Fixing Dodd-Frank--a new proposal for bankruptcy law The events of the last several years on Wall Street make a compelling case for comprehensive, fundamental reform in the oversight of financial firms. In Bankruptcy Not Bailout, a group of expert contributors show why, if a new addition to the bankruptcy laws--Chapter 14--were implemented along with other genuine reforms, the changes could strengthen the US financial system and provide the impetus the US economy needs to thrive once again. The authors reveal the weaknesses in Dodd-Frank Title II, showing how the current law creates an elaborate, and potentially cumbersome, bureaucratic procedure for triggering seizure of a financial company--and tell why Chapter 14 could greatly improve that process, creating greater financial stability and reducing the likelihood of bailouts. They lay the groundwork for a return to a clearer, more rules-based oversight regime that relies more on real capital and true market forces and urge adoption of a Chapter 14 even were Dodd-Frank left untouched. CONTRIBUTORS: Andrew Crockett, Darrell Duffie, Thomas H. Jackson, William F. Kroener III, Kenneth E. Scott, David A. Skeel, Kimberly Anne Summe, John B. Taylor, Kevin M. Warsh

In 2012, building off work first published in 2010, the Resolution Project proposed that a new Chapter 14 be added to the Bankruptcy Code, exclusively designed to deal with the reorganization or liquidation of the nation's large financial institutions. In this book, the contributors expand on their proposal to improve the prospect that our largest financial institutions-particularly with prebankruptcy planning-could be successfully reorganized or liquidated pursuant to the rule of law and, in doing so, both make resolution planning pursuant to Title I of Dodd-Frank more fruitful and make reliance on administrative proceedings pursuant to Title II of Dodd-Frank largely unnecessary.

This book examines the dangers of continuing government bailouts and offers alternative strategies designed to produce growth based on the vigor of the private sector with inflation under control. The expert authors show that it is indeed possible to explain the causes of the crisis in understandable terms and clarify why resolving the bailout problem is esseHow Do We Make Failure Tolerable?The American people are clearly upset about the massive government bailouts of faltering organizations and the consequent commitment of taxpayer dollars-as well as the heavy involvement of the federal government in private sector activities. How do we approach a problem of this magnitude? The key question, which George Shultz presents at the outset, is: How do we make failure tolerable? In other words, if clear and credible measures can be put into place that convince everybody that failure will be allowed, then the expectations of bailouts will recede and perhaps even disappear. Perhaps more important, we would also get rid of the risk-inducing behavior that even implicit government guarantees bring about. In Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them, a team of expert contributors examine the dangers of continuing government bailouts and offer constructive alternatives designed to both resolve the current bailout problem and prevent future crises. The other contributors follow up on Shultz's premise with discussions on a range of key topics. They begin with the nature of systemic risk-particularly in the experience of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy-and the reforms that financial firms can implement, whether or not required by government regulatory agencies. They also explore in detail the two main alternatives to government bailouts in the case of a failing financial firm: bankruptcy versus resolution authority. The book concludes with a summary of the commentary on the chapters by formal discussants and the audience at the conference, ranging from constructive critiques to strong endorsements to ideas for future research.ntial to preventing future crises.