their vital interests and political legitimacy are seriously threatened. For each case, the authors first discuss the weaknesses of some of the prevailing arguments, mainly from rationalist and constructivist theorizing, and then offer an alternative explanation based on their political legitimacy-prospect theory model. This pioneering book tests and expands prospect theory to the study of Asian security and challenges traditional, expected-utility-based, rationalist theories of foreign policy behavior.

This book examines the strategic interactions among China, the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asian States in the context of China's rise and globalization after the cold war. Engaging the mainstream theoretical debates in international relations, the author introduces a new theoretical framework-institutional realism-to explain the institutionalization of world politics in the Asia-Pacific after the cold war. Institutional realism suggests that deepening economic interdependence creates a condition under which states are more likely to conduct a new balancing strategy-institutional balancing, i.e., countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions-to pursue security under anarchy. To test the validity of institutional realism, Kai He examines the foreign policies of the U.S., Japan, the ASEAN states, and China toward four major multilateral institutions, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and East Asian Summit (EAS). Challenging the popular pessimistic view regarding China's rise, the book concludes that economic interdependence and structural constraints may well soften the "dragon's teeth." China's rise does not mean a dark future for the region. Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific will be of great interest to policy makers and scholars of Asian security, international relations, Chinese foreign policy, and U.S. foreign policy.

Harmonious World and China's New Foreign Policy consists of essays by China specialists on the Chinese government's characterization of foreign policy as a "harmonious world." The essays deal with such topics as "harmonious world" and China's new diplomacy, China's multilateral diplomacy after the Cold War, China's changing image of and engagement with the world order, China's energy security diplomacy, and China's trade diplomacy. These insightful contributions will help students in this academic field understand the new concepts and programs adopted by the Chinese new leadership and their important implications for China's new foreign policy behavior in the years to come.

How does China see the rest of the world? One way to answer this question is to look at the work of China's scholars in the field of International Relations (IR). This leads to a second question - to what extent do Chinese IR scholars influence Beijing's foreign policy and outlook? The contributors to this book seek to answer these key questions, drawing on their own first- and second-hand experiences of involvement in scholarly IR debates in China. Discussing fundamental aspects of China's foreign policy such as China's view of the international structure, soft power projection, maritime disputes, and the principle of non-interference, this book provides insights into the hinterland of Chinese foreign policy-making. It is an invaluable reference for global IR scholars, especially those with a direct interest in understanding and predicting China's actions and reactions on a range of international issues.

This book examines the strategic interactions among China, the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asian States in the context of China s rise and globalization after the cold war. Engaging the mainstream theoretical debates in international relations, the author introduces a new theoretical framework institutional realism to explain the institutionalization of world politics in the Asia-Pacific after the cold war.

Institutional realism suggests that deepening economic interdependence creates a condition under which states are more likely to conduct a new balancing strategy institutional balancing, i.e., countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions to pursue security under anarchy. To test the validity of institutional realism, Kai He examines the foreign policies of the U.S., Japan, the ASEAN states, and China toward four major multilateral institutions, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and East Asian Summit (EAS). Challenging the popular pessimistic view regarding China s rise, the book concludes that economic interdependence and structural constraints may well soften the "dragon s teeth." China s rise does not mean a dark future for the region.

Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific will be of great interest to policy makers and scholars of Asian security, international relations, Chinese foreign policy, and U.S. foreign policy.

'Harmonious World' and China's New Foreign Policy consists of essays by China specialists on the Chinese government's characterization of foreign policy as a 'harmonious world.' The essays deal with such topics as 'harmonious world' and China's new diplomacy, China's multilateral diplomacy after the Cold War, China's changing image of and engagement with the world order, China's energy security diplomacy, and China's trade diplomacy. These insightful contributions will help students in this academic field understand the new concepts and programs adopted by the Chinese new leadership and their important implications for China's new foreign policy behavior in the years to come.

Traditionally, the South China Sea (SCS) issue was not on the negotiation table between the United States and China. However, the tensions between the United States and China over the SCS have gradually simmered up to a strategic level. Why and how did the SCS become a flashpoint between the United States and China? Will the United States and China really go to war over the SCS? Why did China adopt an "assertive" policy towards the South China Sea in the 2000s? What will regional actors do in the face of this "new normal" of competition between China and the United States? Will multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific alleviate the potential conflicts over the SCS disputes? How will US-Chinese competition in the SCS shape the dynamics of Asian security? This edited book addresses these questions systematically and theoretically, with contributions from leading scholars in the field of US-China relations and Asian security from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. It elevates the analysis of the SCS disputes from maritime and legal issues to the strategic level between the United States and China.

Traditionally, the South China Sea (SCS) issue was not on the negotiation table between the United States and China. However, the tensions between the United States and China over the SCS have gradually simmered up to a strategic level. Why and how did the SCS become a flashpoint between the United States and China? Will the United States and China really go to war over the SCS? Why did China adopt an "assertive" policy towards the South China Sea in the 2000s? What will regional actors do in the face of this "new normal" of competition between China and the United States? Will multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific alleviate the potential conflicts over the SCS disputes? How will US-Chinese competition in the SCS shape the dynamics of Asian security? This edited book addresses these questions systematically and theoretically, with contributions from leading scholars in the field of US-China relations and Asian security from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. It elevates the analysis of the SCS disputes from maritime and legal issues to the strategic level between the United States and China.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has experienced several notable interstate crises: the 1999 'embassy bombing' incident, the 2001 EP-3 mid-air collision with a United States aircraft, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with Japan. China's response to each incident, however, has varied considerably. Drawing from a wealth of primary sources and interviews, this book offers a systematic analysis of China's crisis behavior in order to identify the factors which determine when Chinese leaders decide to escalate or scale down their response to crises. Inspired by prospect theory - a Nobel Prize-winning behavioral psychology theory - Kai He proposes a 'political survival prospect' model as a means to understand the disparities in China's behavior. He argues that China's response depends on a combination of three factors that shape leaders' views on the prospects for their 'political survival status', including the severity of the crisis, leaders' domestic authority, and international pressure.

How can we know a country, such as the United States or China, is revisionist, that is, whether it intends to upset the international order? What motivates states to act the way they do? Contesting Revisionism focuses on a particular kind of motivation inclining a state to challenge the existing norms, rules, and institutions of international order: revisionism. The authors offer a critique of the existing discourse on revisionism and investigate the origin and evolution of the foreign policy orientations of revisionist states in the past. Furthermore, they introduce an ensemble of indicators to discern and compare the extent of revisionist tendencies on the part of contemporary China and the United States. Questioning the facile assumption that past episodes will repeat in the future, they argue that "hard" revisionism relying on war and conquest is less viable and likely in today's world. Instead, "soft" revisionism seeking to promote institutional change is more relevant and likely. Focusing on contemporary Sino-American relations, they conclude that much of the current discourse based on power transition theory is problematic. A dominant power is not inevitably committed to the defense of international order, nor does a rising power always have a revisionist agenda to challenge this order. The transformation of international order does not necessarily require a power transition between China and the US., nor does a possible power transition necessarily augur war. After developing the concept of revisionism both theoretically and empirically, they conclude with a series of policy recommendations for enhancing international stability and diminishing tension in Sino-American relations.

This book intends to make sense of how Chinese leaders perceive China's rise in the world through the eyes of China's international relations (IR) scholars. Drawing on a unique, four-year opinion survey of these scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing from 2014-2017, the authors examine Chinese IR scholars' perceptions of and views on key issues related to China's power, its relationship with the United States and other major countries, and China's position in the international system and track their changes over time. Furthermore, the authors complement the surveys with a textual analysis of the academic publications in China's top five IR journals. By comparing and contrasting the opinion surveys and textual analyses, this book sheds new light on how Chinese IR scholars view the world as well as how they might influence China's foreign policy.

How can we know a country, such as the United States or China, is revisionist, that is, whether it intends to upset the international order? What motivates states to act the way they do? Contesting Revisionism focuses on a particular kind of motivation inclining a state to challenge the existing norms, rules, and institutions of international order: revisionism. The authors offer a critique of the existing discourse on revisionism and investigate the origin and evolution of the foreign policy orientations of revisionist states in the past. Furthermore, they introduce an ensemble of indicators to discern and compare the extent of revisionist tendencies on the part of contemporary China and the United States. Questioning the facile assumption that past episodes will repeat in the future, they argue that "hard" revisionism relying on war and conquest is less viable and likely in today's world. Instead, "soft" revisionism seeking to promote institutional change is more relevant and likely. Focusing on contemporary Sino-American relations, they conclude that much of the current discourse based on power transition theory is problematic. A dominant power is not inevitably committed to the defense of international order, nor does a rising power always have a revisionist agenda to challenge this order. The transformation of international order does not necessarily require a power transition between China and the US., nor does a possible power transition necessarily augur war. After developing the concept of revisionism both theoretically and empirically, they conclude with a series of policy recommendations for enhancing international stability and diminishing tension in Sino-American relations.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has experienced several notable interstate crises: the 1999 'embassy bombing' incident, the 2001 EP-3 mid-air collision with a United States aircraft, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with Japan. China's response to each incident, however, has varied considerably. Drawing from a wealth of primary sources and interviews, this book offers a systematic analysis of China's crisis behavior in order to identify the factors which determine when Chinese leaders decide to escalate or scale down their response to crises. Inspired by prospect theory - a Nobel Prize-winning behavioral psychology theory - Kai He proposes a 'political survival prospect' model as a means to understand the disparities in China's behavior. He argues that China's response depends on a combination of three factors that shape leaders' views on the prospects for their 'political survival status', including the severity of the crisis, leaders' domestic authority, and international pressure.