Emerging technologies create challenges for traditional regulatory approaches. The contributors to this book - leading scholars in law, innovation, and technology - address the need for new governance methods and models. The unique characteristics of emerging technologies - their diverse applications, the myriad concerns raised by new technologies, the need for public engagement, and the issue of effective coordination between governance players - create the need for new governance approaches. The authors identify innovative new methods of governance, taking into account an environment where changes in technologies can out-pace the corresponding regulatory frameworks. Scholars of technology, science and innovation will find this book to be an enlightening read, as will lawyers, policymakers and think-tanks working within the emerging technologies arena. Contributors: J.W. Abbott, K.W. Abbott, B. Allenby, M. Baram, D.M. Bowman, J. Kuzma, P.H. Lindoe, R.A. Lindor, T.F. Malloy, G.N. Mandel, G.E. Marchant, M. Masterton, L. Paddock, J. Paterson, M.A. Saner, W. Wallach

This book collects and integrates Abbott and Snidal's influential scholarship on indirect global governance, with a new analytical introduction that probes the role of indirect governance techniques in the universe of global governance arrangements. The volume presents the Governance Triangle, a now widely-used figure that demonstrates and helps to assess the proliferation of private and public-private standard-setting organizations, along with new forms of intergovernmental institutions, over recent decades. It then analyzes how intergovernmental organizations, regulatory bodies, and other "global governors" enlist and work through those organizations as intermediaries, so as to govern more effectively and gain knowledge, influence and legitimacy. It demonstrates Abbott's and Snidal's groundbreaking concept of orchestration, a mode of indirect governance in which influential governors catalyze, support, and steer intermediary organizations through wholly voluntary relationships. It also considers their more recent innovations in the theory of indirect governance. These include additional modes of governance, such as co-optation, delegation and trusteeship, as well as the pervasive "Governor's Dilemma" trade-off between a governor's control of its intermediaries and the intermediaries' competence. This book will appeal to scholars and students in multiple disciplines, including international relations, global governance, law, and regulatory studies.

From agriculture to sport and from climate change to indigenous rights, transnational regulatory regimes and actors are multiplying and interacting with poorly understood results. This interdisciplinary book investigates whether, how and by whom transnational business governance interactions (TBGIs) can be harnessed to improve the quality of transnational regulation and advance the interests of marginalized actors. Exploring multiple sectors and issue areas, Transnational Business Governance Interactions presents new empirical and theoretical research from leading and emerging scholars and identifies obstacles to, and opportunities for, mobilizing TBGIs to enhance regulatory capacities, outputs and outcomes and to advance marginalized actors in transnational business governance. The prime readership for this work is an interdisciplinary audience of academics including scholars of law, business, environmental studies, international relations, political science, political economy and sociology. Because of its attention to practical strategies to harness governance interactions to enhance regulatory quality and advance marginalized groups, the book will also be of interest to high-level participants in global business governance, including standards-setting bodies, certification bodies, auditors, trade associations, civil society organizations, social movement organizers, national regulators, overseas development agencies and international organizations. Contributors include: K.W. Abbott, G. Auld, M. Bach, S. Carodenuto, B. Cashore, D. Casey, C.C.-H. Chen, B. Eberlein, P. Foley, S. Gao, T. Havinga, L.F. Henriksen, E. Meidinger, N. Oman, P. Paiement, S. Renckens, R. Schmidt, L. Seabrooke, P. Verbruggen, O. Westerwinter, J.K. Winn, S. Wood

