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"The leading academic vehicle for scholarly publication in the
field of medieval warfare." Medieval Warfare The twenty-first
volume of the Journal of Medieval Military History begins with
three studies examining aspects of warfare in the Latin East: an
archaeological report on the defenses of Jerusalem by Shimon Gibson
and Rafael Y. Lewis; a study of how military victories and defeats
(viewed through the lens of carefully shaped reporting) affected
the reputation, and the flow of funds and recruits to, the Military
Orders, by Nicolas Morton; and an exploration of how the Kingdom of
Jerusalem quickly recovered its military strength after the
disaster of Hattin by Stephen Donnachie. Turning to the other side
of the Mediterranean, Donald J. Kagay analyzes how Jaime I of
Aragon worked to control violence within his realms by limiting
both castle construction and the use of mechanical artillery.
Guilhem Pépin also addresses the limitation of violence, using new
documents to show that the Black Prince's sack of Limoges in 1370
was not the unrestrained bloodbath described by Froissart. The
remaining three contributions deal with aspects of open battle.
Michael John Harbinson offers a large-scale study of when and why
late-medieval men-at-arms chose to dismount and fight on foot
instead of acting tactically as cavalry. Laurence W. Marvin
reconsiders the Battle of Bouvines, concluding that it was far from
being a ritualized mass duel. Finally, Michael Livingston
elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in
general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.
In 1209 Simon of Montfort led a war against the Cathars of
Languedoc after Pope Innocent III preached a crusade condemning
them as heretics. The suppression of heresy became a pretext for a
vicious war that remains largely unstudied as a military conflict.
Laurence Marvin here examines the Albigensian Crusade as military
and political history rather than religious history and traces
these dimensions of the conflict through to Montfort's death in
1218. He shows how Montfort experienced military success in spite
of a hostile populace, impossible military targets, armies that
dissolved every forty days, and a pope who often failed to support
the crusade morally or financially. He also discusses the supposed
brutality of the war, why the inhabitants were for so long
unsuccessful at defending themselves against it, and its impact on
Occitania. This original account will appeal to scholars of
medieval France, the Crusades and medieval military history.
In 1209 Simon of Montfort led a war against the Cathars of
Languedoc after Pope Innocent III preached a crusade condemning
them as heretics. The suppression of heresy became a pretext for a
vicious war that remains largely unstudied as a military conflict.
Laurence Marvin here examines the Albigensian Crusade as military
and political history rather than religious history and traces
these dimensions of the conflict through to Montfort's death in
1218. He shows how Montfort experienced military success in spite
of a hostile populace, impossible military targets, armies that
dissolved every forty days, and a pope who often failed to support
the crusade morally or financially. He also discusses the supposed
brutality of the war, why the inhabitants were for so long
unsuccessful at defending themselves against it, and its impact on
Occitania. This original account will appeal to scholars of
medieval France, the Crusades and medieval military history.
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