During the 2003 war that ended Saddam Hussein s regime, coalition forces captured thousands of hours of secret recordings of meetings, phone calls, and conferences. Originally prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, this study presents annotated transcripts of Iraqi audio recordings of meetings between Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. The Saddam Tapes, along with the much larger digital collection of captured records at the National Defense University s Conflict Records Research Center, will provide researchers with important insights into the inner workings of the regime and, it is hoped, the nature of authoritarian regimes more generally. The collection has implications for a range of historical questions. How did Saddam react to the pressures of his wars? How did he manage the Machiavellian world he created? How did he react to the signals and actions of the international community on matters of war and peace? Was there a difference between the public and the private Saddam on critical matters of state? A close examination of this material in the context of events and other available evidence will address these and other questions.

The Iran-Iraq War is one of the largest, yet least documented conflicts in the history of the Middle East. Drawing from an extensive cache of captured Iraqi government records, this book is the first comprehensive military and strategic account of the war through the lens of the Iraqi regime and its senior military commanders. It explores the rationale and decision-making processes that drove the Iraqis as they grappled with challenges that, at times, threatened their existence. Beginning with the bizarre lack of planning by the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran, the authors reveal Saddam's desperate attempts to improve the competence of an officer corps that he had purged to safeguard its loyalty to his tyranny, and then to weather the storm of suicidal attacks by Iranian religious revolutionaries. This is a unique and important contribution to our understanding of the history of war and the contemporary Middle East.

As long as there have been wars, victors have written the prevailing histories of the world's conflicts. An army that loses -- and especially one that is destroyed or disbanded -- is often forgotten. Nevertheless, the experiences of defeated forces can provide important insights, lessons, and perspectives not always apparent to the winning side. In Wars of Modern Babylon, Pesach Malovany provides a comprehensive and detailed history of the Iraqi military from its formation in 1921 to its collapse in 2003. Malovany analyzes Iraqi participation in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 Arab wars against Israel as well as Iraq's wars with the Kurds during the twentieth century. His primary focus, however, is the era of Saddam Hussein (1979--2003), who implemented rapid and significant military growth and fought three major wars: against Iran from 1980 to 1988, and against coalition forces led by the United States in 1991 and 2003. He examines the Iraqi military at the strategic, operative, and tactical levels; explains its forces and branches; and investigates its use of both conventional and unconventional weapons. The first study to offer a portrait of an Arab army from its own point of view, Wars of Modern Babylon features interviews with and personal accounts from officers at various levels, as well as press accounts covering the politics and conflicts of the period. Malovany also analyzes books written by key figures in the Iraqi government and the army high command. His definitive chronicle offers English speakers new and overlooked perspectives on critical developments in twentieth-century history. The book won the Israel Yitzhak Sade Award for Military Literature in 2010.

The Iran-Iraq War is one of the largest, yet least documented conflicts in the history of the Middle East. Drawing from an extensive cache of captured Iraqi government records, this book is the first comprehensive military and strategic account of the war through the lens of the Iraqi regime and its senior military commanders. It explores the rationale and decision-making processes that drove the Iraqis as they grappled with challenges that, at times, threatened their existence. Beginning with the bizarre lack of planning by the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran, the authors reveal Saddam's desperate attempts to improve the competence of an officer corps that he had purged to safeguard its loyalty to his tyranny, and then to weather the storm of suicidal attacks by Iranian religious revolutionaries. This is a unique and important contribution to our understanding of the history of war and the contemporary Middle East.

During the 2003 war that ended Saddam Hussein s regime, coalition forces captured thousands of hours of secret recordings of meetings, phone calls, and conferences. Originally prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, this study presents annotated transcripts of Iraqi audio recordings of meetings between Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. The Saddam Tapes, along with the much larger digital collection of captured records at the National Defense University s Conflict Records Research Center, will provide researchers with important insights into the inner workings of the regime and, it is hoped, the nature of authoritarian regimes more generally. The collection has implications for a range of historical questions. How did Saddam react to the pressures of his wars? How did he manage the Machiavellian world he created? How did he react to the signals and actions of the international community on matters of war and peace? Was there a difference between the public and the private Saddam on critical matters of state? A close examination of this material in the context of events and other available evidence will address these and other questions.

Events in this story of the "Mother of All Battles," as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, video and audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders' eyes. The book is part of an official U.S. Joint Forces Command research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, the author's balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of his unique access to material. The result is a completely unknown but fully documented view from the other side.