This book shows that the revolutionary guard has resisted professionalization on the key aspect of war decision making. It explains how the Guard was able to resist ideological dilution despite its need to adopt a rationalized and complex organizational structure.

This book shows that the revolutionary guard has resisted professionalization on the key aspect of war decision making. It explains how the Guard was able to resist ideological dilution despite its need to adopt a rationalized and complex organizational structure.

The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is sceptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed, although the Administration announced steps in March 2005 to support those talks. U.S. concerns have been heightened by the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an admitted hardliner, in Iran's presidential election on June 24, 2005. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalise foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's WMD programs to date. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody" and will be tried. Iran did not obstruct the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, at least partly in the expectation that pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic factions would come to power in Iraq in the aftermath. That result occurred as a product of 30 January 2005 elections there. Iran is also assisting pro-Iranian local leaders in Afghanistan, although that support does not appear to be materially hindering the stabilisation and development of Afghanistan. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticised by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities. New limits on personal freedoms could be imposed by Ahmadinejad, who has consistently advocated a return to many of the original principles of the Islamic revolution as set down by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. However, Iran does hold elections for some positions, including that of president, suggesting to some experts that there might be benefits to engaging Iranian officials. According to this view, new sanctions or military action could harden Iran's positions without necessarily easing the potential threat posed by Iran.

Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but much of Iraq remains violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence that, in the judgment of many, constitutes a "civil war." Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without dramatic improvements in levels of violence or clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities -- have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. President Bush announced a new strategy on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward") consisting of deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces ("troop surge") to help stabilise Baghdad and restive Anbar Province. The strategy is intended to provide security conditions conducive to Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as "benchmarks" of political progress. The FY2007 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 110-28, linked some U.S. reconstruction aid to progress on the eighteen named benchmarks, but allows for a presidential waiver to continue the aid even if little or no progress is observed in Administration reports due July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007. The latter will include a major assessment of the effects of the "troop surge" to date. According to the required July 15, 2007 Administration report, released on July 12, the Baghdad security plan has made progress on several military indicators and some political indicators, but progress is unsatisfactory on the most important political reconciliation indicators. The Administration report asserts that the "overall trajectory... has begun to stabilise," a finding on the security situation that is corroborated, to some extent, by an August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate A required report by the GAO released September 4, 2007, assesses less progress on security benchmarks than does the Administration and is pessimistic, as is the NIE, on the prospects for political reconciliation. Some in Congress -- as well as the Iraq Study Group -- believe that the United States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. Both chambers adopted a FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (H.R. 1591) that would have set an outside deadline of March 31, 2008, for U.S. combat withdrawal if the President did not certify Iraqi progress on the "benchmarks." President Bush vetoed it on May 1, 2007, and subsequent bills mandating forms of withdrawal or combat reduction have not moved forward. Some observers say such legislation might see further action after the Administration's September 15 progress report, while others say some positive assessments of the "troop surge" might forestall immediate congressional action. Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq's independence in 1932), and the monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain's presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq's first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old. A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said, a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam's rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs. One of the Baath Party's allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister (and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq's institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam's urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam's home town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam's regime repressed Iraq's Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.

U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilise Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate. This mirrors recent outside studies that contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasising a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan as failing -- either through lack of attention or eliberatestrategy -- to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan. To try to gain momentum against the insurgency, the United States is considering new initiatives including adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, possibly assuming U.S. command of the southern sector, and increasing direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan government remains reasonably stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences, as well as a centre of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai. Major regional strongmen have been marginalised. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later. To help stabilise Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 47,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, 19,000 of the 31,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces.