"Preventing Catastrophe" is written by two authors who are experienced "Washington hands" and who understand the interplay between intelligence and policymaking. Both have been personally involved, in the United States and overseas, in pursuing national and international measures to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Their extensive experience is evident in this book, which puts the Iraqi WMD issue in proper perspective, explains the challenge of monitoring small clandestine programs, and explains how the effort to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD differs from preventing their acquisition and use by nation states. At the same time, the authors are able to make a complex subject understandable to non-technical experts, making this book a useful teaching tool, especially for those who have little or no knowledge or experience in US national security decision making.
"National intelligence and international inspections are necessary to create confidence that violations of non-proliferation commitments are detected in time to permit appropriate action. Both must be pursued with professionalism and critical minds avoiding poor intelligence or cosmetic inspections. The issues studied thoroughly and with good judgment in this welcome volume by Graham and Hansen were intensely controversial in the case of Iraq but remain central to international counter-proliferation efforts."--Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

Since the mid-1950s, the international community has sought to ban all nuclear testing. In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty emerged after three years of intense international negotiations. However, after nearly a decade, there is no sign that the treaty will ever enter into force. Despite the general support for and adherence to a series of national moratoria on nuclear explosive testing, it is important to understand why the effort to achieve a permanent ban on nuclear testing has experienced such difficulties and continues to travel such a problematic road. The author of this book is neither a promoter nor a critic of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but rather he provides a brief historical and analytical understanding of the events surrounding its negotiation and implementation. The author's analysis, based on his personal involvement in the CTBT negotiations, provides one insider's view of how the critical events unfolded and how they are likely to affect future nonproliferation initiatives.

Much has been said and written about the failure of U.S. intelligence to prevent the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and its overestimation of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein. This book focuses instead on the central role that intelligence-collection systems play in promoting arms control and disarmament. Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith Hansen bring more than fifty combined years of experience to this discussion of the capabilities of technical systems, which are primarily based in space. Their history of the rapid advancement of surveillance technology is a window into a dramatic reconceptualization of Cold War strategies and policy planning. Graham and Hansen focus on the intelligence successes against Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the quality of the intelligence that has made possible accurate assessments of WMD programs in North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Their important insights shed a much-needed light on the process of verifying how the world harnesses the proliferation of nuclear arms and the continual drive for advancements in technology.

Much has been said and written about the failure of U.S. intelligence to prevent the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and its overestimation of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein. This book focuses instead on the central role that intelligence-collection systems play in promoting arms control and disarmament. Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith Hansen bring more than fifty combined years of experience to this discussion of the capabilities of technical systems, which are primarily based in space. Their history of the rapid advancement of surveillance technology is a window into a dramatic reconceptualization of Cold War strategies and policy planning. Graham and Hansen focus on the intelligence successes against Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the quality of the intelligence that has made possible accurate assessments of WMD programs in North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Their important insights shed a much-needed light on the process of verifying how the world harnesses the proliferation of nuclear arms and the continual drive for advancements in technology.