"The leading academic vehicle for scholarly publication in the field of medieval warfare." Medieval Warfare The twenty-first volume of the Journal of Medieval Military History begins with three studies examining aspects of warfare in the Latin East: an archaeological report on the defenses of Jerusalem by Shimon Gibson and Rafael Y. Lewis; a study of how military victories and defeats (viewed through the lens of carefully shaped reporting) affected the reputation, and the flow of funds and recruits to, the Military Orders, by Nicolas Morton; and an exploration of how the Kingdom of Jerusalem quickly recovered its military strength after the disaster of Hattin by Stephen Donnachie. Turning to the other side of the Mediterranean, Donald J. Kagay analyzes how Jaime I of Aragon worked to control violence within his realms by limiting both castle construction and the use of mechanical artillery. Guilhem Pépin also addresses the limitation of violence, using new documents to show that the Black Prince's sack of Limoges in 1370 was not the unrestrained bloodbath described by Froissart. The remaining three contributions deal with aspects of open battle. Michael John Harbinson offers a large-scale study of when and why late-medieval men-at-arms chose to dismount and fight on foot instead of acting tactically as cavalry. Laurence W. Marvin reconsiders the Battle of Bouvines, concluding that it was far from being a ritualized mass duel. Finally, Michael Livingston elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.

In 1209 Simon of Montfort led a war against the Cathars of Languedoc after Pope Innocent III preached a crusade condemning them as heretics. The suppression of heresy became a pretext for a vicious war that remains largely unstudied as a military conflict. Laurence Marvin here examines the Albigensian Crusade as military and political history rather than religious history and traces these dimensions of the conflict through to Montfort's death in 1218. He shows how Montfort experienced military success in spite of a hostile populace, impossible military targets, armies that dissolved every forty days, and a pope who often failed to support the crusade morally or financially. He also discusses the supposed brutality of the war, why the inhabitants were for so long unsuccessful at defending themselves against it, and its impact on Occitania. This original account will appeal to scholars of medieval France, the Crusades and medieval military history.

In 1209 Simon of Montfort led a war against the Cathars of Languedoc after Pope Innocent III preached a crusade condemning them as heretics. The suppression of heresy became a pretext for a vicious war that remains largely unstudied as a military conflict. Laurence Marvin here examines the Albigensian Crusade as military and political history rather than religious history and traces these dimensions of the conflict through to Montfort's death in 1218. He shows how Montfort experienced military success in spite of a hostile populace, impossible military targets, armies that dissolved every forty days, and a pope who often failed to support the crusade morally or financially. He also discusses the supposed brutality of the war, why the inhabitants were for so long unsuccessful at defending themselves against it, and its impact on Occitania. This original account will appeal to scholars of medieval France, the Crusades and medieval military history.