This book collects and integrates Abbott and Snidal's influential scholarship on indirect global governance, with a new analytical introduction that probes the role of indirect governance techniques in the universe of global governance arrangements. The volume presents the Governance Triangle, a now widely-used figure that demonstrates and helps to assess the proliferation of private and public-private standard-setting organizations, along with new forms of intergovernmental institutions, over recent decades. It then analyzes how intergovernmental organizations, regulatory bodies, and other "global governors" enlist and work through those organizations as intermediaries, so as to govern more effectively and gain knowledge, influence and legitimacy. It demonstrates Abbott's and Snidal's groundbreaking concept of orchestration, a mode of indirect governance in which influential governors catalyze, support, and steer intermediary organizations through wholly voluntary relationships. It also considers their more recent innovations in the theory of indirect governance. These include additional modes of governance, such as co-optation, delegation and trusteeship, as well as the pervasive "Governor's Dilemma" trade-off between a governor's control of its intermediaries and the intermediaries' competence. This book will appeal to scholars and students in multiple disciplines, including international relations, global governance, law, and regulatory studies.

Kenneth W. Abbott examines the deep entanglement of law and politics in the structures and activities of international organizations and provides a comprehensive overview of the literature in this area, enabling the reader to trace legal, political and scholarly developments over time.

The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect governance relationships face a dilemma: competent intermediaries gain power from the competencies they contribute, making them difficult to control, while efforts to control intermediary behavor limit important intermediary competencies, including expertise, credibility, and legitimacy. Thus, governors can obtain either high intermediary competence or strong control, but not both. This competence-control tradeoff is a common condition of indirect governance, whether governors are domestic or international, public or private, democratic or authoritarian; and whether governance addresses economic, security, or social issues. The empirical chapters analyze the operation and implications of the governor's dilemma in cases involving the governance of violence (e.g., secret police, support for foreign rebel groups, private security companies), the governance of markets (e.g., the Euro crisis, capital markets, EU regulation, the G20), and cross-cutting governance issues (colonial empires, "Trump's Dilemma"). Competence-control theory helps explain many features of governance that other theories cannot: why indirect governance is not limited to principal-agent delegation, but takes multiple forms; why governors create seemingly counter-productive intermediary relationships; and why indirect governance is frequently unstable over time.

The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect governance relationships face a dilemma: competent intermediaries gain power from the competencies they contribute, making them difficult to control, while efforts to control intermediary behavor limit important intermediary competencies, including expertise, credibility, and legitimacy. Thus, governors can obtain either high intermediary competence or strong control, but not both. This competence-control tradeoff is a common condition of indirect governance, whether governors are domestic or international, public or private, democratic or authoritarian; and whether governance addresses economic, security, or social issues. The empirical chapters analyze the operation and implications of the governor's dilemma in cases involving the governance of violence (e.g., secret police, support for foreign rebel groups, private security companies), the governance of markets (e.g., the Euro crisis, capital markets, EU regulation, the G20), and cross-cutting governance issues (colonial empires, "Trump's Dilemma"). Competence-control theory helps explain many features of governance that other theories cannot: why indirect governance is not limited to principal-agent delegation, but takes multiple forms; why governors create seemingly counter-productive intermediary relationships; and why indirect governance is frequently unstable over time.

International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries - including NGOs - IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholars investigate the significance of orchestration across key issue areas, including trade, finance, environment and labor, and in leading organizations, including the GEF, G20, WTO, EU, Kimberley Process, UNEP and ILO. The empirical studies find that orchestration is pervasive. They broadly confirm the theoretical hypotheses while providing important new insights, especially that states often welcome IO orchestration as achieving governance without creating strong institutions. This volume changes our understanding of the relationships among IOs, nonstate actors and states in global governance, using a theoretical framework applicable to domestic governance.

International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries - including NGOs - IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholars investigate the significance of orchestration across key issue areas, including trade, finance, environment and labor, and in leading organizations, including the GEF, G20, WTO, EU, Kimberley Process, UNEP and ILO. The empirical studies find that orchestration is pervasive. They broadly confirm the theoretical hypotheses while providing important new insights, especially that states often welcome IO orchestration as achieving governance without creating strong institutions. This volume changes our understanding of the relationships among IOs, nonstate actors and states in global governance, using a theoretical framework applicable to domestic governance.