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It is often said that everyone understands precisely what is meant
by the notion of probability-except those who have spent their
lives studying the matter. Upon close scrutiny, the intuitively
obvious idea of probability becomes quite elusive. Is it a
subjective or objective concept? Are random variables simply
improperly measured deterministic variables, or inherently random?
What is meant by the phrase "other things held constant" that often
appears in descriptions of probability? These questions involve
fundamental philosophical and scientific issues, and promise to
elude definitive answers for some time. The same type of difficulty
arises when attempting to produce a volume on microeconomic theory.
The obvious first question-what is microeconomic theory?--
It is often said that everyone understands precisely what is meant
by the notion of probability-except those who have spent their
lives studying the matter. Upon close scrutiny, the intuitively
obvious idea of probability becomes quite elusive. Is it a
subjective or objective concept? Are random variables simply
improperly measured deterministic variables, or inherently random?
What is meant by the phrase "other things held constant" that often
appears in descriptions of probability? These questions involve
fundamental philosophical and scientific issues, and promise to
elude definitive answers for some time. The same type of difficulty
arises when attempting to produce a volume on microeconomic theory.
The obvious first question-what is microeconomic theory?--
This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries
presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric
Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers
provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent
research in economics. The book includes surveys and
interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics,
and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics,
covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a
unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by
leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes
theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic
mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.
This is the second of two volumes containing papers and
commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the
Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These
papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent
research in economics. The book includes surveys and
interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics,
and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics,
covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a
unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by
leading specialists in their fields. The second volume addresses
topics such as big data, macroeconomics, financial markets, and
partially identified models.
This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries
presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric
Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers
provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent
research in economics. The book includes surveys and
interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics,
and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics,
covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a
unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by
leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes
theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic
mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory
and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games.
Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly
growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game
theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and
have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models
assume that people choose their strategies through a
trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover
that some strategies work better than others. In games that are
repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out,
and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the
main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the
interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium
selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an
overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of
the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the
dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise,
backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
This is the second of two volumes containing papers and
commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the
Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These
papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent
research in economics. The book includes surveys and
interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics,
and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics,
covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a
unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by
leading specialists in their fields. The second volume addresses
topics such as big data, macroeconomics, financial markets, and
partially identified models.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in
any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated
games and reputations to make important advances in understanding
such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a
careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories,
including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and
equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk
theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect
public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools
of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more
recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and
recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative
approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations
synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area,
bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments
and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples,
discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of
relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful
to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and
reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied
research.
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