This volume brings together papers by a group of scholars, distinguished in their own right, in honour of James Brundage. The essays are organised into four sections, each corresponding to an important focus of Brundage's scholarly work. The first section explores the connection between the development of medieval legal and constitutional thought. Thomas Izbicki, Kenneth Pennington, and Charles Reid, Jr. explore various aspects of the jurisprudence of the Ius commune, while James Powell, Michael Gervers and Nicole Hamonic, Olivia Robinson, and Elizabeth Makowski examine how that jurisprudence was applied to various medieval institutions. Brian Tierney and James Muldoon conclude this section by demonstrating two important points: modern ideas of consent in the political sphere and fundamental principles of international law attributed to sixteenth century jurists like Hugo Grotius have deep roots in medieval jurisprudential thought. Patrick Zutshi, R. H. Helmholz, Peter Landau, Marjorie Chibnall, and Edward Peters have written essays that augment Brundage's work on the growth of the legal profession and how traces of a legal education began to emerge in many diverse arenas. The influence of legal thinking on marriage and sexuality was another aspect of Brundage's broad interests. In the third section Richard Kay, Charles Donahue, Jr., and Glenn Olsen explore the intersection of law and marriage and the interplay of legal thought on a central institution of Christian society. The contributions of Jonathan Riley-Smith and Robert Somerville in the fourth section round-out the volume and are devoted to Brundage's path-breaking work on medieval law and the crusading movement. The volume also includes a comprehensive bibliography of Brundage's work.

Several different approaches to medieval legal history are evident in these articles. The first group uses law to investigate the principles that governed society, whether clearly articulated or not, and to ask how the intellectual structures of the ius commune affected the institutions of government and the presuppositions of the people. The second group of articles illustrates the importance of returning to the manuscript sources of later medieval texts, rather than relying on the early printed editions. In both parts Professor Pennington also focuses on the lives of individual jurists, contending that these provide a key to the understanding of their thought, their position in society, and the connections between the two. One of these articles is published for the first time here, while a number of others have been revised and up-dated for publication. Plusieures approches differentes A l'histoire legale du Moyen Age sont refletees au travers de ces articles. Le premier groupe se sert de la loi pour explorer les principes qui gouvernaient la societe - que ceux-ci soient clairement exprimes ou non - et afin de demander comment les structures intellectuelles de l'ius commune affectaient les institutions gouvernementales et les presuppositions du peuple. Le second groupe illustre l'importance du retour aux sources manuscrites des textes medievaux tardifs, plutAt que de se fier A des impressions anciennes. Au travers des deux parties du volume, le professeur Pennington se concentre aussi sur la vie de certains juristes, avanAant qu'il s'agit lA d'une des clefs permettant de comprendre leur pensee, leur place dans la societe et le rapport entre ces deux facteurs. Un des articles est publie ici pour la premiere fois, alors qu'un certain nombre d'autres ont ete revises et mis A jour pour leur reimpression.

Gratian has long been called the father of Canon Law. This latest volume in the ongoing ""History of Medieval Canon Law"" series covers the period from Gratian's initial teaching of canon law during the 1120s to just before the promulgation of the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX in 1234.Gratian's contributions to the birth of canon law and European jurisprudence were significant: he introduced a new methodology of teaching law by using hypothetical cases and by integrating - and inserting in the texts themselves - his own comments on the canons. He also used the dialectical method to analyze legal problems that he raised in his cases. Though this methodology was first developed by Peter Abelard and others in the schools of Northern France, Gratian was the first to apply it to legal texts with the publication of his Decretum (ca. 1140). Because the Decretum was not just a collection of texts but an analysis of the sources and doctrines of ecclesiastical law, his book enjoyed immediate success across Europe. The Decretum was adopted by teachers from England to Italy and Germany to Spain. Gratian's successors later applied his methodology to the papal appellate decisions (decretals) that gradually became the foundation of canon law in the later Middle Ages.In this volume, distinguished legal historians contribute noteworthy essays on the commentaries on Gratian, the beginnings of decretal collections and commentaries on them, and the importance of conciliar legislation for the growth of canon law. There are also chapters on the influence of Roman law on canon law and the teaching of canon law in law schools.Contributors are James A. Brundage, Anne Duggan, Charles Duggan, A. Garcia y Garcia, Joseph Goering, Michael H. Hoeflich, Peter Landau, Wolfgang P. Muller, Jasonne Grabher O'Brien, Kenneth Pennington, and Rudolf Weigand.

Understanding the rules of procedure and the practices of medieval and early modern courts is of great importance for historians of every stripe. The authors and editors of this volume present readers with a description of court procedure, the sources for investigating the work of the courts, the jurisprudence and the norms that regulated the courts, as well as a survey of the variety of courts that populated the European landscape. Not least, the authors wish to show the relationship between the jurisprudence that governed judicial procedure and what happened in the court room. By the end of the thirteenth century, court procedure in continental Europe in secular and ecclesiastical courts shared many characteristics. As the academic jurists of the Ius commune began to excavate the norms of procedure from Justinian's great codification of law and then to expound them in the classroom and in their writings, they shaped the structure of ecclesiastical courts and secular courts as well. These essays also illuminate striking differences in the sources that we find in different parts of Europe. In northern Europe the archives are rich but do not always provide the details we need to understand a particular case. In Italy and Southern France the documentation is more detailed than in other parts of Europe but here too the historical records do not answer every question we might pose to them. In Spain, detailed documentation is strangely lacking, if not altogether absent. Iberian conciliar canons and tracts on procedure tell us much about practicein Spanish courts. As these essays demonstrate, scholars who want to peer into the medieval courtroom, must also read letters, papal decretals, chronicles, conciliar canons, and consilia to provide a nuanced and complete picture of what happened in medieval trials. This volume will give sophisticated guidance to all readers with an interest in European law and courts.

The power of the prince versus the rights of his subjects is one of the basic struggles in the history of law and government. In this masterful history of monarchy, conceptions of law, and due process, Kenneth Pennington addresses that struggle and opens an entirely new vista in the study of Western legal tradition. Pennington investigates legal interpretations of the monarch's power from the twelfth to the seventeenth century. Then, tracing the evolution of defendants' rights, he demonstrates that the origins of due process are not rooted in English common law as is generally assumed. It was not a sturdy Anglo-Saxon, but, most probably, a French jurist of the late thirteenth century who wrote, "A man is innocent until proven guilty." This is the first book to examine in detail the origins of our concept of due process. It also reveals a fascinating paradox: while a theory of individual rights was evolving, so, too, was the concept of the prince's "absolute power." Pennington illuminates this paradox with a clarity that will greatly interest students of political theory as well as legal historians.