The concept of the imaginary is pervasive within contemporary thought, yet can be a baffling and often controversial term. In Imagination and the Imaginary, Kathleen Lennon explores the links between imagination - regarded as the faculty of creating images or forms - and the imaginary, which links such imagery with affect or emotion and captures the significance which the world carries for us. Beginning with an examination of contrasting theories of imagination proposed by Hume and Kant, Lennon argues that the imaginary is not something in opposition to the real, but the very faculty through which the world is made real to us. She then turns to the vexed relationship between perception and imagination and, drawing on Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, explores some fundamental questions, such as whether there is a distinction between the perceived and the imagined; the relationship between imagination and creativity; and the role of the body in perception and imagination. Invoking also Spinoza and Coleridge, Lennon argues that, far from being a realm of illusion, the imaginary world is our most direct mode of perception. She then explores the role the imaginary plays in the formation of the self and the social world. A unique feature of the volume is that it compares and contrasts a philosophical tradition of thinking about the imagination - running from Kant and Hume to Strawson and John McDowell - with the work of phenomenological, psychoanalytic, poststructuralist and feminist thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Lacan, Castoriadis, Irigaray, Gatens and Lloyd. This makes Imagination and the Imaginary essential reading for students and scholars working in phenomenology, philosophy of perception, social theory, cultural studies and aesthetics. Cover Image: Bronze Bowl with Lace, Ursula Von Rydingsvard, 2014. Courtesy the artist, Galerie Lelong and Yorkshire Sculpture Park. Photo Jonty Wilde.

The concept of the imaginary is pervasive within contemporary thought, yet can be a baffling and often controversial term. In Imagination and the Imaginary, Kathleen Lennon explores the links between imagination - regarded as the faculty of creating images or forms - and the imaginary, which links such imagery with affect or emotion and captures the significance which the world carries for us. Beginning with an examination of contrasting theories of imagination proposed by Hume and Kant, Lennon argues that the imaginary is not something in opposition to the real, but the very faculty through which the world is made real to us. She then turns to the vexed relationship between perception and imagination and, drawing on Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, explores some fundamental questions, such as whether there is a distinction between the perceived and the imagined; the relationship between imagination and creativity; and the role of the body in perception and imagination. Invoking also Spinoza and Coleridge, Lennon argues that, far from being a realm of illusion, the imaginary world is our most direct mode of perception. She then explores the role the imaginary plays in the formation of the self and the social world. A unique feature of the volume is that it compares and contrasts a philosophical tradition of thinking about the imagination - running from Kant and Hume to Strawson and John McDowell - with the work of phenomenological, psychoanalytic, poststructuralist and feminist thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Lacan, Castoriadis, Irigaray, Gatens and Lloyd. This makes Imagination and the Imaginary essential reading for students and scholars working in phenomenology, philosophy of perception, social theory, cultural studies and aesthetics. Cover Image: Bronze Bowl with Lace, Ursula Von Rydingsvard, 2014. Courtesy the artist, Galerie Lelong and Yorkshire Sculpture Park. Photo Jonty Wilde.

The question of difference has always been a controversial issue for feminists. This is certainly true in the case of epistemological questions. What difference does the adoption of a feminist perspective make in relation to traditional knowledge? How are feminist perspectives themselves affected by the difference between women? Both questions require a re-evaluation of issues of objectivity and the justification of knowledge claims in a way that focuses on the subjects who constitute the knowledge producers. Using approaches and methods from both analytic and continental thinking, this collection addresses traditional epistemology and issues raised by postmodern critiques. "Knowing the Difference" features contributions from an international list of contributors including Rosi Braidotti, Gemma Corradi Fiumara, Sabina Lovibond, Liz Stanley and Anna Yeatman, as well as a range of new and innovative thinkers. Margaret Whitford has also published "Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy" (French Forum, 1982); "Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy", co-edited with Morwenna Griffiths (Macmillan 1988, and Indiana University Press, 1988); and "Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Femin

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A welcome introduction to one of the most intellectually demanding areas of the undergraduate philosophy curriculum. The authors provide a clear framework within which students can fit contemporary developments in the Anglo-American tradition which provide the core themes of philosophy of mind and which connect to their other work in epistemology and philosophy of language.

What is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, color, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels of description or explanation? Though reduction has long been a favorite method of analysis in all areas of philosophy, in recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences.

Here, for the first time, contemporary Continental thought comes into conversation with analytic philosophy on all the principal topics of philosophy of mind. Rejecting the dominant Anglo-American paradigm, which reduces mental phenomena to their roles in a scientific psychology, the authors present a non-mysterious, naturalistic alternative. Characterising mental life is, they seek to show, capturing the world from the point of view of the subject. But the subject is essentially embodied, so that mental phenomena are modes of our fleshly existence in the world. The book aims to bring together these three themes - the world,the flesh and the subject - to resolve many of the puzzles that beset contemporary philosophy of mind. It thereby provides a coherent new approach which draws upon phenomenology, hermeneutics, psycho-analysis and poststructuralism, and relates recent feminist work on the body to traditional concerns with the mind. The topics discussed include the problem of consciousness, perception and sensation, imagination, desire, emotion, reason and agency, and the self and others.Features * Brings continental thought to bear on contemporary philosophy of mind * Offers a new approach to problems of mind * Brings recent work on the body together with traditional concerns with the mind * Treats philosophy of mind in a topic oriented way

Kathleen Lennon provides a new approach to the philosophy of action, showing how "reasons" fit into the casual framework of the world, while defending their autonomy. She disputes the rapidly-congealing orthodoxy which maintains that explanations according to intentional states cannot be casual explanations.

Kathleen Lennon provides a new approach to the philosophy of action, showing how "reasons" fit into the casual framework of the world, while defending their autonomy. She disputes the rapidly-congealing orthodoxy which maintains that explanations according to intentional states cannot be casual explanations.