The Maginot Line was the last great gun-bearing line of subterranean forts built before World War II. Although it acquired an unjustified reputation as a white elephant, the Maginot Line fulfilled the role for which it was built, allowing the French High Command the opportunity to mass its forces and counter the German invasion. Unfortunately, the French leadership failed to make the most of its assets, with the resulting disastrous outcome. During the 1920s, the French High Command formulated a number of offensive plans to strike at Germany, but by the end of the decade, it switched to defensive plans because of a lack of manpower. Work thus began on the Maginot Line and on other fortifications such as the French Mareth Line in North Africa and the heavy naval coastal defense batteries in Bizerte (Tunisia) and Toulon (France). The authors conclude that the Maginot Line offered the French High Command many opportunities from September 1939 until May 1940. They blame a failed French military doctrine for taking the initiative away from subordinates, laying the groundwork for the disastrous events of 1940 that left the French High Command paralyzed while German forces broke through the weakly held Ardennes.

This book chronicles the experience of the World War II paratroopers from their earliest days in training to final days of the war spent at Berchtesgaden. Relying heavily on memoirs, letters, and personal interviews with soldiers, this work highlights the rigors of training, the spectacle of combat, and the relief of survival and victory. From D-Day to Bastogne, Kaufmann follows the American advance across France, shedding light on the emotional strain and shock of combat that was, until recently, often overlooked by generations of Americans, but freely admitted to by the Vets themselves. Along the way, the book details the struggle faced by American G.I.s as they made their way through France. Indeed, it becomes clear the Nazis were not the only obstacle to Mutt and Joe during the campaign. The common problems of supply and relief often exacerbated difficult conditions in the field, while incompetent line officers often raised doubt and suspicion among men in the ranks. Ultimately, this is a very personal story about struggle and triumph, told by those who endured the hardship of combat.

Tracing the development of the fortifications in Europe from the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the twentieth century, this is the first comprehensive book in English on the forts of the Maginot Line, German espionage, and the German sieges during the 1940 campaign. It analyzes the reasons why the French opted for this type of defensive system, and explains how the Maginot Line presented the French Army with opportunities (mostly wasted) to regroup and mount an effective defense. Shrouded in media myth for 40 years, this study demonstrates both how the media created the myth and the truth behind the myth of the Maginot Line. At the time reporters wildly speculated about these fortifications, German intelligence agents were busy collecting data. Finally, this book relates the heroic battles waged by the forts, large and small: the tragic fall of La Ferte, the surrender of other DEGREESIpetits ouvrages DEGREESR after prolonged and fierce fighting, the triumphant resistance of the larger forts even in the face of the most savage artillery pounding, and the unqualified victory of the Little Maginot Line over invading Italian forces.

A few of the fortifications and fortified lines of the world wars are well known and have often been written about, illustrated and studied. But they tend to distract attention from the wide range of fixed defences constructed across Europe on an enormous scale after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, during a period of insecurity and aggression. That is why this new, highly illustrated study, which covers the entire continent, is so valuable. The authors examine the major fortified positions and describe their strategic purpose, their design and construction, and the role they played in military planning and operations. The outstanding contribution of the major military architects of the time is a key theme. The work of S r de Rivi res, Brialmont and others had a major influence on the course of the First World War and on the fortifications built before and during the Second World War. Their approach is visible in the designs for the Maginot Line, the East and West walls of Germany, the Vallo Alpino in Italy, the Soviet Stalin and Molotov lines, the Mannerheim and Salpa lines of Finland, the Greek Metaxas Line, the Bene Line of Czechoslovakia as well as the defences built by the Dutch and Scandinavians. The breadth of the coverage, the degree of detail and the numerous illustrations make the book essential reading and reference for anyone who has a special interest in the world wars and the history of fortifications.

Across western Europe the long tradition of castle-building took on its most sophisticated form in the later medieval period and then, in response to the development of gunpowder weapons, it underwent a fundamental change - from castle to fortress. This, the second volume of a highly illustrated new study of medieval fortification, gives a fascinating insight into the last great age of castles and the centuries of violence and conflict they were part of. It traces the advances made between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, looking in particular at the form these fortifications took in contexts as different as Italy, Wales, France and the Iberian peninsula. Many would regard this period in the history of castles as the classic age. It was followed by a phase of relative decline as the conditions of warfare changed and castles had to be adapted to cope with cannon. The conventional castle gave way to new styles of fortification. But, as the authors demonstrate, they were still essential factors in military calculations and campaigns - they were of direct strategic and tactical importance wherever there was an attempt to take or hold territory.

The Maginot Line was the last great gun-bearing line of subterranean forts built before World War II. Although it acquired an unjustified reputation as a white elephant, the Maginot Line fulfilled the role for which it was built, allowing the French High Command the opportunity to mass its forces and counter the German invasion. Unfortunately, the French leadership failed to make the most of its assets, with the resulting disastrous outcome. During the 1920s, the French High Command formulated a number of offensive plans to strike at Germany, but by the end of the decade, it switched to defensive plans because of a lack of manpower. Work thus began on the Maginot Line and on other fortifications such as the French Mareth Line in North Africa and the heavy naval coastal defense batteries in Bizerte (Tunisia) and Toulon (France). The authors conclude that the Maginot Line offered the French High Command many opportunities from September 1939 until May 1940. They blame a failed French military doctrine for taking the initiative away from subordinates, laying the groundwork for the disastrous events of 1940 that left the French High Command paralyzed while German forces broke through the weakly held Ardennes.