Only Imagine offers a theory of fictional content or, as it is sometimes known, 'fictional truth'. The theory of fictional content Kathleen Stock argues for is known as 'extreme intentionalism'; the idea that the fictional content of a particular work is equivalent to exactly what the author of the work intended the reader to imagine. Historically, this sort of view has been highly unpopular. Literary theorists and philosophers alike have poured scorn upon it. The first half of this book attempts to argue that it should in fact be taken very seriously as an adequate account of fictional truth: better, in fact, than many of its more popular rivals. The second half explores various explanatory benefits of extreme intentionalism for other issues in the philosophy of fiction and imagination. Namely, can fiction give us reliable knowledge? Why do we 'resist' imagining certain fictions? What, in fact, is a fiction? And, how should the imagination be characterised?

'A clear, concise, easy-to-read account of the issues between sex, gender and feminism . . . an important book' Evening Standard 'A call for cool heads at a time of great heat and a vital reminder that revolutions don't always end well' Sunday Times Material Girls is a timely and trenchant critique of the influential theory that we all have an inner feeling known as a gender identity, and that this feeling is more socially significant than our biological sex. Professor Kathleen Stock surveys the philosophical ideas that led to this point, and closely interrogates each one, from De Beauvoir's statement that, 'One is not born, but rather becomes a woman' (an assertion she contends has been misinterpreted and repurposed), to Judith Butler's claim that language creates biological reality, rather than describing it. She looks at biological sex in a range of important contexts, including women-only spaces and resources, healthcare, epidemiology, political organization and data collection. Material Girls makes a clear, humane and feminist case for our retaining the ability to discuss reality, and concludes with a positive vision for the future, in which trans rights activists and feminists can collaborate to achieve some of their political aims.

One writer's quest to locate herself within the wet, wild, and diversely human cultural heritage that has shaped her

Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work presents significant new contributions to central issues in the philosophy of music, written by leading philosophers working in the analytic tradition.
Music is an increasingly popular object of reflection for professional philosophers, as it raises special questions not only of relevance to music practitioners, theorists, and philosophers of art, but also of wider philosophical interest to those working in metaphysics, the philosophy of emotion, and the philosophy of language, among other areas. The wide range of contributors to this volume reflects this level of interest. It includes both well-known philosophers of music drawing on a wealth of reflection to produce new and often startling conclusions, and philosophers relatively new to the philosophy of music yet eminent in other philosophical fields, who are able to bring a fresh perspective, informed by that background, to their topic of choice.
The issues tackled in this volume include what sort of thing a work of music is; the nature of the relation between a musical work and versions of it; the nature of musical expression and its contribution to musical experience; the relation of music to metaphor; the nature of musical irony; the musical status of electro-sonic art; and the nature of musical rhythm. Together these papers constitute some of the best new work in what is an exciting field of research, and one which has much to engage philosophers, aestheticians, and musicologists.

Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work presents significant new contributions to central issues in the philosophy of music, written by leading philosophers working in the analytic tradition.
Music is an increasingly popular object of reflection for professional philosophers, as it raises special questions not only of relevance to music practitioners, theorists, and philosophers of art, but also of wider philosophical interest to those working in metaphysics, the philosophy of emotion, and the philosophy of language, among other areas. The wide range of contributors to this volume reflects this level of interest. It includes both well-known philosophers of music drawing on a wealth of reflection to produce new and often startling conclusions, and philosophers relatively new to the philosophy of music yet eminent in other philosophical fields, who are able to bring a fresh perspective, informed by that background, to their topic of choice.
The issues tackled in this volume include what sort of thing a work of music is; the nature of the relation between a musical work and versions of it; the nature of musical expression and its contribution to musical experience; the relation of music to metaphor; the nature of musical irony; the musical status of electro-sonic art; and the nature of musical rhythm. Together these papers constitute some of the best new work in what is an exciting field of research, and one which has much to engage philosophers, aestheticians, and musicologists.

Only Imagine offers a theory of fictional content or, as it is sometimes known, 'fictional truth'. The theory of fictional content Kathleen Stock argues for is known as 'extreme intentionalism'; the idea that the fictional content of a particular work is equivalent to exactly what the author of the work intended the reader to imagine. Historically, this sort of view has been highly unpopular. Literary theorists and philosophers alike have poured scorn upon it. The first half of this book attempts to argue that it should in fact be taken very seriously as an adequate account of fictional truth: better, in fact, than many of its more popular rivals. The second half explores various explanatory benefits of extreme intentionalism for other issues in the philosophy of fiction and imagination. Namely, can fiction give us reliable knowledge? Why do we 'resist' imagining certain fictions? What, in fact, is a fiction? And, how should the imagination be characterised?