The book is about money, central banking and constitutions. It explains how the European Central Bank was established to ensure stability and prosperity for the euro area. The ECB was guided and controlled by a coherent European Macroeconomic Constitution. However, this model has failed during recurring crises, and the ECB has started to act as the euro area fire brigade. Consequently, it is pushing the boundaries of monetary policy, and with that challenging the accountability mechanisms and fundamentally also the democratic legitimacy of the EMU. The book sheds light on this complex economic-constitutional setting with a view on the future. The imbalance between various new operations and a single price stability objective is difficult to remedy. New objectives of financial stability, economic adjustment and environmental sustainability can cause fundamental ruptures between the ECB's formal role and its actions, and they also dangerously overburden monetary policy moving forward with substantial risks.

Topical and timely, this book offers an economically informed constitutional analysis on European responses to the crisis. It discusses the longer-term proposals on the table including rescue measures and stability mechanisms, as well as the tightening of European economic governance. The authors see the European constitution as a multidimensional and multi-temporal process of constitutionalisation. They examine how the crisis has catapulted the economic constitution back to the 'pacemaker' position from where it determines developments in the political and social dimensions. However, now the key role is not played by the constitution of 'microeconomics', focusing on free movement and competition law, but the constitution of 'macroeconomics', introduced in Maastricht.

Topical and timely, this book offers an economically informed constitutional analysis on European responses to the crisis. It discusses the longer-term proposals on the table including rescue measures and stability mechanisms, as well as the tightening of European economic governance. The authors see the European constitution as a multidimensional and multi-temporal process of constitutionalisation. They examine how the crisis has catapulted the economic constitution back to the 'pacemaker' position from where it determines developments in the political and social dimensions. However, now the key role is not played by the constitution of 'microeconomics', focusing on free movement and competition law, but the constitution of 'macroeconomics', introduced in Maastricht.